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
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Volume XV, Issue 2, 2023

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Romanian foreign policy, the Republic of Moldova and the conflict in Transnistria 1990- 2008

Ana Maria ALBULESCU*

Abstract

This article answers the following research question: What effects did Romanian Foreign Policy have on the settlement process in Transnistria between 1992 and 2008? By looking at this particular question this article conceptualizes the role of Romania towards the conflict in Transnistria. It identifies three different major changes in Romanian's Foreign Policy between 1990 and 2008 that include the following defining traits: post-communist identity(1990-1993) ; re- defining of national identity (1993-2004) and defining an Euro-Atlantic identity (2004-2009).Based on this distinction three types of action towards the Republic of Moldova are identified: 1.Establishing Bilateral relations 2.Consolidation of diplomatic relations 3.Advocacy in Euro-Atlantic structures that have led to specific roles by Romania towards: 1.the facilitation of direct mediation (1992-1993) 2. Non-involvement in direct mediation and support for third party mediation (1993-2004) and 3. Support for the expansion of the third party mediation framework in the conflict in Transnistria (2004-2008).¹

Keywords: foreign policy, Transnistrian conflict, mediation, Romania

Introduction and state of the art

The Transnistrian conflict has remained unresolved for more than three decades leaving behind a context of incomplete secession that has seen the involvement of a series of third party mediators in seeking a solution to long-lasting differences (Albulescu, 2021).

Third party mediators include the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, all that have come to propose different formulas for the settlement of the conflict among which the Mediators Document, the Kozak Memorandum and the Yushchenko Plan. The closest the parties were to an agreement was in 2003 through the proposal of the Kozak Memorandum proposed by the Russian Federation (Marandici, 2022a; Albulescu, 2023a).

The failure of the Kozak Memorandum through the last-minute decision of the Moldovan side not to sign the agreement was due mainly in part to the content of the plan that stipulated the stationing

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of Russian troops on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. This clause contravened to previous efforts by the Moldovan government to achieve a settlement that would guarantee the withdrawal of foreign military troops from its sovereign territory (Albulescu, 2023b).

Romanian foreign policy as a neighbouring state with high stakes in the stability and security of the Republic of Moldova has proved unable to move beyond the support offered by Romania as part of the OSCE 5 plus 2 frameworks for settling the conflict with a brief involvement of Romania in the immediate post-conflict stage of the Transnistrian war. Following this position, the foreign policy of Romania towards the Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict was dictated by its national identity imperatives.

As Fawn stresses with regards to post-communist foreign policy:

The role of liberalism as an alternative ideology – especially as expressed in the relations of post-communist states to the international institutions that identify themselves with such values – becomes relevant to post-communist foreign policy, but that is not to say it is the only potential ideology. The second determinant of post-communist foreign policies is considered here to be national identity. (Fawn, 2003, p. 10)

This was indeed the case in Romania, where the forging of a national identity as part of Euro-Atlantic institutions was at the forefront of foreign policy decision-making. The sense of threats and the regional status of Romania have been particularly influenced by its relationship with Europe and NATO and for almost two decades post-communist foreign policy took it upon itself to resolve the issue of Romania's national identity. As Salajan points out, in the aftermath of communism, the foreign policy imaginary of Romania articulated three main themes: 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider'. Especially, with regards to the first theme it should be pointed out that though presented mainly to foreign observers this theme was also validated by the entire political spectrum of Romania that favoured a European political path (Sălăjan, 2016). In terms of security the post-communist security strategies of Romania were clearly defined to achieve its NATO and European membership aspirations. As Sarcinschi stresses with regards to the evolution of the National Security Strategy of Romania:

In the 1999 NSSR, the national interests of Romania were based on five directions oriented towards securing the existence of the Romanian sovereign and an independent, unitary and indivisible nation state; guaranteeing and promoting fundamental rights and freedoms;

consolidating democracy; preserving the identity of Romanians abroad, and participating in guaranteeing security and stability in Europe. The next 2001 NSSR includes national identity as a national interest alongside meeting the conditions for Romania's integration in NATO and the EU, the economic and social development of the country, and protection of the environment. The 2007 NSSR separated the target of EU integration from NATO membership (a status already achieved by that time), introduces modernisation of the education system and make capital out of human, scientific and technological potential, increasing welfare, and asserting and protecting the national culture and identity. Also, this strategy adds the specification "in the conditions specific to the participation in the European Construction (Sarcinschi, 2021, p. 103).

Romania's status in the region has nevertheless not been fully realized with less numerous initiatives than expected from a country of its size and geographical position (Moga and Bureiko, 2022). As Angelescu points out:

During its history as a modern state, Romania has generally not identified with the Central and Eastern parts of the continent. It is only after the fall of communism - and particularly after its accession to the EU and NATO - that Romania has started looking for its 'Eastern vocation'. (Angelescu, 2011, p. 124)

Romania's role regarding the Republic of Moldova for example has been constructed towards the European integration of Moldova which is viewed as a natural task for Romanian foreign policy (Moga *et al.*, 2021). When it comes to the foreign policy of post-communist leaders towards Moldova and especially the conflict in Transnistria, the policies of the Romanian president Traian Basescu towards closer relations with the US and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova and Georgia stand out (Tudoroiu, 2014).

With the Republic of Moldova receiving candidate status to the European Union (European Council 2022), a series of questions are now beginning to form with regards to its relations to Romania as well as the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. This article is concerned with identifying the main periods of continuity and change that Romanian Foreign Policy has undergone between 1990 and 2008 and their effect on Romania's action towards the Transnistrian conflict. The research is based on the following question: what effects did Romanian Foreign Policy have on the settlement process in Transnistria? Methodologically, this article relies on the explaining

outcome process tracing variant and present a within-case analysis of variation in Foreign Policy decisions and their effects on the process of political settlement in Transnistria (Beach and Pedersen, 2019). In this case the outcome of interest is represented by the three different types of involvement that Romania as ex eternal party to the conflict has shifted to thought the historical period discussed above. What therefore constitutes the main focus of analysis and its main contribution is to assess how the various political leadership changes and public discourse in Romania rooted in particular traits of Foreign policy have been causally linked to the changes in actions towards the Republic of Moldova and the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. This article therefore contributes to the broader research on external involvement in unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space (Neukirch, 2001; Axyonova and Gawrich, 2018; Marandici, 2022a; 2022b). In this sense the universe of cases for analysis includes all interested third-parties involved in the conflict (either through negotiation or escalation of the Transnistrian conflict from 1992 onwards – Russia, Ukraine, Romania). A note should thus be made on the concept of interested third parties that in the context of the Transnistrian conflict refers to external actors that have been involved due to their proximity to the conflict zone either in the military phase of the conflict or its subsequent mediation. In the case of Romania, such research is currently missing with a lack of comprehensive knowledge regarding Romania's role both throughout the military conflict as well as throughout the post-conflict phase. This constitutes the main contribution of the article as well as offering a conceptual framework to understand the relationship of between Romanian foreign policy and the process of evolution of the Transnistrian settlement process.

This article thus fills a gap in the literature on Romania that deals only sporadically with the relationship between Romania and the Republic of Moldova in relation the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. As existing studies that address the role of Romania in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict do not cover a longer period of time from the specific vantage point of Romanian –Moldovan relations (Vacaru, 2006) by covering the period 1990-2007, before the accession of Romania to the European Union this study can shed light on the bilateral foreign policy decisions that Romania has taken both towards the initial secessionist conflict as well as towards its subsequent resolution. Towards this aim this study provides in-depth case study analysis that can understand both Romania's bilateral actions towards the Republic of Moldova as well as its foreign policy decisions in multilateral frameworks such as the OSCE. It relies on memoirs of former Romanian Presidents (Constantinescu, 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2002d) and Foreign Ministers (Năstase, 2009a; 2009b) as well as secondary literature covering Romanian Foreign Policy (Bechev, 2009, Dragan, 2019, Dumitrescu, 2021). It thus builds on existing studies that into account

Romania's relations with its neighbouring country that deal with the historical grievances and the issues of Bessarabia (Haynes, 2003) as well as existing scholarship that has addressed more recent traits of Romanian foreign policy after 1990 (Moga *et al.*, 2021; Nitoiu and Moga, 2021).

The first section of this article discusses the question of unification of Bessarabia and the establishment of bilateral relations with the Republic of Moldova at the height of the Transnistrian conflict. The second part of the article engages with the period between 1993 and 2004 and the transition in Romanian politics dominated by the aim of establishing a national identity project both as a sovereign nation and as part of Euro-Atlantic structures. Finally, in the third part, the article presents the period 2004-2007 as the consolidation of Romania's position in the Euro-Atlantic project.

1. The question of unification, the establishment of bilateral relations with the Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict 1990-1992

Between 1990 and 1992 Romania has established its main diplomatic channels in the Republic of Moldova being the first country to support its independence as well as its diplomacy across the world. At the time of the Transnistrian conflict, one can notice the close involvement of the Romanian foreign ministry in establishing a negotiation framework for resolving the conflict. Without any support from external international and regional organizations in the incipient period of conflict resolution, Romania just like neighbouring Ukraine became an important third party to the negotiations. As former Romanian Foreign Minister at the time Adrian Nastase points out about this particular period, the difficulties characterizing the relationship between Moldova and Romania at the time were rooted in the 'burden' of a possible union as well as the lack of flexibility of Moldovan diplomacy. Despite this, close communication between the two governments led on the 6th of April at the adoption of the Declaration of Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Romania (Năstase, 2009c) that guaranteed the unconditional respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova; sustained efforts for the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria through respect for constitutional norms and international law. This declaration marks the highest level of involvement that Romania has experienced throughout the past three decades of unresolved conflicts. It was based on a commitment in Bucharest to forge close ties with the newly independent Moldova but most importantly *to provide advocacy for the international recognition of the country.*

1.1. Bilateral relations and the question of unification

The reason behind Romania's strong support at the time can be found in the way in which the question of a possible unification was addressed in Bucharest. There was an acknowledgment even at the highest level of politics by the then President Ion Iliescu that though the union is a desirable option for Romania it should not become public matter and that any such discussion should start from Chisinau. This is primarily why the official position of Romania had always been that it supports the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. In closed political and diplomatic circles however, the level of support for Moldova was tailored specifically to facilitate a future union. Indeed, at the beginning of 1992 questions regarding the possible union with Moldova were treated cautiously by Bucharest that in public discourse often referred to the unification of Germany as a possible strategy that would apply in its own case of unification with its neighbours. The reason behind this caution was that Romania was keen to retain the support of Western allies and believed this would be the only solution acceptable in international law by other countries (Năstase, 2009c). In practice then, Romania's actions towards Moldova were directed towards establishing the closest level of relations with the Republic of Moldova. The Fraternity and Integration Treaty between Romania and Bucharest proposed by the Romanian Foreign Ministry that was nevertheless not ratified was based on the idea that:

Romania and the Republic of Moldova will establish relations based on the premise that the Romanian people is one single people and its optimal development can only be achieved in a common space of its ethno-genesis, without any artificial divisions (Năstase, 2009c, p. 638).

The Treaty proposed collaboration in various fields such as common and shared security concerns, economic cooperation and integration, the development of a unique cultural space, research cooperation, freedom of movement across the border and cooperation against terrorist threats.

At the beginning of the 1990s Romania was still finding its ground in international relations having experienced the only bloody transition from the communist regime. Even prior to the conflict in Transnistria, Romanian politicians indicated a close interest to the question of a Union with Moldova and a preoccupation with the potential form that such a decision could take, with unified Germany providing the most appropriate example of what could be possible in terms of a union (Năstase, 2009c). There were nevertheless concerns in Bucharest that such a decision should be left to the Moldovans with expressed fears that a move in this direction would ultimately antagonize Russia (Năstase, 2009c). In particular Romanian politicians acknowledged the Moldovan position

that favoured its recognition of independence rather than a possible union with Romania (Năstase, 2009c). It should therefore not be a surprise that throughout the battle with separatists in Transnistria, the Romanian threat was extensively politicized and the ‘fear of a union with Romania’ exploited by the separatists as accusations regarding military support by Romania for the Republic of Moldova have been made by the Transnistrian authorities at the time (Official Kremlin Int’l News Broadcast, 1992). There are indeed indications of the level of public and diplomatic support that Romania had offered Moldova in its aftermath of its declaration of independence. Romania was acting towards opening the right diplomatic avenues for the Republic of Moldova, be it that this meant arranging meetings with the Embassies of the UK and United States or organizing Moldova’s participation in United Nations’ meetings (Năstase, 2009a). This type of relationship that was consolidated with Moldova would in the late 2000s be transformed into *the type of advocacy for Moldova’s Western path that is now very familiar both in Bucharest and Chisinau* and that involves a strategic neighbourly partnership between Romania and the Republic of Moldova.

This defining foreign policy approach thus generated a series of specific actions that Romania undertook throughout the period under discussion. This includes support for the establishment of diplomatic channels abroad for the Republic of Moldova and facilitation of diplomatic engagement with countries such as the United States as well as organizations such as the UN. In terms of involvement in the Transnistrian conflict facilitating mediation was the second most important aspect of foreign policy.

2. Facilitating mediation: The conflict in Transnistria and the quadripartite meetings Romania, Ukraine, Russia, the Republic of Moldova 1992-1993

In order to understand Romania’s initial involvement in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, the context of international mediation at the time and the decision to set-up a quadripartite framework for discussing the conflict in Transnistria involving Russia, Ukraine, Romania and the Republic of Moldova should be assessed.

In mid-October 1992 a letter sent by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations was already drawing attention to the heavy involvement of the Russian Federation in support of the separatists fighting in Transnistria, calling for a United Nations peacekeeping mission as response to the escalation in the region (Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the UN, 1992). Thus, negotiations were initially set to take place with the participation of Moldova, Russia, Romania and Ukraine with the later three being viewed as interested parties in the conflict.

Five months prior to the signing of a ceasefire in July 1992 Romania was part of the official negotiation process (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Between March and July, this involvement meant dialogue both at the bilateral level with the Russian Federation as well as meetings in the quadripartite format. On the 16th of March 1992 the Romanian government expressed for the first time its concern regarding the escalating situation in Moldova stating that:

The Romanian government considers it necessary that all political factors that can have a word to say in positively influencing events - and, first of all, the governments of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Romania to act urgently for the immediate stop of acts of violence, for disarmament gangs of mercenaries, for the solution of all the problems that concern the population of these districts through discussions and negotiations, starting from insurance territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and from the application of all provisions regarding the human rights inscribed in the C.S.C.E. documents, including those regarding persons belonging to national minorities (Țăranu and Gribincea, 2012, p. 294).

