Quo vadis, European Union?

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Abstract

The general objective pursued through this research is to map out the main perspectives on the future of the European Union in the new legislature elected following the May 2019 elections, with regard to the main attitudes and preferences shaping the European citizens’ agenda for the 2019 EU elections. We aim to illustrate and interpret the main trends at European and national level, providing a better understanding of how citizens relate to the main challenges faced by the European Union. The secondary objective of the research is to highlight the impact of the rise of populism and extremism on the results of the elections organized in the 28 Member States.

Keywords: European elections, Eurobarometer Survey, European values, the Future of Europe, European crisis

Introduction

The European Union is by no means a perfect construction from the point of view of cooperation and efficiency. The many crises have undoubtedly shed light on the imperfections and limits of the Union, the divergent and sometimes contradictory interests of the Member States in relation to different policies, as well as different solutions to solving problems in the European space. However, despite the tensions that have arisen between Member States over the years, the European Union has succeeded in finding consensus and mitigating the negative impact of economic, social and political crises by supporting each Member State on the road to economic, social and political progress.

The Membership of the European Union was, on the one hand, the collective effort of the Member States to manage the different challenges, as well as the effort to identify a common direction that corresponds to the different interests of the Member States. On the other hand, European construction has generated advantages for each member state, both from an economic point of view, facilitating through the Single Market the free exchange necessary for economic and social development (Bolthoand Eichengreen, 2008; Crespo-Cuaresma, Ritzberger-Grünwald and Silgoner, 2008).
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2008; Camposab, Coricellicd and Morettie, 2019), reducing the barriers represented by cultural and ethnic stereotypes, by gender or by age, by promoting a wide range of policies and programs to combat discrimination in the European area (Ziller, 2014). Last but not least, the European Union has contributed to the democratization of the Member States, providing real support especially to the countries of Eastern Europe freed from the yoke of the communist regime (Lane, 2007).

In this article, we aim to map out the main perspectives on the future of the European Union in the new legislature elected following the May 2019. Our approach sets out to identify the impact that the rise of populism and extremism had on the results of the elections organized in the 28 Member States for the appointment of Members of the European Parliament. We analyse these results in relation to those obtained in the 2014 elections, as well as in relation to the perception of European citizens towards the main topics on the agenda of the European Union.

Our initial hypothesis captures the prevalence of national themes in voters' choices, which is why the rise of the populist and extremist candidates was determined by the erosion of traditional parties, simultaneously with the exploitation of the voters' dissatisfaction at the local level. In this context, the debate on the future of the European Union has come to a standstill, in the absence of promoting transnational issues in the electoral campaign. In addition, the division of the political spectrum in the new legislature limits the prospects of forming a majority that will support and promote the reform project of the European Union. Even though the interest of voters was high in the May 2019 European elections, in this article we aim to identify the level of fragmentation of the electorate in relation to their positioning against the support of anti-European candidates.

Through the internalization of European values and principles, a different lifestyle has emerged in the European space, where citizens have converged around the European goals of achieving a high standard of living (Foret and Calligaro, 2019). From an abstract and bureaucratic entity, in time - even though the size of European bureaucracy has expanded over the past decades - the European Union has gained an essential dimension that has allowed it to continue and grow despite the obstacles it has met. The European construction has become a concrete identity in the lives of European citizens.

From the most developed communities to the least-developed territorial administrative units, regardless of the needs and expectations of the citizens of the Member States, the European Union managed to make its presence felt through the adopted economic, social and political policies and programs. The European Union has thus become the only credible option that has the resources to provide the Member States with the additional capacity to protect the safety and freedom of citizens. Although the difference in pace and intensity can be observed throughout the history of the European construction, we must not neglect that they have not led to the integration process of state actors with
a lower integration rate. On the contrary, there were sectoral policies aimed exclusively at reducing the economic, social and political gap, designed to support disadvantaged communities.