On the 21st of March 1992 a meeting in Helsinki was held with the purpose of discussing the developments of the situation in Moldova and the formulation of principles for the resolution of the conflict. The aim of the Romanian Foreign Minister as part of this meeting was to obtain a declaration of condemnation of the Transnistrian conflict, the closing of the border with Ukraine as well as the collection of weapons offered to Transnistrian separatists by the Russian 14th Army. He stressed the importance of setting up a working group where these issues with the benefit that the necessary representatives could discuss with both parties, including the inhabitants of Transnistria in order to identify the issues at hand and show willingness for finding a political solution to the conflict (Năstase, 2009c). This meeting was followed on the 6th of April by a similar discussion between the four Foreign Ministers where the support for the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova was reaffirmed and the possible involvement of the UN and the CSCE in conflict resolution were considered. On the same day the four countries proposed the formation of a provisional group of military observers that would observe the ceasefire with the participation of troops from all four countries. A third meeting was then held on the 17th of April 1992 with the participation of representatives from Transnistria where the necessity of a peacekeeping force to end the conflict was discussed. This meeting led to the creation of a Mixed Control Commission that would observe the ceasefire. What followed on the 25th of June 1992 was a meeting at the level of heads of states between representatives of Romania, Ukraine, the Republic

of Moldova and the Russian Federation. This meeting proposed the neutrality of the 14th Army as well as encouraging the Republic of Moldova to consider a special status for Transnistria (Năstase, 2009d).

As the conflict dragged on it was only in November 1993 that the OSCE established a mission in Transnistria, following a ceasefire signed between the parties. This particular decision to create a regional mediation mechanisms rather than an international one, opened up the possibility for neighbouring states such as Ukraine and Romania to be involved in the mediation framework established under the leadership of the OSCE, nevertheless with Romania no longer being a separate part in the negotiations despite retaining high stakes both in the resolution of the conflict and its developing bilateral relations with Moldova (Solomon and Gumeniuc, 2008).

3. Romania's redefinition of national identity and the support for third party mediation in Transnistria 1993-2004

Being left out of the official OSCE-led mediation process, Romania's foreign policy with regards to the Republic of Moldova focused on supporting the official 3 plus 2 mediation framework established at the time. Throughout the period 1993-2004 Romania's actions mainly included its own integration the European Security Architecture and the search for a clear pro- Western Foreign Policy vector. Nowhere is this approach more visible than in the memoirs of the former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu that summarizes a period of redefining Romania's national project in the aftermath of the communist collapse. It is important to point out that during his term in office the negotiations for bilateral Treaties with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova were started with the first being ratified during his presidency.

Internal political developments are particularly important throughout this period in defining Romania's path in international relations. If in the immediate aftermath of the 1989 revolution, the power transition in Romania led to the election of post-communist forces such as the social democrats of Ion Iliescu, a first change of government is recorded in 1996 with the election of the Democratic Convention and Emil Constantinescu seeking a clearer path towards the democracies of Western Europe.(Constantinescu, 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2002d). Plagued by crises and economic uncertainty this political force nevertheless only lasts for one term, bringing Romanians to the polls to face yet again the choice between the social democrats of Ion Iliescu and the nationalists of Greater Romania Party led by Corneliu Vadim Tudor. The political history undergone by Romania throughout this period is important for several reasons. Firstly, it shows the climate of uncertainty and political instability brought about by the failure of successive governments in the period 1996-2000 to maintain a majority in Parliament. Secondly, it shows the national preferences of the electorate when

it comes to the orientation of the country's Foreign Policy and the struggle to forge a new sense of post-communist national identity as part of Euro-Atlantic institutions. What this meant was that the relationship with the Republic of Moldova was left static, often being exploited in national political discourse by the nationalists but with no clear strategy as to where this relationship should lead. With the opportune moment for unification being lost, the redefining moment in Romania's foreign policy throughout this period was also felt in its direct relations with the Republic of Moldova.

What is particularly interesting in terms of the role that Romania had in the post-conflict phase in Moldova is that throughout this period, when major decisions were being taken with regards to the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict such as the drafting of the Kozak Memorandum, Romania is only involved in Moldova through its bilateral relation and the official support for the resolutions of the OSCE and not yet capable to deliver on a strong bilateral initiative with regards to the conflict in Moldova.

Talking about the first half of the 1990s the then Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu summarizes Romania's approach to national security as part of the Euro-Atlantic structures as following:

The Association with the European Union, the status of partner associated to the EU and the participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace have the scope of establishing structural cooperation, but none of these has been designed to offer security guarantees. They can be called 'partial arrangements' and they seem to elude the readiness of Romania and other European states to finish the integration process. In any case, Romania is determined to fully use this cooperation structure and obtain the quality of member state with full rights in the major European and Euro-Atlantic structures (Meleşcanu, 2002, p. 71).

At the beginning of the 1990s this Euro-Atlantic dimension of Romanian Foreign Policy is complemented by a determination to work with the structures of the Organization for Security in Europe. The commitment to find a solution to the Transnistrian conflict through OSCE mediation is expressed by Teodor Melescanu despite the remaining difficulties of the stationing of Russian troops on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The then Foreign Minister appreciates regarding the mechanisms at the OSCE's disposal that:

We fully agree that pre-emptive diplomacy is one of the principle functions of the OSCE, our organization being equipped with adequate structures and mechanisms. However, these instruments have to be better and more efficiently used (Meleşcanu, 2002, p. 71).

With regards to regional cooperation Romania was in favour of including newly independent states such as the Republic of Moldova in the Partnership for Peace towards enhancing regional cooperation and stability (Meleşcanu, 2002). Important steps towards the partnership with Moldova can be observed in the bilateral cooperation treaties between Romania and the Republic of Moldova that cover a series of issues such as access to passports, education as well as financial assistance to Moldova especially between 1996 and 2000. The relationship is being consolidated but is in no way evolving to something more than the maintenance of bilateral contacts. In 2000 an important step in the bilateral relation is made by the signing of the Treaty for privileged partnership and cooperation between the two countries that consolidates the established relationship between Romania and the Republic of Moldova (Roman 2019). Between 2000 and 2004 a series of issues actually have negative effects on the bilateral relationship, an example being that the military ‘attache’ of Romania to the Republic of Moldova is declared persona non-grata and the remarks of the Moldovan president that the relationship with Romania can be ‘quite fun’ (Pintescu, 2011).

In terms of conflict resolution Romania supports the OSCE mediation framework but is completely inactive in terms of its own initiatives with the conflict being solely addressed as part of Romania’s membership of the OSCE.

4. The strategic goal of Euro-Atlantic integration and the support for the expansion of third party mediation of the Transnistrian conflict – 2004 -2008

Two defining moments have marked the period between 2004 and 2008 in terms of Romania’s foreign policy. The first is represented by Romania’s accession to NATO in 2004 and the second by its integration into the European Union in 2007. These two defining moments finally set Romania’s external relations on a course of Western integration that undoubtedly changed not only its own history but also the relations that it had with its neighbours. With Romania clearly set on the Euro-Atlantic integration path, all questions regarding unification with Moldova had been put aside, and the official position towards its neighbour being of respect for its independence. Throughout this period Romania consolidated its bilateral relations with the Republic of Moldova. There is a tendency to continue the lack of involvement in the mediation of the Transnistrian conflict that had consolidated in the previous period as a result of lack of capacity on behalf of Romania to develop its own abilities of pursuing its interests towards the resolution of the conflict. Remaining outside the OSCE official mediation framework Romania did not have any specific involvement or peace proposals such as neighbouring Ukraine had for example under the Yushchenko Plan One important change in the mediation framework is brought about by the

inclusion in 2005 of the European Union as official observer to the settlement process as part of the now 5 plus 2 OSCE-led negotiation framework. This is usually cited in Romania as the way by which the country pursues its commitments to respecting the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict.

This period has also marked an important shift in terms of regional security and the Transnistrian conflict. Especially during the first term of former President Traian Basescu, the issue of unresolved frozen conflicts in the region have received increased attention with Romania being pro-active in its positions in Euro-Atlantic institutions towards drawing attention to the risks brought about by these conflicts. Indeed on the occasion of the escalation of the war in Georgia in 2008 the president declared that Romania has been warning since 2005 of the lurking dangers of unresolved conflicts and that their resolution can only be based on the respect of the territorial integrity of countries fighting separatism (HotNews, 2008).

In spite of such renewed interest in forging a strategic security position in Eastern Europe, Romania's role in addressing the conflict has been limited to supporting the position of the European Union in the 5 plus 2 negotiation framework as well as aligning itself in accord with the expressed positions of the OSCE. It is thus fair to say that Romania's foreign policy since 2007 onwards has received a clear Euro-Atlantic direction, this also having an impact upon the strategic relationship developed with the Republic of Moldova.

Especially at the beginning of 2005 the bilateral relationship is improved by the visit of President Traian Basescu to Chisinau that brings a somehow new and fresh perspective on the relations between the two states (BBC Romanian, 2005a). New bilateral accords are signed with the purpose of cooperation in the economic and scientific fields as well as tourism and free movement of citizens across the border. Indeed, in his assessment of the bilateral relation, the then Foreign Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu observed that:

I will tell you that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs- regardless of who is in power in Chisinau- has continued to support- and we believe with great strength- the interests of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, interests that we believe to know and that where it is possible we continue to be of help. Furthermore, we believe that for the first time the first EU member state neighbouring the Republic of Moldova has shown the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, these hundred of thousands of citizens which see in Romania a chance, that Europe is real and that there is no problem for the Republic of Moldova to become sooner or later a

member of this family; no other problem than the political willingness in Chisinau (Ungureanu, 2008, p. 20).

This position shows the strengthening feature of the partnership with Moldova and the determination of the Romanian government to support its neighbour through various means of support such as offering Moldova electricity. During his visit to the country the President declared that:

I would like to give assurances to President Voronin, to the politicians in the Republic of Moldova that no matter what issues might appear for Moldova they can simply be resolved through a phone call to Bucharest. We assure you that there is no other country who will respond most promptly to Moldova's needs (BBC Romanian, 2005a).

Throughout his first term as president, Traian Basescu was in favour of re-establishing a more prominent position for Romania in the negotiating framework of the Transnistrian conflict, considering that adding Romania to the format would speed up the search for a viable solution. Apart from this type of advocacy for further inclusion into the negotiation process, the administration was vocal in supporting the EU integration and NATO partnership prospects of the Republic of Moldova especially throughout the French Presidency of the European Union (IPN, 2008).

The relationship with the Republic of Moldova was characterized by the then Foreign Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu as following:

The Republic of Moldova remains a prominent political theme. Between Romania and the Republic of Moldova relations have gathered pace and consistency, in the context of renewed bilateral contacts at the highest level. We are convinced that the Republic of Moldova deserves a European destiny. From this profound belief stems our determination to support Moldova, as good neighbours and witness the success of this country and its realignment to European values (Ungureanu, 2008, p. 275).

The type of involvement throughout this period was support on the resolution of the conflict in all international mechanisms involved in finding a solution with the president Traian Basescu making it clear to his Moldovan counterpart Vladimir Voronin that Romania 'does not conceive of Transnistria outside of the authority and sovereignty of Moldova' (BBC Romanian, 2005b).

Finally, proof that Romania's advocacy in international institutions would touch upon the issue of the Transnistrian conflict stands the agenda at the UN General Assembly Meeting in New York from 8th of June 2006 where the Foreign Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu declared that there is a need for the United Nations actors and other international organizations and neighbouring states to use their political willingness to put an end to the conflict (Ungureanu, 2008).

Discussion and conclusions

The analysis helps define the main features of Romanian foreign policy between the 1990s and the present day, showcasing for different trends throughout this main period (see Table 1). How are they then related to the actions that Romania has taken towards the Republic of Moldova, and towards the Transnistrian question? This section summarizes the main contribution of this article towards conceptualizing Romanian Foreign policy in the context of its relations with the Republic of Moldova and the negotiations towards the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. The first period under discussion is 1990 to 1993 which can be defined as the post-communist period in foreign policy that assumed a series of changes in Romania's relations with the world including Russia and the newly independent Republic of Moldova. Throughout this period Romanian foreign policy towards Moldova was pro-active and involved certain types of advocacy actions such as the opening of diplomatic channels with western embassies on behalf of Moldova. Throughout this period Romania was briefly part of the official settlement process of the Transnistrian conflict. The second period 1993-2004 is defined by Romania's search for a national identity which is reflected in its foreign policy that at this point takes no clear direction. In terms of its actions towards Moldova, bilateral relations are preferred. A policy of non-involvement is preferred with regards to the Transnistrian conflict. The third period 2004-2008 is similar in many of these respects with the exception that the main trait of foreign policy is its scope- namely Euro-Atlantic integration. Finally post 2007, Romanian foreign policy takes own its main Euro-Atlantic dimension- returning to the policy of advocacy on behalf of the Republic of Moldova this time in European institutions and supporting the EU's role as observer to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and the possible expansion of this function for the European Union (IPN, 2008).

Table 1. Conceptualizing Romanian Foreign Policy towards the Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict

Historical Period	Main RO FP Trait	FP action towards Moldova	Impact on the Transnistrian conflict
1990-1993	Post-communist	Establishing Bilateral relations	Facilitating direct mediation
1993-2004	Defining national identity	Maintenance of diplomatic relations	Non-involvement in direct mediation / Support for third party mediation
2004- 2008	Defining Euro-Atlantic identity	Advocacy in Euro-Atlantic structures	Support for expansion of third party mediation

Following Romania's integration into the European Union, the main shift in Foreign Policy with regards to the Republic of Moldova can be identified as the advocacy role played by Romania for the European future of Moldova. Following changes in the politics in Chisinau that have led to the election of pro-European political forces, the Republic of Moldova benefited from a series of actions by Romanian officials towards supporting its European future. In parallel to this advocacy function abroad, Romania has also consolidated a strong bilateral relation that involved specific aid measures for the Republic of Moldova as well as support for its citizens. These measures included economic aid towards supporting energy corridors, support for Moldovan citizens to receive Romanian passports as well as more recently vaccine diplomacy during the pandemic. These measures have marked an important change in Romanian foreign policy that has started since 2007 identifying the strategic benefits of the partnership with the Republic of Moldova as well as pursuing its interests at the level of European institutions towards a certain type of economic integration between the two countries that had put on hold any form of union between the two states.

In recent years, the question of the union has again resurfaced, predominantly in Chisinau, where this step is considered to help Moldova in its European perspective. In Bucharest however, such discussions are not a priority, with the official Romanian position having been since 2007 that European integration of the two countries would in effect serve the purposes of any unification between the two countries, bringing with it closer economic cooperation and political cohesion.

Acknowledgement: The research leading to these results has received funding from the EEA Grants 2014-2021, under Project "Interdisciplinary Research on Russia's Geopolitics in the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean", contract no. 35/2021.

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The problem of developing a model for the settlement Transnistrian conflict in the context of European integration of the Republic of Moldova

Anatolii DIRUN*, Valentina TEOSA**

Abstract

The participation of the European Union in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict created favorable conditions for the implementation of the concept of "involvement without recognition" of the Transnistrian region in the legal field of the Republic of Moldova. The effectiveness of this approach largely depended on the effective functioning of the EU as an intermediary and the tools used to solve this problem. The purpose of the work is to consider the influence of the "post-military" stage on the effectiveness of the implementation of the mediation activities of the European Union, as well as to analyze the strategy of "Europeanization" from the point of view of rational choice theory, which affects the change in the behavior of the conflicting parties in the context of the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.

Keywords: Transnistrian conflict, Europeanization strategy, post-war stage, conflict transformation

Introduction

The consolidation of the Moldovan society around the idea integration in the EU has not removed all the contradictions between the center and the regions in the Republic of Moldova on issues of domestic and foreign policy. This problem has been actualized for the Republic of Moldova as a state that has received the status of a candidate for EU accession in the context of the war on the territory of Ukraine. The rupture of socio-economic relations with Russia does not find full support among Moldovan citizens, and is also negatively perceived in Transnistria, in the southern and northern regions of the republic. One of the explanations for this attitude is the fact that the implementation of the Moldovan policy of integration until 2022 took place against the backdrop of maintaining trade and cultural relations with Russia. In turn, the official inclusion of the European Union in the process of settling the Transnistrian conflict took place only in 2005, when Tiraspol and Chisinau decided to grant observer status to the EU and US representatives in the negotiation process.

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Since by the time of the “pivot” towards Europe during the reign of President Vladimir Voronin in 2005, the republic had already formed the foundation of the negotiation process with Transnistria. In a generalized form, it can be said that since the official start of the negotiation process in 1994, two main solution models have been used in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict: ‘Transnistrianization’ and Europeanization. And if, ‘Transnistrianization’ was typical until the early 2000s, after 2005, the mechanisms of Europeanization became more widespread.

By this time, the EU was guided by the adopted European Security Strategy, approved in 2003, in which regional conflicts were considered as one of the main challenges for European security. General approaches, as well as the procedure for the use of forces in peacekeeping operations and missions under the leadership of the EU, were regulated by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Petersberg (1994) and Helsinki Declarations (1999). The proclaimed “EU Security Comprehensive” model included a wide range of tools: peacekeeping operations, police operations, security reforms, and post-conflict economic recovery. Such attention to the settlement of regional conflicts was due to the fact that “problems similar to Kashmir, conflicts in the Great Lakes region, on the Korean Peninsula directly or indirectly affect the interests of Europe, just like the centers of conflicts closer to it, primarily the Middle East. Violent or deadlocked conflicts that persist along our borders are a threat to regional stability”. Regional conflicts can often lead “to extremism, terrorism, statehood failure; they create conditions for the formation of organized crime and can fuel the need to master weapons of mass destruction”. Obviously, in each individual case, the EU has taken a different approach to resolving the problem, referring to the most practical approach is sometimes to address the roots of long-standing regional conflicts. It is recognized, however, that both military action and effective policing may be required. Economic instruments serve the purpose of economic recovery, and civilian crisis assistance helps restore civilian rule.

The process of settling the Transnistrian conflict has been going on for more than 30 years since the signing of the ceasefire agreement between the parties in July 1992. At the same time, the causes of the conflict, its development and culmination in the form of hostilities between the parties obliges the researcher to turn to the origins of the confrontation, the roots of which go back to the late Soviet period. In this regard, the correct typology of the conflict is important for the researcher, as it affects the development of tools for its settlement. At the same time, there is a need to take into account all the elements - both those that were at the heart of the conflict, and those that emerged during the peace process. The conflict in Transnistria is inherently ethno-political, categorized as identity conflicts. Along with the conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan, the events in Moldova were the result of contradictory internal political processes in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At

the same time, unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova has developed its own approach to conflict resolution, in which the post-military stage in relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol has taken a significant place.

1. Post-war stage as a new stage in the settlement of the Transnistrian issue

An analysis of the protracted nature of the Transnistrian conflict allows us to single out one important pattern, namely, the cessation of hostilities and the provision of a mechanism for controlling the situation over a long period of time, allows us to speak about the emergence of a new, post-war stage in the context of peacebuilding in protracted conflicts. The post-war stage can be defined as "the period of peaceful relations between the parties to the conflict from the moment of cessation of hostilities until the conclusion of a political agreement on the settlement of the ethno-political causes of the conflict" (Dirun,2021). It is quite logical that since the ceasefire in 1992, the parties have been using this time, including for the modernization of their armed forces. However, when we talk about the beginning of the post-war stage of the conflict, in practice this means the implementation of three mechanisms that minimize the possibility of resuming hostilities. First, the conduct of a peacekeeping operation on the line of contact between the conflicting parties; Second, the organization of a direct dialogue between the parties to the conflict in the framework of the negotiation process; Third, the public demand for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, not by armed means.

In the case of Transnistria and Moldova, we are talking, first of all, about the factually equivalent military potential of the parties, and the negative experience of solving the problem by armed means. To understand the importance and complexity of the emergence of the post-war stage in the Transnistrian settlement, it must be compared with a conflict of low combat intensity, which persists between the parties even after the signing of a ceasefire agreement. Since this happened over the past years in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thereby complicating the peace process in these regions. Thus, the creation of a peacekeeping mechanism in the region in 1992 is one of the reasons for the effective implementation of the negotiation process as the main institutional instrument for resolving the conflict.

The official start of the negotiation process was laid on July 21, 1992, when the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin and the President of the Republic of Moldova M. Snegur, in the presence of the leader of Transnistria I. Smirnov, signed the Agreement "On the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Pridnestrovian Region of the Republic of Moldova". In accordance with this Agreement, joint trilateral peacekeeping forces were created, as well as the Joint

Control Commission (JCC), a Security Zone was established along the administrative border of Transnistria and Moldova on both sides of the Dniester. The JCC was formed from representatives of Russia, Transnistria and Moldova. The military contingents of the three sides were transferred to her subordination to ensure the ceasefire and security in the region (six battalions from Russia, three from each of the parties to the conflict). The principles for resolving the conflict were determined, obliging the parties not to use armed violence. The document mentioned “both sides” of the conflict, as well as three parties involved in the settlement”. The conclusion of the 1992 Agreement legally established the end of the war, marked the beginning of a peacekeeping mission on the banks of the Dniester and created conditions for the negotiation process, and for the first time recorded the international dimension of the settlement of the conflict in Transnistria (United Nations, 1992).

Thus, for the first time, a trilateral settlement format was established: the two sides of the conflict and Russia. It is important to note that a short period of time was required from the moment the Agreement was signed to the final cessation of hostilities. On July 31, the head of the Transnistrian Defense Department, Major General Sh. Kitsak, signed an order “On the cessation of hostilities in all sectors of the front”, and on August 1, an order “On the withdrawal of troops from the front line to permanent deployment points”. Officially, hostilities between Transnistria and Moldova have ended. On the same day - August 1, formations of the 106th division of the Russian Airborne Forces occupied the central part of Bendery. In addition to the Russian military, 50 law enforcement officers from Transnistria and Moldova remained in the city. In general, the period of hostilities lasted from March to June 1992 and claimed more than 1 thousand dead and 4.5 thousand wounded on both sides. For the Moldovan society, these figures were a real shock, which had a huge impact on the formation of the domestic and foreign policy of the state. Since the signing of the Agreement on the Principles of a Peaceful Settlement, it took the conflicting parties almost two years to officially start direct negotiations. At the same time, it is important to note that informal communication between the officials of Transnistria and Moldova never stopped, even during the period of hostilities in 1992 (Dirun, 2021).

As a result, on April 28, 1994, the first joint statement was adopted by the leaders of the conflicting parties - Moldova and Transnistria, who agreed on the basic parameters of the negotiation process. Then the parties agreed to immediately and without preconditions begin a negotiation process on the entire range of issues of mutual interest, as well as to remove all barriers that impede the normal implementation of economic, social and cultural ties and establish mutually beneficial ties in the economic, trade, credit, financial and other areas. The statement also recorded the consent of the parties to create a system of mutual and international guarantees for the full and unconditional

implementation of the agreements reached. In the same year, on October 21, as a follow-up to the agreement to start negotiations, a number of documents were signed on the methods and timing of the withdrawal of Russian troops to ensure the conduct of a peacekeeping operation on the Dniester. The parties agreed to synchronize the withdrawal of Russian troops with a political settlement of the conflict, which, in the opinion of the developers and signatories, could be achieved within a three-year period, which they called transitional.

The principle of such synchronization was also recorded in its documents by the OSCE, which from the very beginning played an active mediating role in the settlement (Agreement on Confidence Measures, 1998). The first practical result of the negotiations can be considered the Agreement signed on July 5, 1995 at the highest level “On the maintenance of peace and guarantees of security between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria”, by which the parties assumed obligations not to use military force in mutual relations and not to exert political, economic or other forms of pressure on each other. At the same time, the parties to the conflict turned to Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE with a request to be guarantors of compliance with the agreements. This is how Ukrainian mediation began in the process of resolving the conflict in Transnistria, and the negotiation format itself expanded to a five-party format.

With the active mediation of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, the parties were looking for formulas for a future political settlement and were building up negotiating potential. The question of why the parties expected to find solutions to the conflict in a three-year period deserves special attention. One of the reasons in our opinion, the circumstance is that both Moldova and Tiraspol actively resorted to the help of Russia as a mediator and guarantor. It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the 1990s Moscow had a serious influence both on the left and right banks of the Dniester, which in turn was reflected in the positive dynamics of meetings between the conflicting parties. Since the mid-1990s and early 2000s, the years have been productive in terms of developing a political solution to the Transnistrian issue. First of all, we are talking about the “Primakov Memorandum” of 1997, in which Transnistria and Moldova fixed the concept of a “common state”. It should be noted that in addition to the efforts of international mediators, this became possible thanks to personal contacts between the leader of Transnistria, Igor Smirnov, with Moldovan presidents Mircea Snegur and Petr Luchinskiy.

In 2001, after the communist party headed by Vladimir Voronin came to power, the first serious crisis arose in the region, connected with the activities of the customs of Transnistria. The official authorities of Moldova withdrew the customs seals previously issued to Tiraspol for cargo clearance, thereby complicating the foreign economic activity of Transnistrian enterprises. As a result of these actions, negotiations between the parties were terminated. The guarantors and mediators had to

quickly create a new format - an auxiliary negotiation mechanism that would allow maintaining a dialogue between the conflicting parties at the level of political representatives of the parties. For this purpose, the creation of the “Permanent Conference on Political Issues in the Framework of the Transnistrian Settlement Process” was initiated. The corresponding agreement was reached in February 2002 during a meeting in Bratislava of political representatives of the countries-guarantors and mediators of the settlement - the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE, and one of the parties to the conflict - Transnistria. Moldova joined soon after. In diplomatic circles, the new negotiating mechanism was called the “Bratislava format”, which was a consultative body that did not involve the direct participation of the heads of state in its activities. As experts noted, the mechanism of the negotiation process has become more cumbersome, but the main thing is that it itself has been preserved. But even under these conditions, attempts were continued to find solutions at the institutional level based on the political formula of a settlement.

First of all, we are talking about the creation and work of the Joint Constitutional Commission in the spring of 2003, within the framework of which Tiraspol and Chisinau took the first steps to develop a draft constitution for a future federal state. The closest political project to be signed was the “Kozak Memorandum”, which envisages a solution to the conflict based on the model of asymmetric federalization of the Republic of Moldova. The failure of Russia's diplomatic efforts related to the refusal of President Voronin to sign the “Kozak Memorandum”, in fact, drew a line under the project of federalization of Moldova and became the starting point for turning the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova towards the European Union.

In turn, the problem of developing a model for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict with the participation of the European Union is due, in our opinion, to contradictions in the implementation of the two models of “Europeanization”. Within the framework of the first model, “Europeanization” is considered by the leadership of the Republic of Moldova as a task - to become part of the process of creation, dissemination of institutional norms, rules and procedures, which are first developed and agreed upon at the supranational level, and then implemented by the member states (Radaelli, 2003).

The second model is used to resolve protracted conflicts, in which europeanization is interpreted as a process driven and stimulated by European institutions, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of stakeholders into European structures (Borzel and Risse, 2000). In practice, this meant that in the context of the protracted conflict, in which Moldova is one of the parties, it was the political institutions of the European Union that needed to develop a course in order to most effectively use each of the two indicated strategies. At the same time, it is important to take into account that the speed of implementation of each of these strategies in practice differs

significantly from each other, which in turn affects the results achieved. It is significant that in her interview, the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, expressed her hope that the accession of the country to the European Union will take place in parallel with the reintegration of Transnistria into the republic. According to her, both processes should occur side by side. Sandu noted that if the standard of living in Moldova rises, then many more residents of Transnistria will be in favor of unification with Chisinau (Sandu, 2023). Formally, the country's reintegration policy began to be implemented from the first days of the negotiation process. However, it is the effectiveness of the use of the strategy of europeanization of the conflict that affects the achievement of practical results of reintegration in general. An analysis of 20 years of EU activities on the Transnistrian track allows us to better identify common patterns and evaluate the results obtained in the context of rational choice theory.

2. The “Rational Choice Model” in the Transnistrian Conflict: a working hypothesis

The object of study of the theory of rational choice are individuals, organizations or states that operate within a certain institutional environment. In turn, institutions with their limited capabilities influence the choice of an individual who, under these conditions, chooses the most beneficial strategy for himself. As Olson writes, the key motivation of an actor in choosing a strategy is his individual interest in realizing his own goal (Olson, 1971). At the same time, the researcher separately draws attention to the fact that the individual has his own hierarchy of values and priorities, within which he makes a decision. From the point of view of studying the behavior of the parties to the conflict, in addition to their own benefit, a number of researchers believe that the rational choice model is also able to take into account the possibility for the participants in the conflict to receive ideological advantages (Nicholson, 1990). However, the starting point in this case, the parties to the conflict should have the same understanding of the current situation, due to which a rational attitude to the present is formed. The difference in approaches to assessing what is happening should be resolved by transforming the structure of interests of the conflicting parties. The use of the rational choice model in the analysis of the actions of the conflicting parties in the Transnistrian conflict lies in the following hypothesis.

In the context of the equivalent combat potential of the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, resolving the conflict by military means is an elusive task. The conflicting parties were forced to look for new points of contact, as the request for a peaceful settlement was demonstrated by residents, both on the right and on the left bank of the Dniester. At the same

time, the difficulty of reaching a political agreement was offset by the desire of the parties to focus on the economic aspect of the relationship. The economic approach made it possible for politicians in Moldova and Transnistria to see their perceived benefits and risks, as well as the tools to achieve and neutralize them. In turn, the effectiveness of economic interaction largely depended on the efforts and capabilities of the EU as an intermediary. To solve this problem, the European Union had to choose the right instruments of sanctions and incentives, as well as determine the algorithm for their use in order to effectively involve Pridnestrovie in the legal field of the Republic of Moldova.

Since the most important condition ensuring the promotion of europeanization in the context of the conflict was not so much a political discourse focused on the values of euro integration, but the real interest of the participants in the conflict (Emerson, 2004). An analysis of the activities of the EU as a mediator for more than 20 years, based on the method of historical analysis, allows us to empirically verify the effectiveness of sanctions and incentives, and to highlight the emotional factor of values, the influence of which on the behavior of the parties significantly reduced the effectiveness of rational choice.