1. The crisis of legitimacy of the European Parliament

The turnout for the election of MEPs has fallen to a European level from 61.99% (in the 1979 EU-9 parliamentary elections) to 42.61% (in the 2014, EU-28 European Parliament elections) (European Parliament, “Results of the 2014 European elections”). The eradication of traditional parties and the lack of legitimacy of European institutions have facilitated the rise of populism and Euroscepticism, which have led the European Union to a moment of impasse over the future of the European project. The migration crisis and the outflow of the UK from the EU and Euratom are the most recent examples that have highlighted the consequences of challenging EU values and principles.

The Union’s reform must take into account the changing faces of the surrounding reality. By better targeting the Union's energies and resources, Member States and European institutions must cooperate to promote the European ethos. European citizens must once again look with confidence in Europe as a solution to the main challenges we face. Peace on the continent, the free movement of people, capital and services, as well as the transnational solidarity to manage crises and challenges cannot be capitalized in the absence of a constant dialogue between citizens and European institutions.

For the first time, the May 2019 elections took place in a context marked by the need to shape the future of the European Union, responding to the political, social and economic challenges faced by the Union and the Member States. The Brexit referendum, the struggle to secure Eastern border, terrorism, the economic crisis are the main new challenges that are shaking the political foundations of the EU (Bauböck, 2019; Carrapico, Niehuss and Berthélémy, 2019; Foret and Calligaro, 2018; Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Bremberg, Michalski and Oxelheim, 2019; Costa, 2019). At the same time, the identity and the role of the EU citizens are in crisis (Dinan, Nugent and Paterson, 2017, pp. 1-16.), because the European liberal values which consolidated the democracy in this region are challenged on the one hand by the decline of the role of the traditional political parties and on the other hand, by the rise of populism in many of the EU member states (Müller, 2016, pp. 9-25; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, pp. 329-355).

The European Parliament’s elections are shaped by the need to adopt a direction on the future of European construction, responding to the expectations and needs of European citizens. The outcome of the election will reflect not only the way the Union will follow, but also the European citizens’ trust in the European project. The future of the European Union is jeopardized by a different
speed of will in terms of following the European path of the Member States. The short-term domestic political stance influences the will of the Member States to be part of the European Union’s construction. The temptation to use the “EXIT” option to obtain domestic political capital is the real challenge facing the European Union at this time.

An important aspect is the organization of 2019 Presidential elections in five Member States (Ireland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania and Croatia) and legislative elections in eleven Member States (Slovenia, Sweden, Latvia, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Poland and Portugal), which is why the campaign for the European elections are strongly anchored in the domestic political landscape (“Daybook: Future International and National Events 2019”; Joannin, 2018, pp. 1-9; Koerner, 2018, pp. 1-16.).

The results of 2019 European elections are also a test for European political families, electoral campaign and voter options giving us an answer on the lessons they have learned to combat misinformation and choosing European values. The role of the Union is also under discussion, but these reforms eventually translate into the skills that European political parties and institutions succeed in rebuilding citizens’ confidence, acting effectively and transparently to ensure safety and development throughout the Union.

2. Eurobarometer Survey of the European Parliament

At European level, according to the last Eurobarometer of the European Parliament (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2 of the European Parliament. A Public Opinion Monitoring Study, May 2018), the dominant trend is in favor of recognizing the importance of the European construction: for the first time, more than two-thirds of respondents appreciate the affiliation with the European project, while the “majority of Europeans think their voice counts in the EU” (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2, p. 7). These results confirm that the UK referendum has been a “wakeup call” for citizens of other EU Member States since the second half of 2016 (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2). The Spitzenkandidaten process is perceived by 61% of the respondents as “as important cornerstone of democratic life in the EU” (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2), while security and immigration are the main topics that European citizens are interested in (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2, p. 8). The citizens’ agenda also includes issues such as prosperity and well-being, the fight against terrorism and the fight against youth unemployment (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2). Instead, only 32% of respondents believe that the
promotion of human rights and democracy, together with European social protection, should be among the issues debated in the European elections campaign, which took place from 23rd to 26th May 2019 in the 27 EU Member States (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2).