3. Sanctions as a tool for transforming the interests of Transnistria

The EU began to show interest in the Transnistrian settlement only at the beginning of the 2000s. The preparation and accession of Romania to the EU in 2007 brought the conflict closer to its borders. In this regard, already in the spring of 2003, the European Neighborhood Policy was proclaimed, in the context of which the EU's desire was declared to play a more active role in resolving the conflict in Transnistria, including the use of financial instruments for post-conflict reconstruction (European Parliament, 2003). Analyzing the process of Europeanization of the negotiation process, it is important to take into account the fact that the period of EU involvement in the negotiations (2003-2005) included two fundamental positions. First, the EU has never proposed projects related to the political status of Transnistria. In this matter, Brussels considered Tiraspol from the standpoint of the Law On the main provisions of the special legal status of settlements on the left bank of the Dniester (Pridnestrovie), adopted by Parliament in July 2005. Secondly, the main efforts of the EU were reduced to the need to return Transnistria to the Moldovan economic and customs space. The justification here was the arguments about the damage caused to the Moldovan economy by the unresolved conflict. For example, British experts, assessing the scale of economic damage,

indicated that Moldova annually loses up to 13% of GDP due to non-collection of customs duties, taxes and other payments from Pridnestrovian economic agents (European Union, 2006).

The EU High Representative for Security and Foreign Policy Javier Solana, commenting on the idea of subordinating Transnistria to the customs rules of Moldova, stated that the conflict in Transnistria is a conflict involving economic elites, and there is no place for such conflicts in the 21st century (newdaynews.ru, 2006). A demonstration of the seriousness of the intentions of the European Union in the Transnistrian direction was the initiative to impose sanctions against the Transnistrian leaders. On February 27, 2003, the EU imposed sanctions that prohibited members of the Transnistrian leadership from entering the countries of the Union. The EU stated that such measures are aimed at supporting a more active EU involvement in the political process and should encourage sanctioned individuals to cooperate in order to promote a political solution to the conflict. The possibility of revising such restrictions was linked to an assessment of the steps taken by the leadership of Transnistria to achieve significant progress in the negotiations (Council Common Position, 2003). European experts called the sanctions an early attempt to apply special EU instruments to the Transdnestrian settlement and an inverted EU perspective aimed at eliminating the symptoms, rather than eliminating the causes of the conflict (Cristescu and Matveev, 2011).

It is significant that the EU maintains these sanctions today. Despite the fact that the sanctions list has been reset to zero, it no longer contains persons to whom the ban applies. But the sanctions themselves are formally preserved, and the corresponding document on their extension is adopted every year (Declaration by the High Representative, 2019). Analyzing the initial stage of the European involvement of the EU in the Transnistrian settlement, one cannot ignore the attempt to include the EU in the sphere of security in the conflict region. Thus, in 2003, the Netherlands chairing the OSCE came up with an initiative to reformat the peacekeeping operation conducted on the banks of the Dniester under the auspices of Russia, in which the contingents of the conflicting parties interact. It was proposed to replace the contingents of Moldova and Transnistria with the OSCE forces, and to transfer control of the operation to the EU (Mikhailov, 2013). And although formally this initiative cannot be attributed to the proposal of the European Union, it was widely discussed, but did not find support, primarily from France, Germany and Italy, who did not want to worsen relations with Russia. And the Dutch diplomat A. Jacobovitz de Szeged, who put forward this initiative, was later, in 2005, appointed to the position designed to become another European instrument - the EU Special Representative for Moldova, responsible for guiding the Transnistrian settlement. Taken together, these initiatives to impose sanctions against Pridnestrovian officials, change the peacekeeping format, as well as the establishment of the position of a Special Representative laid the foundation for strengthening the influence of the EU in Moldova, which, in

turn, could already be transformed into practical carrot and stick tools to bring the positions of the conflicting parties closer together (ICG Europe Report, 2004). The official institutionalization of European participation in the negotiation process took place in April 2005 with the active support of the Ukrainian side and its 7 Steps initiative. The document contained a proposal to include the EU and the US in the negotiations, and although it was not supported by Moldova because of the ideas contained in it about holding democratic procedures in Transnistria under the patronage of international organizations, it nevertheless gave a serious impetus to the negotiation process.

The EU increased its engagement with Moldova, Ukraine and Russia, including through the establishment of a political dialogue through the EU Special Representative for Moldova (EUSR) appointed in spring 2005 with a mandate to strengthen the EU contribution in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and representation of the EU in various forums by developing close contacts with all relevant actors (European Council, 2007). It should be understood that to a high degree the work of the Special Representative overlaps with the activities accredited in Moldova by the Mission of the EU Delegation. However, according to experts, the Special Representative initially had more opportunities, including because he had more staff to work in the Transnistrian direction. In May 2005, Ukraine again launched an initiative known as the Yushchenko Plan. In this project, the US and the EU were offered the role of observers in certain areas. On the basis of the Ukrainian proposals, the OSCE developed its own draft, which was adopted in autumn 2005 in Odessa at a meeting of the pentilateral format (OSCE, 2005). Since then, the EU and the US have been direct participants in the negotiations on the Transnistrian settlement with the status of observers. It was from this year that the EU began the Europeanization of economic processes, which can be divided into several conditional levels: trade and economic involvement, economic and technical assistance to the negotiation process, and, finally, control of the region with the help of economic instruments. Thus, in 2005, the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was established, the legal basis of which was the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the European Commission and the Governments of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The Mission is called upon to work with these countries to bring the standards and procedures of border management, customs and trade in line with those in force in the EU member states, to promote international cooperation and to strengthen security in the region. Notably, EUBAM prioritizes promoting a peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through confidence-building measures and approximation of legislation and procedures in the areas of customs, trade, transport and organization of cross-border activities (EUBAM, 2006).

Just a few months after the establishment of the EUBAM Mission, on December 30, 2005, the beneficiaries of its assistance, Moldova and Ukraine, agreed and signed a joint statement of the heads of government on the establishment of a new customs regime for Transnistrian goods, according to which transit through the Ukrainian border can only be carried out on the basis of Moldovan customs acts. It should be noted that Moldova has put forward such an initiative more than once before, but the Ukrainian government rejected it, calling it a virtual blockade. For example, Sergey Pirozhkov, deputy secretary of the Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, in 2003, commenting on such Moldovan proposals, argued that Kiev would never go for an economic blockade of Transnistria (Pirozhkov, 2003). And later, in 2008, already in the rank of Ukrainian ambassador to Moldova, he explained the change Ukrainian position on this issue is the request of the European Union to enter into international standards of customs clearance of goods (Pirozhkov, 2008) and the impossibility of Ukraine's refusal from the new customs regime is obligations to the European Union. For Transnistria, which had traditional economic ties with the CIS countries and supplied the Russian market with the bulk of its products through the territory of Ukraine, the new customs regime created serious problems. Only in 2006, as a result of the shutdown of enterprises, the losses of the unrecognized republic amounted to more than 450 million US dollars, of which 380 million dollars were losses of economic agents, the rest was shortfalls in the budget. These amounts, in comparison with the consolidated annual budget of Transnistria, almost doubled the latter. External actors were involved in resolving the current situation. Official Moscow stated that the actions of Chisinau and Kiev, presented as restoring order on the border, in reality are another attempt to put economic pressure on Tiraspol in order to force it to political capitulation on the issues of the Transnistrian settlement.

The statement was followed by a large-scale provision of Russian humanitarian aid to Transnistria. Brussels, in turn, continued the tactics of coercive diplomacy, stimulating the transition of Transnistrian economic agents under Moldovan jurisdiction. For Transnistrian enterprises that agreed to register in Moldova and comply with Moldovan rules, the EU provided a special preferential treatment in its sales market in the form of individual trade preferences that increase competitiveness in the European sales market. In 2005, it was the GSP+ preference regime, and since 2008, an even more advantageous system of autonomous trade preferences (ATP). Moldova, in turn, undertook to provide Transnistrian economic agents with a special regime of registration and tax accounting with tax exemption. As a result of additional financial burdens that arose in connection with the emergence of new economic levers in Moldova to influence Transnistrian economic entities, the products of Transnistrian enterprises became less competitive in traditional markets. To this were added the problems of transporting Transnistrian goods to Russia, associated with the so-called transport

blockade, when the Transnistrian freight transport lost the Moldovan licenses necessary for its activities. Thus, the enterprises of Transnistria, which traditionally supplied their goods to the CIS markets, being burdened with double subordination and the ensuing double taxation, gradually redirected their exports to Europe. In this context, the foreign economic indicators of the unrecognized republic over the past decade and a half can serve as an indicator of the Europeanization of the Transnistrian economy.

By 2014, the economic context was overgrown with two new European initiatives for the conflict region - an attempt to include Transnistria in the free trade zone formed by the Association Agreement signed with Moldova (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area - DCFTA) and support for the establishment of joint borders with Ukraine on the Transnistrian segment of the border with Ukraine. Ukrainian-Moldovan posts of customs and border control. By that time, as noted in Tiraspol, Brussels' positions in the region had significantly strengthened, having received additional institutional and legal consolidation. And although Tiraspol managed to enter into direct negotiations with Brussels on the future of trade and economic relations, insist on not joining the DCFTA as part of Moldova and get the EU to abandon the idea of ending the preferential trade regime for Transnistrian goods, nevertheless, according to experts, tools to influence the external the policy of Transnistria in the EU has become more. The basis for such fears is the dependence of the export-oriented Transnistria on European markets and the increased control of the EU over the Transnistrian economy.

Finally, over the years of the customs regime introduced in 2006, there has been a radical reorientation of Transnistrian exports. The main trade partner of Transnistria has traditionally been Russia. So, for example, until 2001, Transnistria's exports to Russia amounted to about 25-30%, and until 2005 it reached 40%. In 2006, with a 25% drop in overall exports due to the blockade, exports to Russia accounted for almost 50%. And even in 2007 and 2008, the share of Pridnestrovie's exports to Russia was 43% and 40.5%, respectively. Now one of the main trading partners of Transnistria is the EU. The EU accounted for 29.4% of all exports in 2020¹⁴⁶. If we take into account the fact that another 53.2% is accounted for by Moldova and Ukraine, which have taken a course towards European integration, then the degree of separation from the Russian market (only 6.4% falls on the share of the Russian Federation) is more than indicative. To date, more than two thousand Pridnestrovian economic agents have passed under Moldovan jurisdiction, including all budget-forming enterprises of Transnistria, such as the Moldavian Metallurgical Plant, the KVINT wine and brandy factory, the Tirotext textile factory and others (Bulletin of the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank, 2021). Thus, without formally developing the status of Transnistria, the political institutions of the

EU have seriously influenced the involvement of economic agents from the left bank of the Dniester into the legal field of the Republic of Moldova.

4. The EU Confidence Building Policy and its limits to effectiveness

The implementation of a set of sanctions aimed at the imposed involvement of Transnistrian economic agents in the legal field of Moldova was used by the Transnistrian authorities to develop an internal ideological discourse about the blockade of the Transnistrian economy and the negative perception of the EU's efforts in the Transnistrian society. Largely for this reason, in 2009 the European Union decides to implement projects aimed at strengthening confidence building measures between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Hugh Mingarelli, Deputy Director General of the Directorate for External Relations of the European Commission, said at a meeting in Chisinau with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova Andrei Stratan that "... the population of the Transnistrian region will benefit from the implementation of these projects, the purpose of which is to modernize society and reduce the consequences of the conflict on the Dniester" (Dirun, 2017, p. 28). In the period from 2009 to 2015, more than 174 projects were implemented more than 1870 jobs were created. Total funding amounted to €24.3 million, of which the European Union €23.2 million and UNDP €1.1 million over the period 2012-2015. It should be noted that when developing plans for the implementation of projects in Transnistria, representatives of the European Union checked their positions with the Transnistrian authorities. Thus, according to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transnistria Vitaly Ignatiev, Brussels is ready to offer Tiraspol targeted projects for the long term, funds that can be invested in the budgets of EU structures for 2013-2015. Within the framework of the Confidence Building Measures program, funded by the European Union and implemented by UNDP, 16 civil society development projects on both banks of the Dniester will be funded in 2023, which should reach more than 30,000 people. Their total cost is more than 290 thousand euros. The initiatives were selected through an open competition for which 90 proposals were submitted. A significant contribution to the development of confidence building measures between Tiraspol and Chisinau was the policy of football diplomacy. Thus, the Moldovan football champion, the Sheriff team received permission from UEFA to host European teams at its home stadium in Tiraspol. One of the signs of the effectiveness of the incentive policy was the increase in the number of residents of Transnistria who received Moldovan citizenship. According to the Bureau of Reintegration, the number of residents with Moldovan citizenship is 350 thousand people, while the total population of Transnistria is 465 thousand people.

Researchers also have yet to study the issue of the effectiveness of the implementation of the Europeanization strategy in the context of realizing their own interests in the region of such states as

Romania, Germany, Bulgaria and Poland. But in general, all these actions have made EU policy in the region much more flexible and institutionalized. This concerns the establishment of the institution of the EU Special Representative, acting in the conflict zone and reporting directly to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission), as well as the creation of a special thematic department in EU External Action Service responsible for mediation policy.

At the same time, the strategy of Europeanization of the Transnistrian conflict, using the recommendations of rational choice theory, has also demonstrated the limits of its effectiveness. The main problem for increasing confidence building measures between the parties is the factor of the different value system of coordinates of the conflicting parties, which are based on intangible assets such as language, culture and history (Kolosov, 2019). In other words, no matter what economic preferences enterprises receive from the European Union, and citizens of Pridnestrovie who have Moldovan citizenship could enjoy the advantage of a visa-free regime, different cultural understanding of the causes of the conflict, as well as a vision of the prospects for its settlement, continue to have a serious impact on the final decision (Waal, T. and Twickel, N. 2020). There is no doubt that the EU-proposed confidence-building measures policy has improved and expanded intercultural communication between the parties. However, this strategy could not be consolidated into a system of guarantees between the parties. A certain mechanism that compensates for the lack of a system of guarantees for maintaining peace in the region was the geopolitical balance of power, which did not allow any of the international actors: Russia, the EU and the United States to gain additional advantage and influence on the situation.

Conclusions

An analysis of the activities of the European Union from 2005 to the present day testifies to the effectiveness of the use of the policy of sanctions and incentives based on the recommendations of the theory of rational choice in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. There are at least three main indicators of the success of Pridnestrovie's involvement in the legal field of the Republic of Moldova. First, in 2022, 64% of exports from Transnistria went to the EU, which is 10% more than in 2021. This, in turn, entailed the registration of economic agents of Transnistria in the authorities of the Republic of Moldova. Second, in 2023, the total number of citizens from the left-bank regions of the Dniester with Moldovan citizenship is 350 thousand people out of 465 thousand of the total population. This fact testifies, in our opinion, to the growing demand of the inhabitants of Transnistria for the use of the

European labor market and education. Third, the EU funding of projects to increase confidence building measures between the banks of the Dniester, gradually removes the enemy image from the parties to the conflict from the agenda and translates it into a complex but pragmatic relationship.

At the same time, stimulating the parties to the conflict, primarily Transnistria, to the European choice as a political platform has demonstrated the limits of using the rational choice methodology. For Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova, European integration takes place in different systems of value coordinates. If for Tiraspol the process of European integration is of an economic nature and does not contradict the pro-Russian vector of the statehood of Pridnestrovie (Rytovuori-Apunen, 2020). For the Republic of Moldova, Europeanization is a consolidating factor for the Moldovan society. Such a different understanding of European integration among the parties to the conflict is reflected in a different assessment of the Soviet past, which is transformed into problems in the present and forms opposite approaches to understanding the common future.

The outbreak of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine in February 2022 became a serious test of the strength of the agreements reached between Transnistria and Moldova mediated by the EU. Since in wartime conditions the logic of war comes to the fore, and rational tools no longer have such effectiveness. The question remains how long the status quo can be maintained in maintaining peace in the region, which, in fact, ensures the independence of Transnistria. Such a formulation of the problem is natural in that the emergence of the Transnistrian issue in 1990, as well as the hostilities on the territory of Moldova in 1992, were the result of the collapse of the Soviet state. After 30 years, the war in Ukraine actualized the issue of the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet space.

Thus, the outcome of the war in Ukraine will have a decisive significance and influence on the dynamics of the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and the determination of the status of Tiraspol in the new system of European security. Under these conditions, the increased influence of the European Union, achieved through effective mediation, can play a significant role both in maintaining peace on the banks of the Dniester and in developing a political format for resolving the conflict.

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Current state and priorities of post-war entrepreneurship development in Ukraine

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Abstract

The full-scale military invasion of the Russian Federation in February 2022 caused significant damage to the Ukrainian economy. The war caused obstacles in the sphere of foreign and domestic trade, disruption of transport and logistics processes, outflow of personnel abroad or partial movement of labor resources within the country, occupation of territories, destruction, looting of enterprises, which certainly affected the ability of entrepreneurship to fully function. This made it necessary to study the impact of war on the state of entrepreneurship of Ukraine. The purpose of the article is to study the state and identify priorities for the restoration and further development of entrepreneurship in the post-war period.

Keywords: trade, entrepreneurship, war, development, European Union

Introduction

Russia's military aggression against Ukraine caused large-scale destruction of production capital and infrastructure, brought human casualties and social losses. The war led to a reduction in jobs and incomes, a decrease in purchasing power and the amount of accumulated assets. In 2022, the national economy lost 29.2% of real GDP, and 14.5 million people were forced to leave their homes. More than 7 million people were below the poverty line, and the poverty level reached 24% of the population. Experts of the World Bank and the European Commission estimate the damage from the war in Ukraine in the period from February 24, 2022 to February 24, 2023 in the amount of 134.7 billion dollars. USA, and the needs for recovery - 410.6 billion US dollars (The World Bank, 2023).

In the course of the research, a set of methods was used, in particular, methods of economic and statistical analysis, system analysis and scientific abstraction, synthesis and generalization, methods of graphical analysis. The paper also examines the geographical structure of the main counterparty states and the commodity structure of the main categories of goods of foreign trade

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operations. In order to assess the entrepreneurial activity during martial law, the indicators of profitability of enterprises were studied and their dynamics were determined. In the course of the study, the state, structure and dynamics of assets of enterprises, as well as the sources of their formation, were analyzed. A special place in the research process is occupied by the analysis of registered legal entities and individual entrepreneurs. Indicators of the volume of industrial products sold and indices of industrial products, trade turnover of wholesale and retail trade enterprises are quite significant and indicative in assessing the activity of entrepreneurship. The article describes state and donor programs, private initiatives of the EU to support entrepreneurs in war conditions, and defines priorities for the post-war development of entrepreneurship in Ukraine.

Domestic business has also suffered significant losses and destruction since the start of the full-scale invasion. According to the Ministry of Digital Transformation, since the beginning of the war, 47% of enterprises have been stopped or almost stopped, and the total direct losses of small and medium-sized businesses since February 24 are estimated at 85 billion US dollars (Ministry of Digital Transformation, 2022).

The analysis of statistical data reflecting the current state of entrepreneurship in Ukraine is quite difficult at the moment, because on the basis of the Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of the Interests of the Subjects of Reporting and Other Documents during the Period of Martial Law or the State of War", the State Statistics Service has suspended the publication of statistical information for the period of martial law or the state of war, as well as for three months after its termination. The decision to close access to open data in connection with the war is part of Ukraine's defense strategy (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2022).

Such scientists as Bohdan, T. and Slutsky, B. were engaged in considering the issues of the current state and priorities of the development of post-war entrepreneurship in Ukraine. In particular, the work of Bohdan, T. is devoted to the financial and economic consequences of the war, prospects for post-war post-war recovery. Slutsky, B. investigated problematic issues of business functioning in wartime conditions (Bohdan and Slutsky, 2022).

1. General characteristics of foreign and domestic trade of Ukraine in recent years

During 2020-2022, foreign trade operations were conducted with partners from more than 200 countries of the world. In 2020, the volume of export of goods amounted to 49,191.8 mln. dollars USA, import - 54336.1 mln. dollars USA. The negative balance was 5144.3 mln. dollars USA.

In 2021, the total value of exports of goods reached a record level of 68,072.3 million US dollars, or 138.3% compared to 2020. Ukraine had previous indicators of this level during 2011-2012,

but without taking into account the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol and, partially, Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Import volumes increased to 72,843.1 million US dollars, or by 37.7% compared to 2020. The negative balance was 4,770.8 million US dollars (Fig. 1).


Figure 1. Foreign trade balance of Ukraine, 2020 -2022, million US dollars



Source: Authors ' representation based he Ministry of Economy of Ukraine data, 2023

In the period of 2020-2021, China, Poland, Turkey, Russian Federation, India, Italy, Netherlands, Egypt, Germany, Belarus, Spain were the largest counterparty countries of foreign trade operations with Ukraine in terms of export volumes.

Figure 2. Structure of exports by country, 2020-2022, in %



Source: Authors ' representation based he State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

During 2021, Ukraine exported the most to China in the amount of 7,886 million US dollars, which is 12.6% more than in 2020. Next was Poland with the volume of 4,378 million US dollars (by 73.9% more than in 2020). The three leaders in terms of exports were closed by Turkey with a volume of 4,016 million US dollars (by 68.5% more compared to 2020).

Table 1. Structure of exports by country, 2020-2022, million US dollars

	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2021</i> <i>/2020</i>	<i>2022</i> <i>/2021</i>	<i>2022/</i> <i>2020</i>
China	7003	7886	2453	112.6	31.1	35.0
Poland	2518	4378	5985	173.9	136.7	237.7
Turkey	2383	4016	2901	168.5	72.2	121.7
Russian Federation	2206	2728	339	123.7	12.4	15.4
India	1936	2482	889	128.2	35.8	45.9
Italy	1856	3340	1581	180.0	47.3	85.2
Netherlands	1618	2116	1448	130.8	68.4	89.5
Egypt	1616	1940	796	120.0	41.0	49.3
Germany	1497	2278	1786	152.2	78.4	119.3
Belarus	1335.3	1479.6	186	110.8	12.6	13.9
Spain	1241	1659	1563	133.7	94.2	125.9
United States of America	966	1595	856	165.1	53.7	88.6
Romania	787	1204	3639	153.0	302.2	462.4
Bulgaria	496	807	1417	162.7	175.6	285.7
Hungary	491	608	1359	123.8	223.5	276.8
Slovakia	355	924	1434	260.3	155.2	403.9
Others	20887.5	28631.7	15516.8	137.1	54.2	54.8
Total	49191.8	68072.3	44148.8	138.4	64.9	89.7

Source: Authors' representation based on State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2023

Export of goods to EU countries in 2022 increased by 4.2% compared to 2021 and amounted to about 27.9 billion dollars. USA (Svyridenko, 2023). Despite the fear that Ukraine may completely lose its presence in foreign markets, the real value volume of the reduction in turnover in 2022 amounted to 35.1% compared to the period of 2021 and reached the size of 44,148.8 million US dollars. Traditionally, there is a tendency to increase the negative balance of foreign trade. The value of this indicator at the end of 2022 increased 2.3 times compared to 2021 and amounted to 11,124.7 million US dollars. The export-import coverage ratio in 2022 was 0.8 (0.93 in 2021).

The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which is part of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, abolished most import duties, making it easier for Ukrainian entrepreneurs to exchange goods and services on the EU market. As a result of the mutual liberalization of market access within the framework of the FTAA and the reorientation of

Ukrainian trade, the share of the EU in the structure of Ukraine's foreign trade began to grow significantly from 2016 (Taran *et al.*, 2022).

A characteristic feature of 2022 became noticeable changes in the structure of trade partners of Ukraine. At the beginning of 2022, the main buyers of Ukrainian products were the EU and CIS countries, the remaining 50% was accounted for by other states, which include the USA, Asian and African countries. By the end of the year, the share of the EU in exports increased by 1.6 times, the share of the CIS countries fell in half, and the share of the rest of the partners decreased by more than a third (Pshenychnyy, 2023).

Geographically, the largest share of domestic exports in 2022 - 63% - was directed to EU countries. Among the EU member states, Poland (13.6%), Romania (8.2%), Germany (4.0%), Italy (3.6%), the Netherlands (3.6%) and Spain (3.5%). Outside the EU market, the largest exports were to Turkey (6.6%) and China (5.6%) (Calculated by the authors based on data State Statistics Service of Ukraine).


The geographical limitation of Ukraine's trade became an integral part of military operations. The northern direction was blocked by Belarus, and the eastern direction by Russia. In addition, during the first half of 2022, Russia blocked all sea ports of Ukraine, which prevented the possibility of using the southern (Black Sea) route for Ukraine's foreign trade. Therefore, the only direction of foreign trade became the western one. This very fact and the removal from June 4, 2022 by the EU of all customs duties and fees on any products coming from Ukraine determines the growth of the EU's share in the geographical structure of foreign trade and enables Ukrainian products to compete with European products and is an instrument of support for Ukraine in conditions of war (Gavrylenko, 2022).

During the second half of 2022, the situation regarding foreign trade logistics improved due to (Ministry of Development of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure of Ukraine, 2023):

- conclusion of the "Grain Initiative" with the UN and Turkey, which allowed unblocking the ports of Odesa (July 22, 2022);
- signing of the Agreement on Liberalization of Road Freight Transportation with the EU;
- development of border infrastructure (increasing the capacity of existing road and railway checkpoints, as well as opening new ones);
- increasing cargo handling in Danube ports.

Thanks to the opening of the grain corridor, the competition between the main modes of transport for the export of products has increased. In general, during 2022, 54% of Ukrainian exports will be shipped by sea, 34% by rail, and 12% by automobile.

Figure 3. Structure of exports by types of transport (million tons)



Source: Authors' representation based on Ministry of Development of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure of Ukraine data, 2023

The main commodity positions of Ukrainian exports in 2021 with a share of 23.5% (15991 million dollars USA) were base metals and preparations thereof, which is 77.1% more than in 2020. In particular, the export of ferrous metals increased by 13,950.1 million US dollars, which is 81% more than in 2020. 22.8% (15538 million dollars USA) in the commodity structure of exports in 2021 occupied plant products. Thus, the supply of cereals increased by 31% compared to 2020 in the amount of 12,343 million US dollars. To export-forming groups with a share of 12.4% (8,414.4 million US dollars, which is 57.8% more compared to 2020) and 10.3% (7,037.2 million US dollars, which is 22.5% more compared to 2020) respectively belonged to mineral products; animal or plant fats and oils.

Traditionally, the positions of exports of food and agricultural products strengthen during crisis events. Their share in the product structure of exports in 2022 was 53%, exceeding the indicators of 2020 by 7.9%, in 2021 - by 12.3% (Gavrylenko, 2022).

The leader in the commodity structure of Ukraine's foreign trade in terms of money (and volume) was corn grain. The export of this product group amounted to 24.99 million tons, worth 5941.2 million US dollars, which is 1% higher than in 2021. The second place in terms of export value was occupied by sunflower oil - 5,464.4 million US dollars, which is 14.4% less than in 2021. Wheat was exported by 44.1% less in physical volume - 11.2 million tons and by 44.7% in monetary terms - worth 2623.8 million US dollars. The export of sunflower seeds with a total value of 1,255 million US dollars increased significantly, by more than 33 times compared to 2021. USA. In 2022, compared to 2021, soybeans were exported by 81.6% more (1.99 million tons) with a total value of 862 million US dollars, which exceeds last year's figures by 42%. (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023). Although an increase in export volumes can be observed for most product groupings of food


and agricultural products, in the section of ready-made food products, there was a decrease of 25.7% for 2020-2022, for 2021-2022 by 34 %.

Table 2. Structure of exports by sections of goods of the Ukraine, 2020-2022, million US dollars

	2020	2021	2022	2021/ 2020	2022/ 2021	2022/ 2020
Live animals and livestock products	1188.2	1345.2	1472.4	113.2	109.5	123.9
Plant products	11883.2	15538.0	13478.5	130.8	86.7	113.4
Animal or plant fats and oils	5746.9	7037.2	5949.4	122.5	84.5	103.5
Finished food industry products	3361.0	3788.5	2497.0	112.7	65.9	74.3
Mineral products	5331.6	8414.4	4323.5	157.8	51.4	81.1
Products of chemical and allied industries	2020.1	2815.6	1287.2	139.4	45.7	63.7
Wood and articles of wood	1411.6	2005.8	1885.4	142.1	94.0	133.6
Base metals and preparations thereof	9030.0	15991.0	6004.1	177.1	37.5	66.5
Machines, equipment and mechanisms, electrical and technical equipment	4486.6	5260.2	3736.0	117.2	71.0	83.3
Others	4732.6	5876.4	3515.3	124.2	59.8	74.3
Total	49191.8	68072.3	44148.8	138.4	64.9	89.7

Source: Authors' representation based on State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

Figure 4. Structure of exports by sections of goods of the Ukraine, 2020-2022, in %



Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2023

The commodity grouping of low-value metals and their products highlights the entire tragedy of domestic metallurgy. The total export volume for 2020-2022 decreased by 33.5%. Comparing the indicators of 2022 with 2021, a decrease in exports by 62.5% can be observed. So, in particular, semi-finished products

made of steel and hot-rolled products experienced the biggest drop in volume - 72%. Also, in the course of 2020-2022, the volume of exports by mineral groupings decreased most significantly products; products of chemical and allied industries; machines, equipment and mechanisms, electrical and technical equipment. In 2022, according to the equation from 2021 - by 48.6%; 54.3%; 29% respectively.