Despite the challenges that have made the EU resilience difficult, the results of the Eurobarometer reflect the attachment of European citizens to the political and economic model that is the foundation of the European construction (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2). However, 38% of respondents believe that the emergence of new parties could pose a threat to democracy (between 2013 and 2018 more than 70 new parties and alliances have appeared in EU Member States) (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2). Another worrying aspect is the low level of political knowledge for respondents (only 32% of them know that European elections will be held in 2019, even if 50% said that they are interested in these elections) (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2, p. 9). Looking at these results, we wonder how much Eurobarometer Survey remains a tool that faithfully identifies the respondents’ opinions and attitudes. We must not neglect the underlying causes of the spiral of silence, a phenomenon that causes respondents not to express their dissatisfaction (Noelle-Neumann, 1974, pp. 43–51; Noelle-Neumann, 1986).

Reporting the citizens of the Member States to European elections they will be influenced, first of all, by their perception of the democratic mechanisms that the EU offers. In countries like Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands or Germany, the high level of confidence in participation in the decision-making process is a major premise for participating in European elections. With the exception of Netherlands, the other three states had a 50% voting rate in 2014 at the European elections (average European level of 42.61%) (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2, p. 64).

At the level of the Member States, the citizens’ agenda for European elections differs according to national context, predominantly those issues that have had a direct impact on the living standards. Thus, in countries such as Hungary, Malta or Italy, the main theme of interest is immigration, while for respondents in Croatia, Greece and Cyprus campaigns against youth unemployment is the issue that should be prioritized during the election (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2, p. 35). However, we should draw attention to the fact that the fight against terrorism is the main concern of citizens from Czech Republic and Finland, while fighting climate change and protecting the environment is the main team of interest for respondents in Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2, p. 35).

The citizens’ agenda is also influenced by the level of information available to people. The relevant example is that in countries such as France, Latvia or Portugal where the share of respondents who correctly indicated the date of the European elections was below 25%, although between 32% and 47% of the citizens of these countries declared to be very interested in the elections to the
European Parliament (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2, p. 67). A special case is represented by Czech Republic, where 79% of respondents declare themselves totally “not interested” to take part in European elections, which is why the voting rate is expected to be still very low (in May 2014, the level of participation was 18.20%) (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2, p. 64).

3. More or less Europe in the campaign for European elections

With the exception of the debate on 15 May 2019, broadcast live on over 35 TV channels and over 60 on-line platforms, attended by the six Spitzenkandidaten (European Parliament, May 16, 2019), the debate on the European Union has moved second, the campaigns in the Member States presenting a strong national specificity. On the one hand, the failure to adopt transnational lists has increased the importance of national lists, with the EU discourse being divided according to the campaign strategy used by political parties in each Member State in the context of poor communication with the political groups in the European Parliament. On the other hand, the weak articulation of a European political agenda, that would have been capable of marginalizing „local“ issues, has illustrated the diversity and the multitude of notional themes that prevailed among the citizens’ choices.

While in Germany the CO2 tax and the Internet upload filters were the main subjects of the electoral campaign (Riegert, May 6, 2019; Riegert, May 25, 2019), overlapping the aggressive and violent messages promoted by AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) (DW.com, April 26, 2019), the anti-migrant discourse and the salvation of Christianity impregnated a strong nationalistic hue to the Hungarian campaign ((Riegert, May 6, 2019; Riegert, May 25, 2019). Instead, in Poland, sex and religion were the main themes invoked in the campaign by political parties (Davies, May 22, 2019).

Another important moment was the Informal Summit in Sibiu on May 9, 2019, which was addressed in the electoral key. At this Summit, the Heads of State and Government did not address the sensitive issues posed by the challenges that made it hard cooperation and solidarity between Member States and EU institutions. Participants’ efforts were centered on the electoral campaign, the only objective for this Summit was not to affect the electoral campaign. Specifically, in the Preamble of The Sibiu Declaration (European Council, “The Sibiu Declaration”, May 9, 2019), the emphasis is placed on the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament, while in the Joint Call for Europe, the 21 signatory heads of state stressed that “our common European future that is on the ballot” (Presidential Administration, “Joint Call for Europe ahead of the European elections in May 2019”, May 9, 2019).
The call for a single Europe, solidarity in difficult times, and the protection of democracy and the rule of law is undoubtedly a necessary reaffirmation of the values and principles underpinning the European Union. It is not enough, however, because during this period the Member States and EU institutions need a common (re)definition of these values and principles. In other words, the EU needs a consensus that each actor understands the same thing when it talks about cooperation, solidarity, democracy and the rule of law without bringing national or partisan nuances or interpretations.

The Sibiu Summit was seen as a moment for the main actors to catch their breaths. The sensitive talks will be resumed after Brexit's actual concretization at the following Summits organized by Finland and Croatia. The hot topic will most likely be to condition the access of European funds to the respect for the rule of law in the context of the strict adoption of the new Multiannual Financial Framework.

4. The EU’s democratic resilience

Elections of the European Parliament have generated numerous surprises at European level, both in terms of the record-breaking presence in the ballot box (50.97% participation average) and in the results of populist, extremist and Eurosceptic parties (especially in France, Italy, Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands) (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”).

Overall, the results need to be analyzed in relation to the ability of Member States to guarantee the organization of free and fair European election (European Commission, Communication, Brussels, 12.9.2018, COM(2018) 637 final), the democratic resilience of the European Union (“Resilience is the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks.” See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The Eu Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises, Brussels, 3.10.2012 COM(2012) 586 final; Council of the European Union, 2013, May 28; European Commission, 2013, June 19; Joseph, 2018; Burnell. and Calvert, 1999) being tested in the run-up to the electoral ballot in the 28 Member States (European Commission, September 2018), which signalled the need for awareness of threats and the transparency of the democratic process:

“European citizens should be able to vote with a full understanding of the political choices they have. This entails more awareness of threats and more transparency in our political process. An open public sphere, secure in its protection from undue influence, ensures a level playing
field for political campaigning and electoral processes the public can trust” (European Commission, September 2018).

Space for mobilization, the online environment is also an area of misinformation and radicalization, and the user is at the same time a victim of such attacks, eroding the resilience of democratic systems. The aggressive campaign carried out by populist and extremist political candidates and political parties in the online world, along with the misinformation promoted by other electoral competitors, did not purport to inform voters, while in most Member States the debate on the EU came second. The internal battles between the parties and the dispute around some national themes have transformed the Euro-parliamentary elections into an internal confrontation. The EU’s democratic resilience is weakened after these elections, and further actors have gained from the widening of cleavages and stereotypes in the community space.

5. The Phantom of populism haunts the European Union

Even if most news journals presented the results as a good result for pro EU parties (De Sio, Franklin, Russo, 2019), the result of the European elections confirms the erosion of traditional parties, as well as the concerns on the rise of populism, extremism and Euroscepticism. With a single German engine [after the defeat of the En Marche party by the French far-right National Rally (RN-Rassemblement National)] and the need to form conjoining alliances, the decision-making process in the new legislature will be hampered by the rhetoric and opposition from the contestants of the European model.