Comparing the import indicators of 2021 with 2020, an increase in volumes can be observed, in 2022, in comparison with 2021, a decrease. In general, the increase over three years was 1.7%. In the period of 2020-2021, the most imported goods to Ukraine were China, Germany, Russian federation and Belarus. During 2021, Ukraine imported the most goods from China - 10,476 million US dollars, which is 31% more than in 2020. The second place was taken Russian Federation (6,018 million US dollars, which is almost 38.3% more than in 2020), the third is Germany (5,890 million US dollars, which is 18.8% more than in 2020).

The import of Ukrainian products in monetary terms during 2022 decreased by about a quarter compared to 2021.

Table 3. Structure of imports by country in 2020-2022 years, million US dollars


	2020	2021	2022	2021/ 2020	2022/ 2021	2022/ 2020
China	7991	10476	8253	131.1	78.8	103.3
Germany	4956	5890	4305	118.8	73.1	86.9
Russian federation	4350	6018	1540	138.3	25.6	35.4
Poland	3815	4622	5230	121.2	113.2	137.1
United States of America	3032	3294	2146	108.6	65.1	70.8
Belarus	2860	4774	1358	166.9	28.4	47.5
Turkey	2372	3189	3319	134.4	104.1	139.9
Italian	1987	2500	1678	125.8	67.1	84.4
France	1434	1730	1208	120.6	69.8	84.2
Hungary	1066	1225	740	114.9	60.4	69.4
Japan	1053	1200	623	114.0	51.9	59.2
Czechia	888	1326	1414	149.3	106.6	159.2
Lithuania	809	1281	1315	158.3	102.7	162.5
Netherlands	726	980	1056	135.0	107.8	145.5
India	714	949	1675	132.9	176.5	234.6
Romania	546	653	1413	119.6	216.4	258.8
Bulgaria	287	394	2003	137.3	508.4	697.9
Others	10305.8	22342.1	15997.5	216.8	71.6	155.2
Total	54336.1	72843.1	55273.5	134.1	75.9	112.4

Source: Authors' representation based on State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

At the beginning of 2022 the main partners who exported goods to Ukraine there were EU, CIS and other states countries that are not part of this groups. By the end of the year, the majority share in imports was taken by the EU, the share of the CIS decreased by more than 2 times, the share of

Asia, Africa, the USA and other countries did not change (Pshenychnyy, 2023). **In general, according to the results of 2022, Ukraine imported almost 15% of all goods from China, 7.8% from Germany, 9.5% from Poland, 6% from Turkey.** Deliveries from Bulgaria have increased significantly, by more than 5 times; in more than 2 times from Romania, by 76.5% from India.

Figure 5. Structure of imports by country in 2020-2022 years, in %



Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

During 2020-2022, the largest share in the commodity structure of Ukraine's imports was made up of mineral products; products of chemical and allied industries; machines, equipment and mechanisms, electric and technical equipment; ground, air and water transport facilities, which are intended, in particular, for needs defensive complex.

During 2020-2022, import of goods of the mineral group products increased by 51.9%, although in 2022, compared to 2021, deliveries decreased by 12.4% to 13,112.1 million US dollars. Most of all, in 2021, Ukraine imported mineral fuel, petroleum and petroleum distillation (for 14,330 million US dollars, which is 79.5% more than in 2020); machines, equipment and mechanisms, electric and technical equipment (for 14,206 million US dollars, which is 23% more compared to 2020).

Table 4. Structure of imports by sections of goods of the Ukraine, 2020-2022


	2020	2021	2022	2021/ 2020	2022/ 2021	2022/ 2020
Plant products	1989.3	2130.5	1926.6	107.1	90.4	96.8
Finished food industry products	2970.6	3578.4	2554.7	120.5	71.4	86.0

Current state and priorities of post-war entrepreneurship development in Ukraine

Mineral products	8633.3	14968.8	13112.1	173.4	87.6	151.9
Products of chemical and allied industries	7333.7	9743.0	6302.7	132.9	64.7	85.9
Polymeric materials, plastics and articles thereof	3403.8	4816.7	3247.2	141.5	67.4	95.4
Textile materials and articles of textiles	2291.1	2661.5	2483.0	116.2	93.3	108.4
Base metals and preparations thereof	3129.3	4372.5	2590.7	139.7	59.2	82.8
Machines, equipment and mechanisms, electrical and technical equipment	11552.8	14206.0	9181.6	123.0	64.6	79.5
Ground, air and water transport facilities	5743.1	7572.4	5629.8	131.9	74.3	98.0
Others	7289.1	8793.3	8245.1	120.6	93.8	113.1
Total	54336.1	72843.1	55273.5	134.1	75.9	101.7

Source: Authors' representation based on State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

Figure 6. Structure of imports by sections of goods of the Ukraine, 2020 -2022, in %



Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2023

In 2022, Ukraine's significant need for fuel and energy products led to the fact that the leading place was occupied by the mineral group products and accounted for almost a quarter of imports - 23.7%. Traditionally, most of the fuel in Ukraine was supplied by Russian federation and Belarus, up to 40% of the market's needs were covered by domestic production. Currently, Western European countries, Turkey and India export fuel to Ukraine. In connection with the reduction in its consumption, imports in monetary terms decreased in 2022 by 13.4% compared to 2021.

The leading position of Ukraine's imports in 2022, namely 16.6%, was occupied by machines, equipment and mechanisms, electric and technical equipment, but comparing the indicators of 2020 and 2021, a reduction in the volume of supplies of this group can be seen by 35.4% and 20.5%,

respectively. Significantly, with a share of 11.4% (6302.7 million US dollars) and 10.2% (5629.8 million US dollars) will accordingly import products of chemical and allied industries; ground, air and water transport facilities.

In the context of the analysis of trade relations between Ukraine and the EU during 2020-2022, we note that the export of goods to the EU countries in 2021 increased by almost 50% compared to 2020 and amounted to 26.8 billion dollars. USA. Thus, in 2021, the main product groups of exports were ferrous metals - 20.3% (126.8% more compared to 2020); ores, slag - 11.2% (107.6% more compared to 2020); electric cars – 9.6% (20.3% more compared to 2020); fats and oils – 8.8% (35.3% more compared to 2020); grain crops - 7.2% (16.3% more compared to 2020); seeds and fruits of oil plants - 5.5% (more by 29.2% compared to 2020); wood and wood products - 5.4% (46.4% more than in 2020); furniture – 3.3% (41.1% more compared to 2020).

During 2022, the export of goods to the EU increased by 4.2% compared to 2021 and reached \$27.9 billion. USA. Cereal crops were exported the most - 16.8% (141.7% more than in 2021); fats and oils - 11.0% (29.4% more than in 2021); seeds and fruits of oil plants - 10.4% (more by 96.5% compared to 2021); ferrous metals - 10.0% (down by 48.7% compared to 2021); ores, slag - 8.5% (21.0% less than in 2021); electric cars – 8.3% (down by 10.0% compared to 2021); wood and wood products - 5.8% (13.2% more than in 2021); energy materials - 3.3% (59.5% more than in 2021).


The import of goods from the EU in 2021 compared to 2020 increased by 25.2% **and amounted to** 29.0 billion dollars. USA. In 2021, nuclear reactors, boilers, and machines were imported the most - 13.3% (28.2% more compared to 2020); means of land transport, except for railway - 11.3% (more by 28.3% compared to 2020); energy materials – 11.0% (58.3% more compared to 2020); electric cars – 7.0% (3.8% more compared to 2020); pharmaceutical products - 7.0% (17.6% more compared to 2020); plastics, polymer materials – 6.2% (36.0% more compared to 2020); various chemical products – 2.8% (10.1% more compared to 2020); paper and cardboard - 2.4% (20.5% more than in 2020).

During 2022, the import of goods from the EU decreased by 6.7% **and amounted to** 27.0 billion dollars. USA. Energy materials in imports made up 24.0% (more by 103.7% compared to 2021); means of land transport, except for railway - 10.8% (10.5% more compared to 2021); nuclear reactors, boilers, machines - 7.1% (down by 50.1% compared to 2021); miscellaneous - 6.7% (more by 2532.7% compared to 2021); electric cars – 5.6% (down by 25.4% compared to 2021); plastics, polymer materials – 5.0% (down by 24.2% compared to 2021); pharmaceutical products – 4.8% (35.9% less compared to 2021); various chemical products - 2.4% (20.2% less compared to 2021) (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023).

During 2020-2021, the values of wholesale indicators and retail trade turnover of wholesale and retail enterprises increased. Thus, in particular, wholesale turnover of wholesale enterprises (legal entities) increased by 37.2%; turnover of retail trade - by 20.2%; retail turnover of retail trade enterprises (legal entities) - by 20.3%. Traditionally, non-food products have a greater specific weight in both wholesale and retail trade, with annual growth in volumes.

The turnover of the retail trade of Ukraine in 2022 compared to 2021 decreased by 3.2% and amounted to about 1,397,825 million UAH. The turnover of retail trade enterprises (legal entities) in 2022, compared to 2021, decreased by 6.8%, amounting to 973,800.1 million UAH.

Figure 7. Wholesale and retail trade turnover of wholesale and retail enterprises, 2020 -2022, million UAH



* Wholesale trade turnover of wholesale trade enterprises in 2022 is shown for January
 Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2023

The wholesale turnover of wholesale trade enterprises (legal entities) in January 2022 was 267,623.0 million hryvnias. Compared to January 2021, its physical volume increased by 12.6%. Retail turnover in January 2022 it was 127,437 million hryvnias, which is 18.0% more than the volume of January 2021. and 18.5% less than the volume of December 2021.


The share of sales by retail enterprises of goods produced on the territory of Ukraine during 2020-2021 reached the level of 53%. About 80% of domestically produced food products are sold; about a third - non- food (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2020-2022). Among food products, domestically produced eggs and bakery products take the largest share in sales, while fresh fruits, berries, grapes and nuts occupy the smallest share.

2. Analysis of Entrepreneurship in Ukraine

Business is an active participant in the struggle for Ukraine's independence. 93.4% - involved in helping the country during the war, about 70% - directly in volunteer activities. From 32.5% (East of Ukraine) to 43.3% (South of Ukraine) of owners/co-owners/managers and employees of the business independently, if possible, involved in the struggle for independence. For 41.5% of respondents in Central Ukraine, army assistance (volunteering, transfer of part of their own products free of charge/at cost price, provision of services, etc.) is an important part of the life of their team and business in general.

Every fifth (and in the West of Ukraine - every third) business is convinced that it is the development of business, the creation of new jobs, the timely and full payment of taxes — an important contribution to Ukraine's victory in the war with the Russian Federation (Center for Innovations Development, 2022).

Figure 8. Analysis of business assistance to Ukraine in victory in the war, in %



Source: Authors' representation based on the Center for Innovations Development data, 2022

Provide assistance mostly by volunteering, transferring a large part of the products for free or at cost, and to the extent of their capabilities. It should be noted that assistance through the development of business, jobs and the ability to pay taxes is provided most in the western and northern

regions of the country. Enterprises of the eastern region, more than others, do not have the opportunity to provide assistance in the war due to a significant part of the occupation of these territories.

According to the results of the survey, carried out with the assistance of the Center for the Development of Innovations, the Office for the Development of Entrepreneurship and Export, the national project Diya.Business together with Advanter Group, with the support of the European Union, analyzed what prevents entrepreneurs from restoring and developing their business (Diya. Business, 2022).

Among the most significant obstacles to the recovery and development of business, it is worth highlighting (Diya. Business, 2022):

- lack of a sufficient number of solvent customers in the domestic market - 62%;
- unpredictability of the development of the situation in Ukraine and the domestic market - 48%;
- lack of sufficient capital - 43%;
- unforeseen actions of the state that can worsen the state of business - 29%;
- unavailability of credit funds, in particular the "5–7–9" program, loans at 0%, etc. - 28%;
- destruction of supply chains - 26%;
- inefficient, long, expensive logistics - 23%.

The analysis of its profitability and profitability is of great importance in determining the state of entrepreneurship. So, the analysis of net profit (loss) of large and medium-sized enterprises is presented in Table 5.


Table 5. Net profit (loss) of large and medium-sized enterprises for January-September

Year	Net profit (loss), million UAH	Businesses that made a profit		Enterprises that received a loss	
		in % to the total number of enterprises	financial result, million UAH	in % to the total number of enterprises	financial result, million UAH
Jan-Sept 2019	254629.8	76.7	349397.7	23.3	94767.9
Jan-Sept 2020	-89824.6	64.5	209117.4	35.5	298942.0
Jan-Sept 2021	452957.7	76.3	545141.3	23.7	92183.6
Jan-Sept 2022	-195799.0	58.9	225064.5	41.1	420863.5

Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

According to the data presented in the table, it is worth noting the instability of the financial results of large and medium-sized enterprises during the studied years. Thus, the total net profit of enterprises is recorded during 2019 and 2021, and the loss during 2020 and 2022. Positive dynamics of the percentage of profitable enterprises is noted in 2019 and 2021. On the other hand, the percentage of enterprises that suffered a loss increased in 2020 and 2022.

Figure 9. Profitability of operating and all activities of large and medium-sized enterprises by types of economic activity for January-September



Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

Analyzing data on the operational profitability of large and medium-sized enterprises, we note that over the past four years it has been positive, reaching the highest values in 2019 and 2021, in particular 10.2% and 14.9%, respectively. Investigating the value of the level of profitability of the whole We will note unprofitability of enterprise activities in 2020 and 2022, in particular -2.7% and -5.0%, respectively.

Table 6. Analysis of the state and structure of assets of large and medium-sized enterprises of Ukraine as of September 30

Years	Name of the asset						Total assets Amount, million UAH
	Non-current assets		Current assets		Non-current assets and disposal groups		
	Amount, million UAH.	Specific weight, %	Amount, million UAH	Specific weight, %	Amount, million UAH	Specific weight, %	
2019	3250466	48,69	3421078	51.24	4478.1	0.07	6676022
2020	3212382	46,12	3748009	53.81	4570	0.07	6964961
2021	3565732	43.77	4576641	56,18	4059.5	0.05	8146433
2022	3426097	42.89	4559323	57.07	3463.1	0.04	7988883

Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

According to the data on the state of assets of large and medium-sized enterprises of Ukraine, we note that their growth has been occurring during the years under study. Except for a slight drop in 2022.

Analysis of the dynamics of enterprise assets showed their fluctuations during the studied periods. Thus, in 2020, there is a reduction in non-current assets and an increase in current assets and non-current assets and disposal groups. In 2021, there was an increase in both non-current and current assets, with the exception of only non-current assets and disposal groups, the rate of change of which was 88.83%. The year 2022 is characterized by the reduction of all assets.