The final results show a balance between EPP and S&D (separated by 28 mandates), the composition of the European Parliament being characterized by a relative balance between the political groups that obtained between 41 and 74 mandates, out of the total 751 mandates (GUE/NGL, ECR, ID and Greens/EFA) (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”). The Renew Europe group, which has 108 seats in the European Parliament, will very likely play a crucial role in the formation of the new majority (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”). In this context, the national dimension plays an important role, the rhetoric of extremists and populists being an impediment to the articulation of transnational discourse, a hypothesis confirmed by the result of the European elections. In order to have an overview, we present in Table 1 (in Appendix) the most important results obtained at the European elections, on the basis of which we identify the weakening of the traditional parties, at the same time as the ascension of the Euro-skeptic parties.
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The French far-right RN (Rassemblement National) won the election in France (final results), outpacing the coalition of LREM + MoDem + A + MRSL. The result is all the more surprising given that the turnout (50.12%) that approached the high waters of the 1994 ballot (52.71%) (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”). However, Le Pen managed to keep the result obtained in the 2014 elections (European Parliament, “2014 European election results”).

In Germany, the right-wing party of Chancellor Angela Merkel, CDU/CSU won of the European elections, while the SPD declined (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”). The Green Party (Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen) doubled its electoral score, reaching 21 seats in the European Parliament’s new parliamentary term (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”), while the far right, represented by AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), gained 4% more, with a total of 11 mandates (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”).

The provocative results in Italy reflect one of the most important Eurosceptic victories after the categorical victory of the right-wing Lega Salvini Premier, headed by Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Matteo Salvini (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”). Democratic center-left party of former prime minister Matteo Renzi placed second (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”). Compared to the 2014 elections, the Partito Democratico has almost halved its electoral score, with the number of MEPs decreasing from 31 to 19. The 5-Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle) seems bound on a downward slope, having achieved 3 mandates less than the 2014 elections.

In the Netherlands, the victory of the PvdA, for which Frans Timmermans has also run, outperforming the VVD led by Prime Minister Mark Rutte, liberated Frans Timmermanms from the scenario which would put him in a delicate situation if he had not won the elections in his native country. Beyond the victory gained by the PvdA, the rise of the new extreme right-wing populist FvD is a worrying sign for the EU. Placed on the fourth position, with 3 seats in the new European Parliament (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”), the party led by the charismatic figure Thierry Baudet backs the idea of holding a referendum on the departure from the EU (Kleinpaste, March 28, 2019), following the same rhetoric used by Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen.

The extreme right FPÖ remained in third position in Austria, even if it gained 2.5% less than in the 2014 elections (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”), but the surprise was the election of the former Austrian Chancellor and Party leader, Heinz Christian Strache, even if he was ranked 42 on the FPÖ list, due to the fact that the electoral system uses the open lists (Mischke, May 27, 2019).
The results of the Czech elections confirmed the victory of the populist ANO movement headed by Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis. ANO will be represented in the European Parliament by 6 MEPs, while the right-wing ODS (Občanská demokratická strana) has obtained 4 mandates (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”).

In Hungary, however, the victory of the FIDESZ extremist political party is not surprising, but a notable evolution is the erosion of the radical Jobbik nationalist party, while the Democratic Coalition (DK - Demokratikus Koalíció) is firmly on an upward slope, placing the second position (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”).

The Polish Nationalist Party Law and Justice (PiS) won the European elections with 45.38% of votes, as the Coalition Koalicja Europejska, which includes the Civic Platform of the former Prime Minister President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, comes in a not-so-close second with 38.47% of votes (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”). The rise of the PiS is a strong sign of concern, with nationalist rhetoric becoming much stronger in the new legislature.

In the UK, the elections have been somewhat atypical in the context of the Brexit and the election of MEPs for several months. The new party set up by Nigel Farage, Brexit Party, gained 30.75% of the vote, quite literally crushing the ruling Conservative Party who plummeted with only 8.85% of votes (European Parliament, “2019 European election results”), after it had gathered 23.31% in the 2014 elections (European Parliament, “2014 European election results”).

The rise of populism, extremism and euroscepticism takes place in the context of the debate on the relaunch of the European project, the stakes of the European elections being to legitimize the approaches to the future of the European Union. The optimism generated by the high turnout is shaded by the weak results of traditional parties, which will make it difficult to obtain political consensus on the EU’s reform policies.

Conclusions

In this article, we identify the impact that the rise of populism and extremism has on the results of the elections organized in the 28 Member States for the appointment of Members of the European Parliament. We set out analyse these results in relation to those obtained in the 2014 elections, as well as with regard to the perception of European citizens towards the main topics on the agenda of the European Union.

We observe that the prevalence of national themes in voters' choices, which is why the rise of the populist and extremist candidates was determined by the erosion of traditional parties, simultaneously with the exploitation of the voters' dissatisfaction at the local level. In this context,
the division of the political spectrum in the new legislature limits the prospects of forming a majority that will support and promote the reform project of the European Union.

The decreasing of the level of cooperation between Member States, the reducing solidarity within the Union, the increasing the development gaps and the different visions between Member States are all factors that will exacerbate the crisis among less developed countries, providing fertile ground for the rise of Euroscepticism and populism in those states. The differences between the Member States and the dismissal of the founding values have divided the EU and have de facto placed the Eastern European states in a position of inferiority - from an economic, political, social point of view - in some areas compared to the other Member States, particularly in areas where cooperation and solidarity between Member States do not work at optimal parameters.

The different speeds of integration, cooperation and solidarity with respect to certain areas have divided Member States into “champions” and “losers”, which has generated the accumulation of experts, investors and capital in “champions” states, because an accelerated integration speed determines a developed and sustainable economic market, an efficient health and education system, a justice system that ensures citizens’ equality in the Member States.

Accepting differentiated treatment in favour of the states with accelerated speeds represents a risk for the rise of populist anti-European parties in vulnerable countries with a low integration rate within certain areas. Replication of the Brexit promoters’ speeches in Eastern European countries pose a risk to European construction. Increasing the development gap will refresh the speeches of the Eurocampaigns in order to punish the Union for its transformation into sub-unions, thereby increasing tensions and cleavages among European construction.

The cleavages developed between fast-growing states and countries developing at moderate speed is a reality within the European Union. Brexit emerged precisely as a result of the use of this electoral cleavage in a populist manner. The strategy was replicated in the Netherlands and France by populist Eurosceptic candidates. The solution is to abandon the strategy of “condemning” Member States to be part of a single category without giving them the opportunity to progress alongside the most developed countries of the Union.