Table 7. Analysis of the state and dynamics of sources of asset formation of large and medium-sized enterprises of Ukraine as of September 30

Years	The name of the source of the formation of the asset							
	Equity		Long-term obligations and security		Current liabilities and provisions		Liabilities related to non-current assets and disposal groups and net value of non-state pension fund assets	
	Amount, million UAH	Growth rate, %	Amount, million UAH	Growth rate, %	Amount, million UAH	Growth rate, %	Amount, million UAH	Growth rate, %
2019	2164013.1	-	1017235.5	-	3494769.3	-	4	-
2020	1887027.2	87.20	1112084.5	109.32	3965771.5	113.48	77.5	1937.50
2021	2448392.7	129.75	1149355.3	103.35	4548575.3	114.70	109.7	141.55
2022	2226827.6	90.95	1260618.6	109.68	4501334.7	98.96	102.4	93.35

Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

According to the analysis of the sources of asset formation, we will note a reduction in the use of own assets in 2020 (87.2% growth rate) and 2022 (90.95% growth rate). In 2021, a 29.75% increase in equity is noted. When studying long-term liabilities, it is worth noting the stable growth rates during the studied period. Current liabilities increased during 2019-2021. In 2022, there was a reduction of 1.04%.

Table 8. Number of registered legal entities with distribution by gender of the manager as of the beginning of the year

Year	Total number of legal entities, units	Legal entities whose managers are			
		men		women	
		quantity, units	share, in % to the total amount	quantity, units	share, in % to the total amount
2020	1350627	960296	71.1	390331	28.9

2021	1395448	987977	70.8	407471	29.2
2022	1437009	1016341	70.7	420668	29.3
2023	1464953	1036980	70.8	427973	29.2

Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2023

Analysis of the number of registered legal entities as of the beginning of the year allows us to judge positive changes, evidenced by the annual increase in their number.

A study of the number of registered legal entities with a distribution based on the gender of the manager as of the beginning of the year makes it possible to conclude that the vast majority of enterprises are headed by men. Over the past four years, there has been an increase in both the number of men and the number of women among managers, but the structural changes are relatively stable.

Table 9. Number of registered natural persons-entrepreneurs with distribution by gender of the manager as of the beginning of the year

Year	The total number of individual entrepreneurs, persons, units	Natural persons-entrepreneurs, whose heads are			
		men		women	
		quantity, units	share, in % to the total amount	quantity, units	share, in % to the total amount
2021	1855165	994368	53.6	860797	46.4
2022	1359002	721011	53.1	637991	46.9
2023	1422526	770147	54.1	652379	45.9

Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2023

Apart from the positive changes occurring in the dynamics of legal entities, the analysis of the number of registered individual entrepreneurs as of the beginning of the year allows us to judge their significant decline in 2022. In 2023, there was a slight increase in the number of registered individual entrepreneurs, reaching the value of 1,422,526 units.

Examining the number of registered individual entrepreneurs by gender, it is worth noting the slight predominance of men among managers. During the last three years, there have been practically no significant structural changes, only minor fluctuations are noted.

Analyzing the number of active enterprises of Ukraine, it is worth noting minor fluctuations during 2020-2021, in particular 699.80 thousand units. and 698.77 thousand units. in accordance. A noticeable reduction is noted in 2022, reaching the value of 659.76 thousand units. (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2020-2022).

One of the rather indicative indicators characterizing the state of entrepreneurship is the index of industrial production.

Table 10. Indices of industrial production in Ukraine for 2020-2022

Month	Month to previous month			The month to the corresponding month of the previous year		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
January	91.9	84.3	87.0	95.1	96.5	102.9
February	101.1	100.3	87.4	99.0	95.8	89.9
March	103.7	111.1	57.2	93.3	102.6	46.3
April	87.6	97.0	111.9	84.9	113.7	53.4
May	103.5	97.2	107.5	87.5	106.7	59.1
June	104.4	100.2	100.3	95.3	102.4	59.2
July	104.2	103.4	100.6	97.1	101.5	57.7
August	96.5	96.8	101.9	95.9	101.9	60.6
September	104.5	102.7	102.3	96.6	100.2	60.2
October	105.6	108.0	105.0	95.8	102.4	58.4
November	101.2	100.0	99.3	100.5	101.2	58.1
December	102.7	101.2	96.3	105.3	99.7	55.9

Source: Authors' representation based on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

It is important to evaluate the study of indices of industrial production as compared to the previous month, as well as in the dynamics to the corresponding month of the previous year. Studying the dynamics of the indices until the previous month, we note that the following conclusions can be reached. In 2020 and 2021, an insignificant reduction of the indices is noted in January, April and August. The year 2022 is characterized by a decrease in the index at the beginning of the year, in particular in January (87.0%), February (87.4%) and March (57.2%), which is directly related to the beginning of military aggression. Starting from April to October 2022, slight increases in the index can be noted. However, the year ended with the reduction of the index to the values of 99.3% in November and 96.3% in December.

Table 11. Volume of sold industrial products for 2020-2022

Years	Volume of sold industrial products (goods, services) without VAT and excise duty		From it, the volume of products sold outside the country	
	million UAH	in % to the total volume of industrial products sold	million UAH	in % to the volume of realized industrial products by type of activity
2020	2481148.5	100.0	710206,1	x
2021	3589379	100.0	1017675.9	x
2022	2813790.1	100.0	564097.2	20.0

Source: Authors' representation based on State Statistics Service of Ukraine data, 2022

Of the index of industrial production in comparison with the corresponding month of the previous year is of great importance. It should be noted that during 2020 there was a reduction in almost every month, with the exception of November and December. In 2021, positive dynamics are noted in almost every month. The largest decline in the index of industrial production is observed throughout 2022. The biggest drop occurred in March (46.3%) and April (53.4%) compared to these months in 2021.

The analysis of the volume of industrial products sold makes it possible to judge the growth in 2021, the value of which amounted to 3589379.0 million UAH. In 2022, it will decrease to 2,813,790.1 million UAH. It should also be noted that the volume of products sold outside the country in connection with military operations in 2022 decreased by almost half, amounting to 564,097.2 million UAH.

3. Priorities for the post-war development of entrepreneurship in Ukraine

The war became an indicator for Ukrainian business, showing its weaknesses and highlighting its advantages. All last year, entrepreneurs learned stability, resistance to change, showed maximum flexibility and ingenuity, and changed business models. And although the domestic market is unstable, and business has not fully adapted to the realities of war, Ukrainian companies are already preparing for the next step, which involves the active recovery of activities after our victory.

The study of the presence of a business strategy and a business development plan taking into account new realities showed that 11.1% do not have and do not see the point, 55.5% are in the process of thinking and intuitive management, 7% have a strategy, the basic elements of planning have been established, in particular financially, 20% have a strategy and flexibly adapt their action plans, and 6% have both an adapted strategy and a business plan (Diya. Business, 2022).

According to the results of a survey published on the national Diya.Business portal, among the key decisions for the development of entrepreneurship for 2023, the owners noted the following:

- search for new customers / sales channels - 68%;
- cost reduction - 52%;
- search for financing - 41%;
- launch of new business areas - 35%;
- anti-crisis management – 33%;
- search for partners in foreign markets – 32%;
- export development – 30%;

- receiving debts from customers - 21%;
- staff reduction - 20% (Career Hub, 2022).

The national recovery website of Ukraine presents a recovery plan aimed at accelerating sustainable economic growth (Recovery of Ukraine, 2022). A positive aspect of the Recovery Plan of Ukraine is that it represents a potential synergy on the way to EU integration. The Plan adequately covers tasks related to EU integration, synchronizing Ukrainian legislation with the Copenhagen criteria, and ensuring mutual access to markets. Post-war reconstruction is considered as a tool for achieving Ukraine's compliance with EU rules and standards (Bohdan, 2023).

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the government of Ukraine, despite the negative consequences for the state budget, has introduced a number of government programs to support entrepreneurs in wartime conditions. In the first days of the war, the right was granted to natural persons-entrepreneurs and legal entities with a turnover of up to 10 billion UAH. to pay a single turnover tax of 2%, canceled duties, customs fees and value added tax (20%) on imported goods, canceled excise tax and reduced VAT on fuel to 7%, exemption of individual entrepreneurs of groups 1-2 from payment of a single tax, a moratorium was introduced on non-calculation of fines and penalties for businesses and citizens.

Table 12. Donor programs, private initiatives to support entrepreneurs in wartime (state)

№ s/p	Name of the program	Characteristics of the program
1	Catalog of Ukrainian exporters (e-catalogue)	Free online service created to establish direct business contacts between foreign companies and Ukrainian producers of goods and services.
2	Compensation for employment of internally displaced persons	Employer support program (providing compensation to employers for employment of internally displaced persons)
3	The grant program is Work	Grants for business start-up, entrepreneurship development and training. It is aimed at activating entrepreneurial activity and stimulating the creation of jobs. The project includes 6 grant programs: micro-grants for creating your own business; grants for the development of a processing enterprise; state funding for planting a garden; funds for the development of greenhouse farming; a grant for the implementation of a startup .
4	Program for the relocation of Ukrainian productions	It is intended for enterprises located in the zone of active hostilities or territory where there is a threat of the introduction of active hostilities. Priority is given to strategic enterprises and enterprises that produce essential goods.
5	The program of affordable financing for exporters during	The state, through the tool of the Export Credit Agency, acts as a guarantor of the return of loans issued for the

	the war "Loans for the execution of foreign economic contracts under a simplified procedure"	performance of foreign economic contracts (FET), which makes bank loans more accessible to Ukrainian exporters.
6	Ukrainian Food Platform	The first Ukrainian marketplace focused on finding importers and promoting Ukrainian food products on foreign markets
7	"RE: start. A safe space for your business."	The project is aimed at supporting small and medium-sized Ukrainian businesses that are on the verge of closure due to physical placement in occupied/ de-occupied /victimized territories.

Source: Authors' representation based on the Diya. Business, Ministry of Economy of Ukraine data, 2022

However, by the beginning of 2023, most business benefits have been significantly revised or canceled. That is why Ukrainian entrepreneurs began to prefer receiving international grants in attracting resources to continue their activities.

Table 13. Donor programs, private initiatives to support entrepreneurs in wartime (international, EU)

No s/p	Name of the program	Characteristics of the program
1	USAID program "Competitive Economy of Ukraine"	A grant program to support business continuity and recovery, including business relocation or recovery, expansion into foreign markets, and maintaining and/or improving existing business capabilities.
2	Business support project "Biz For Ukraine"	A project for Ukrainian companies that have the opportunity to remotely provide service services for foreign companies.
3	The Supply Chain Resilience (SCR) platform	The platform involves finding international partners, protecting international supply chains (preserving, restructuring or replacing existing chains), as well as finding/offering raw materials, parts, components and services needed to support production.
4	Do Business with Ukrainians	The project is aimed at encouraging American and global international companies to support Ukrainian business. The B2B platform enables foreign customers to work with proven small and medium-sized businesses from Ukraine, and Ukrainian entrepreneurs to obtain new contracts with Western companies.
5	Ready For EU	Helping entrepreneurs and enterprises to take advantage of the EU internal market. The project is designed for Ukrainian small and medium-sized entrepreneurs who suffered from the war, as well as for new Ukrainian businesses.
6	Women's Entrepreneurship Empowerment Program	For women who have lost sources of income to support their families due to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Source: Authors' representation based on the Diya. Business, Ministry of Economy of Ukraine data, 2023

The cost of damages and losses from Russian aggression has already reached record levels, and the drop in real GDP in Ukraine is deeper than in most countries that have experienced armed conflicts. At the same time, Ukraine managed to maintain macro-financial stability and attract significant amounts of international aid, which will positively affect the prospects of post-war recovery (Bohdan, 2023).

Today, you can see how business sharks, as well as medium and small businesses, create and test new strategies for scaling and development. So, in order to be successful not only on the domestic market, but also on the international market, the main directions of the development of Ukrainian enterprises in the post-war period were highlighted:

1. Adaptation and change of business models. Ukrainian entrepreneurs reacted quickly enough to the needs of wartime. Many enterprises repurposed production to meet the needs of the Armed Forces. The post-war period will also require entrepreneurs to repurpose, expand the range of production and open new areas of activity. In this way, entrepreneurs will try to insure themselves against losses in unstable times.

2. Creative approach and personalization. To stay in the market and win the favor of customers, entrepreneurs will need to use a variety of creatives and personalize the approach to the potential consumer.

3. Digitization. Today, business considers digital technologies as a growth stimulator. The latest IT solutions are actively used: artificial intelligence, chatbots, means of communication with clients. Therefore, the presence of the company online has become mandatory. E-commerce will enable entrepreneurs to avoid certain risks.

4. Partnership. Since the first days of the war, Ukrainian entrepreneurs have supported each other by establishing useful contacts and advice, which will not lose its relevance even in the post-war period. In the conditions of collapsing logistics chains, lack of raw materials, partnership agreements can be formed even with former competitors. As a result of such collaboration, entrepreneurs will be able to protect their businesses and strengthen each other.

5. Grants. Grants can also be a life-saving opportunity for business. Today, many programs are operating in Ukraine - both from international and state donors. And the business can receive start-up, scaling and development funds from 1,000 dollars. USA and up to 270,000 dollars. USA.

6. Globalization. Economic globalization became one of the most important tools of Ukrainian entrepreneurship during the war. Thus, Ukrainian entrepreneurs are already creating and developing businesses that will not only remain in the domestic market, but also integrate abroad.

7. Willingness to meet international standards. Certification, obtaining permits is a mandatory condition for the company to enter the EU market. As well as reference quality of products or services and reliability in the fulfillment of orders.

Europeans are very selective in choosing their partners. Therefore, only those companies that meet the standards and have a good reputation in the country of origin will be able to gain a foothold in the international business environment. For Ukrainian business, this is an opportunity not only to expand the market, but also to adopt business traditions. That will also have an impact on the culture of doing business within the state.

Conclusions

The paper examines the geographical structure of the main counterparty states and the commodity structure of the main categories of goods of foreign trade operations. In order to assess the entrepreneurial activity during martial law, the indicators of profitability of enterprises were studied and their dynamics were determined. In the course of the study, the state, structure and dynamics of assets of enterprises, as well as the sources of their formation, were analyzed. A special place in the research process is occupied by the analysis of registered legal entities and individual entrepreneurs. Indicators of the volume of industrial products sold and indices of industrial products, trade turnover of wholesale and retail trade enterprises are quite significant and indicative in assessing the activity of entrepreneurship. The article describes state and donor programs, private initiatives of the EU to support entrepreneurs in war conditions, and defines priorities for the post-war development of entrepreneurship in Ukraine.

The national economy largely adapts to military conditions. The situation with the export of Ukrainian goods and services is gradually improving, the volume of non-critical imports of those goods that can be produced domestically is decreasing, which contributes to the reduction of the balance of payments deficit. An important task for the government remains to create an opportunity for businesses to export goods with greater added value and further increase the potential of the defense-industrial complex. Ukrainian business demonstrates to the world extraordinary resilience and desire to develop despite the challenges of war. Despite the existing difficulties, domestic entrepreneurs should continue to work and hold the economic front.