References


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### Appendix

**Quo vadis, European Union?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>2019 European election - Results by national party (percentage of votes, seats)</th>
<th>2019 Turnout</th>
<th>2014 European election - Results by national party (percentage of votes, seats)</th>
<th>2014 Turnout</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Rassemblement national (23,31%, 22 seats)</td>
<td>50,12%</td>
<td>Front national (24,86%, 23 seats)</td>
<td>42,43%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coalition Renaissance (La Republique En marchel + MoDem + Agir + Mouvement radical, social et liberal) (22,41%, 21 seats)</td>
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<td>Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (20,81%, 20 seats)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Europe écologie-Les verts (13,47%, 12 seats)</td>
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<td>Parti Socialiste - Parti radical de gauche (13,98%, 13 seats)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Europe Ecologie (8,95%, 6 seats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands / Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. (28,90%, 29 seats)</td>
<td>61,38%</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands / Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. (35,30%, 34 seats)</td>
<td>48,10%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (20,50%, 21 seats)</td>
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<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (27,30%, 27 seats)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (15,80%, 16 seats)</td>
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<td>Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (10,70%, 11 seats)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland (11,00%, 11 seats)</td>
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<td>DIE LINKE (7,40%, 7 seats)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DIE LINKE (5,50%, 5 seats)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland (7,10%, 7 seats)</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>Lega Salvini Premier (34,33%, 28 seats)</td>
<td>54,50%</td>
<td>Partito Democratico (40,81%, 31 seats)</td>
<td>57,22%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Partito Democratico (con Siamo Europei) (22,69%, 19 seats)</td>
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<td>Movimento Cinque Stelle (21,15%, 17 seats)</td>
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<td>Movimento Cinque Stelle (17,07%, 14 seats)</td>
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<td>Forza Italia (16,81%, 13 seats)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Forza Italia (8,79%, 6 seats)</td>
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<td>Lega Nord (6,15%, 5 seats)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fratelli d'Italia (6,46%, 5 seats)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition (Nuovo Centrodestra + Unión de Centro Democrático + Popolari per l'Italia) (4,38%, 3 seats)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coalition La Sinistra (Sinistra italiana + Rifondazione comunista + Altra Europa con Tsipras + Partito del Sud + Transform Itali + Convergenza Socialista) (1,74%, - )</td>
<td></td>
<td>L’Altra Europa – Con Tsipras (4,03%, 3 seats)</td>
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<td>Fratelli d'Italia - Alleanza Nazionale (3,66%, - )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid (19,01%, 6 seats)</td>
<td>41,93%</td>
<td>Democraten 66 (15,48%, 4 seats)</td>
<td>37,32%</td>
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<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (14,64%, 4 seats)</td>
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<td>Christen Democratisch Appèl (15,18%, 5 seats)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Christen-Democratisch Appèl (12,18%, 4 seats)</td>
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<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid (13,32%, 4 seats)</td>
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<td>Forum voor Democratie (10,96%, 3 seats)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (12,02%, 3 seats)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid</td>
<td>(9,40%, 3 seats)</td>
<td>59,80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Österreichische Volkspartei</td>
<td>(34,55%, 7 seats)</td>
<td>45,39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich</td>
<td>(23,89%, 5 seats)</td>
<td>42,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</td>
<td>(17,20%, 3 seats)</td>
<td>30,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative</td>
<td>(14,08%, 2 seats)</td>
<td>27,90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechia</td>
<td>ANO 2011</td>
<td>(21,18%, 6 seats)</td>
<td>28,72%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Občanská demokratická strana</td>
<td>(14,54%, 4 seats)</td>
<td>22,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Česká pirátská strana</td>
<td>(13,95%, 3 seats)</td>
<td>20,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STAROSTOVÉ (STAN) s regionálními partnery a TOP 09</td>
<td>(11,65%, 3 seats)</td>
<td>18,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Svoboda a přimá demokracie</td>
<td>(9,14%, 2 seats)</td>
<td>16,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová</td>
<td>(7,24%, 2 seats)</td>
<td>14,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Coalition (FIDESZ - Magyar Polgári Szövetség + Kereszténypedemokrata Néppárt)</td>
<td>(52,14%, 13 seats)</td>
<td>43,36%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demokratikus Koalíció</td>
<td>(16,26%, 4 seats)</td>
<td>16,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom</td>
<td>(6,44%, 1 seat)</td>
<td>8,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</td>
<td>(45,38%, 26 seats)</td>
<td>28,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Platforma Obywatelska</td>
<td>(32,13%, 19 seats)</td>
<td>24,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Coalition Koalicja Europejska (Platforma Obywatelska + Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe + Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej + Nowoczesna + Partia Zieloni)</td>
<td>(38,47%, 22 seats)</td>
<td>45,68%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wiosna Roberta Biedronia</td>
<td>(6,06%, 3 seats)</td>
<td>8,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Brexit Party</td>
<td>(30,74%, 29 seats)</td>
<td>36,90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>(19,75%, 16 seats)</td>
<td>20,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>(13,72%, 10 seats)</td>
<td>15,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>(11,76%, 7 seats)</td>
<td>14,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative and Unionist Party</td>
<td>(8,84%, 4 seats)</td>
<td>10,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
<td>(26,77%, 24 seats)</td>
<td>35,60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>(24,74%, 20 seats)</td>
<td>20,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>(23,31%, 19 seats)</td>
<td>18,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>(7,67%, 3 seats)</td>
<td>6,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Democrats Party</td>
<td>(6,69%, 1 seat)</td>
<td>5,00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>