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International cooperation for countering terrorism within the UN: theoretical-empirical aspects

Cristina EJOVA*

Abstract

This paper explores the policies of the United Nations and specialized institutions concerning the coordination of international community efforts to combat terrorist threats. Terrorism remains a significant threat to international security, despite the war in Ukraine taking priority in terms of insecurity. In this regard, international cooperation aimed at countering terrorism remains relevant, and the actions taken between 2015 and 2018 must be expanded and intensified. Such cooperation requires the participation of a broad spectrum of actors in international relations, including states, governmental international organizations, and civil society. Terrorism continues to be a global problem, and multilateral cooperation is both timely and necessary to counter it. Terrorist movements have not taken a break, despite their lack of large-scale actions, as they continue to express themselves through the activities of crisis cells or lone wolves. Consequently, prophylaxis methods must be supplemented, considering the new forms of terrorism expression. The United Nations organization continues to prove itself as the institution authorized to develop the legal framework and coordinate international efforts to counter this scourge.

Keywords: international terrorism, international cooperation, United Nations

Introduction

One of the most pressing and discussed issues on the global agenda in recent years is the problem of international terrorism, as well as the activities of states and the international community in countering it. Terrorism is a real, long-term, and large-scale threat. Currently, it is one of the major factors affecting global development and shaping the socio-political agenda at all levels, from national to international. The threat of terrorism is transnational in nature; therefore, it cannot be suppressed by any state in isolation. Only close interaction of the international community is the most important factor in the effectiveness of implementing global anti-terrorist policy and efficient cooperation among participating states. International cooperation in the fight against terrorism is continuously based on building an efficient system for combating terrorism. The UN and European

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regional organizations have made the greatest contribution to strengthening international cooperation in the field of counterterrorism.

The study of terrorism as a scientific subject emerged relatively recently. At the same time, it has been influencing the development of society since the 19th century, but scientific works dedicated to this phenomenon only began to appear in the second half of the 20th century. It's worth noting that in the 21st century, in the Western world, the last stage of researching the phenomenon of terrorism in the social sciences began. In 2001, representatives of the main directions in socio-political thought in the United States paid special attention to international terrorism, associating this threat with the conflict between the Christian and Muslim civilizations. Of course, the role of the events of September 11, 2001, which provoked an immediate response in the scientific community, was crucial. Numerous works were developed to both explain the tragedy of terrorist acts and address the issue of terrorism in the modern world. Since that moment, terrorism has become a very important topic on the agendas of security experts, government agencies, and scholars, leading to the publication of numerous scientific papers.

A significant contribution to the research on the evolution of terrorism and its changing forms was made by D. Rapoport, the author of the concept of the “four waves” of terrorism. The researcher analyzes contemporary terrorism, treating it as a means of revolutionary violence through these “waves” of terrorism. The main criteria for distinguishing one wave from another are its global nature, common driving force, objectives, and strategy differing from the previous wave. The first wave, the anarchist one, occurred at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (1870-1920). The next one is the “anti-colonial wave,” beginning with the legalization of the principle of self-determination after World War I, followed by acts of violence after World War II, such as the civil wars in Algeria or Vietnam. The third wave (1960-1980) is known as the new left or Marxist wave. Marxist terrorists sought to dramatize their actions, using assassinations and assassination attempts on politicians as visible punishment for their policies. They also employed kidnapping and hostage-taking strategies to attract public attention. Unlike nationalist terrorists, they lacked broad support, which led to the collapse of this wave. The fourth wave (1970–2020) is the religious one, with Islam at its center. However, terrorist groups professing other religions (such as Sikhs in Punjab, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, or Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka) are also included in this wave. During this period, religious terrorism gained momentum and became a global phenomenon (Rapoport, 2004).

A renowned researcher of the theoretical aspects of terrorism, Professor I. Primoratz from the University of Melbourne, in “*Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues*,” has classified definitions of the concept of terrorism based on three main content areas: defining terrorism through the lens of

violence; extensive and narrow definitions of terrorism; and non-standardized definitions of terrorism (Primoratz, 2005).

Noam Chomsky, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a representative of American “dissident alternative” thinking, is a consistent critic of U.S. administrations and their policies. Chomsky argues that the main sources of international terrorism are the world’s major powers, particularly the United States, in his case study. Other areas of analysis include the relationship between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, the introduction of concepts such as “Islamic terrorism” and “global terrorism” into the scholarly discourse, and an extended interpretation of the theory of asymmetric threats to international security (Chomsky, 2002).

One of the more recent significant works in this field is “*Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice*,” authored in collaboration by De. Frias, K. Samuel, and N. D. White. This work emphasizes the study of human rights mechanisms in the context of counter-terrorism, as well as the integration of international and national legal mechanisms in the fight against terrorism (De Frias, Samuel, White, 2012).

In the same vein, it’s worth mentioning the work “*Counter-terrorism strategies in a fragmented international legal order: Meeting the challenges*,” edited by professors L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver. According to the authors, a significant boost in the development of international law in this field will ensure the relationship between different branches of international law, the systematic application of its norms for combating terrorism, the use of a comprehensive strategy within the international legal framework, with a strong emphasis on international cooperation in preventing and investigating terrorism. This also includes broadening the foundations for the use of force against terrorism and the relationship between human rights law and international human rights law in the fight against terrorism (Herik and Schrijver, 2015).

Referring to the exponents of international relations theory who have contributed to the study of international terrorism to varying degrees, we can mention the following: neorealists such as K. Waltz and S. Waltz, who view terrorism as a tool of state foreign policy, used to achieve strategic objectives at the lowest cost without altering the structure of the international political system; representatives of the liberal institutionalism school, R. Keohane and J. Nye, who classify terrorism as a phenomenon that introduces structural changes in global politics and requires international community cooperation to combat it; constructivists like A. Wendt and A. Spencer, who focus on the socio-cultural causes of terrorism and the role of identity in shaping extremist ideologies.

K. Waltz, in his article “*The Continuity of World Politics*,” notes that the problem of modern terrorism is associated with an imbalance in the modern global political system caused by the dominance of the United States (Waltz, 2002, p. 20). According to the theorist of the

neoliberal school, R. Keohane, terrorism in the near future will be defined “inductively and operationally as acts of illegal violence that the vast majority of states, members of the anti-terror coalition, consider illegitimate.” (Keohane, 2002) From the perspective of J. Nye, terrorism is not the most prevalent threat in developed countries. In fact, it is a “form of theater” because the terrorists’ task is to attract public attention, not just to cause casualties. Social media platforms play a significant role in spreading terrorist acts, ultimately benefiting the terrorists, as they aim for extensive public outcry. Modern jihadist terrorism is a long-term phenomenon, “cloaked in religious garb,” and its emergence is attributed to the loss of identity due to globalization processes. To eliminate it, Nye suggests the use of “smart power,” which involves both tough measures to combat terrorists and “soft power” to prevent the recruitment of new terrorists (Nye, 2016). A. Wendt, one of the founders of constructivist international relations theory, insists that international relations are not something given but rather something fundamentally created. He emphasizes the influence of ideas and individuals and how they shape state policies. Thus, terrorism is inseparable from the discourse of national security within which it exists. Terrorists, in forming their identity, construct their own values (Wendt, 1999, p. 51). A. Spencer delves into the issue of identifying a universal definition of terrorism. He underscores that most researchers agree on the presence of violence in the concept of “terrorism” and the political motivation behind this violence. However, differences in defining terrorism are numerous and involve means and goals of violence, the nature of the targeted objects, the status of terrorism and its victims. Furthermore, there is no consensus on whether only the civilian population is considered the victims of terrorist attacks or if terrorist attacks can also be directed towards the police and the army; whether terrorism targets are specifically selected due to their symbolic nature or if they are random targets. Moreover, there are varying opinions regarding the goals of terrorism and its “communication strategy.” (Spencer, 2006, 1995)

The theoretical and methodological basis applied in the analysis of United Nations policies and specialized institutions concerning the coordination of international community efforts to combat terrorist threats, as applied in this article, encompasses an interdisciplinary approach to the study of terrorism. This approach has developed in recent decades through the interaction of political science with other scientific disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, and law. However, despite the multidisciplinary research on terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon, a universally accepted approach to analyzing the aspects of the research problem and research methodology has not been established within the scientific community.

We will emphasize that the methodological and theoretical-scientific framework of this research employs general scientific methods for understanding socio-political phenomena. This includes the *descriptive method and systemic, institutional, and structural-functional approaches*, which enable the scientific definition of the field of study, clarification of key categories, highlighting the conceptual aspects of the research topic, and outlining the prospects for the development of cooperation within the United Nations in combating terrorism, as well as identifying possibilities for improving the international legal means used in this fight.

The *descriptive method*, based on specific contemporary categories and concepts, has been extensively utilized to review events related to the evolution of combating and preventing terrorism within the United Nations. The *systemic method* involves treating terrorism as a comprehensive and holistic phenomenon, while simultaneously providing the definition of the systemic foundations of international counter-terrorism cooperation within the United Nations. Successfully countering terrorism is only possible through international cooperation since modern terrorism transcends national borders and takes on an international character. The *institutional approach* has facilitated the study of the United Nations' activities, including through the content analysis of their adopted documents and the formal aspects of their work. International organizations, particularly the UN, that operate in the fields of human rights, counterterrorism, and peace studies, have a greater influence on the changes and maintenance of the balance of the international security architecture. In this work, we utilize the theory of the *new institutionalism* in the analysis of international terrorism countermeasures through international institutions. New institutionalism highlights the influence of the behavior of individuals or groups on social institutions and the regulatory role of the restrictive framework created by institutions in human relations. Formal international institutions have the capacity to strengthen peace, reduce the risk of conflicts, and curb the growth of terrorist activities. In the research process, *structural-functional analysis* has been employed. The political aspects of countering international terrorism have been analyzed as a complex of structural components, each fulfilling a distinct function. This method has allowed for the analysis of international cooperation and legal regulation in countering terrorism, as well as the definition of the fundamental elements of the United Nations' anti-terrorist policy.

Next, the conceptual aspects of international cooperation within intergovernmental international organizations concerning the combat of terrorism, as well as the policies of the United Nations and specialized institutions regarding the coordination of international community efforts to combat terrorist threats, will be subject to analysis.

1. International cooperation in the fight against terrorism: theoretical aspects

Recently, there has been an active discussion about the necessity and importance of international cooperation in the field of counterterrorism. Despite some differences of opinion, all participants in the anti-terrorist discourse unanimously agree that successfully combating terrorism is only possible under the conditions and within the framework of international cooperation, since modern terrorism transcends national borders and acquires an international character.

In this regard, we consider it important to emphasize the importance of understanding the essence of the concept of “international cooperation” in its theoretical and legal context. International cooperation is a direct expression of peace and international security. The modern international system includes mechanisms for cooperation among its subjects. In the rapidly globalizing world of today, new forms of international cooperation are constantly emerging, as economic, financial, and information and communication interdependence in world politics increases (Tsygankov, 2019, p. 238).

Russian professor Tsygankov P. defines international cooperation as “various ways of cross-border interaction between subjects of the international system based on norms of international law and national legal systems, based on the principles of independence, respect for national sovereignty of state entities, and ensuring mutual benefit of the participants. International cooperation can cover a wide range of areas - political, economic, cultural, military, scientific-technical, and environmental” (Tsygankov, 2019, p. 239). New transnational structures constantly emerge on the world stage, and substantive, inter- and supranational actors are increasingly penetrating world politics, which become the subject of academic study.

Another Russian researcher, M. Muntean, notes that “international cooperation reflects a process of interaction between two or more actors in which the use of armed violence is excluded, and joint searches for opportunities to implement common interests dominate. Contrary to the ordinary understanding, cooperation is not the absence of conflict, but the “elimination” of its extreme, crisis forms” (Muntean, 2006, p. 176).

As rightly noted in the literature, the principle of international cooperation received conventional consolidation and universal recognition only in the 20th century. The idea of comprehensive cooperation between states, regardless of differences in their political, economic and social systems, is the basis of the UN Charter. In accordance with the Charter, states are obliged to engage in international cooperation in resolving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems, as well as to maintain international peace and security and take effective collective measures for that purpose.

Subsequently, the principle of international cooperation received a more specific substantive meaning through the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Krysanov, 2018, p.23). According to this declaration, states are mandated to collaborate with other nations to preserve international peace and security. Additionally, they are obligated to work towards establishing universal respect and adherence to human rights and fundamental freedoms, while striving to eliminate racial discrimination and religious intolerance. In their international interactions within economic, social, cultural, technical, and trade domains, states must adhere to the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference. Moreover, member states of the United Nations are required to engage in cooperative efforts with the organization, participating in joint and individual measures as outlined in the relevant provisions of the Charter.

It should be noted that international cooperation does not arise without certain conditions. Among scholars, there is an opinion that international cooperation presupposes the presence of three elements: common goals of partner states, their expectation of benefits from the situation, and the mutual nature of these benefits (Tsygankov, 2019, p. 239).

Traditionally, cooperative relations involve bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, the conclusion of various types of alliances and agreements that provide for mutual coordination of political courses (for example, for the purpose of joint conflict resolution, ensuring common security, or resolving other issues of common interest for all parties involved) (Muntean, 2006, p. 177).

The evolution of collaboration between states and various actors in international relations has led to the establishment of a comprehensive network of global and regional intergovernmental as well as non-governmental organizations. The escalation of global interdependence and the emergence of pressing global issues have substantially amplified the necessity for broadening multilateral cooperation and have played a role in extending its scope into various aspects of human existence. In the contemporary era, international cooperation encompasses not only matters related to trade and peaceful conflict resolution but also the tackling of global challenges, including terrorism and other critical issues.

International cooperation is an indispensable element for the implementation of anti-terrorism activities, both in the development of a unified strategy to combat terrorism and eliminate its causes, and in the exchange of specialized data and other information. Terrorism has its own specificities in different regions of the world, which consequently dictates the need to adapt unified norms and strategic provisions for countering it.

Although international cooperation in the field of combating terrorism has emerged relatively recently, a certain system of managing this cooperation has already begun to take shape at three levels: binary (cooperation between two states), regional (cooperation within the geographic or geopolitical region), subregional (cooperation at the level of groups of states united by historical and cultural traditions, common political interests), and global (cooperation of all or several states). At each of these levels, management has its own goal, complementing and strengthening the functional tasks of other levels.

In this context, international cooperation in countering terrorism operates at various levels: inter-state, intergovernmental, and interdepartmental. Heads of state define the primary directions of their countries' domestic and foreign policies in the fight against terrorism and represent their nations in international affairs, including the signing of bilateral and multilateral treaties. However, the central responsibility for addressing terrorism on the international stage typically falls upon authorized government agencies within a state. These agencies have a broader range of duties in this regard. Often, in accordance with national laws, these entities are empowered to engage in international cooperation and enter into interdepartmental international agreements. Consequently, interdepartmental international collaboration has assumed an increasingly crucial role in the fight against terrorism, driven by the imperative need for such cooperation (Novoskoltseva, 2015, p. 118).

The international counterterrorism system operates based on: unconditional condemnation as criminal of all terrorist activities, methods and practices, and the fact that they have no justification, regardless of where or by whom they are committed; the inadmissibility of justifying acts of terrorism, regardless of the political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that guides the individuals who commit them; the uncompromising fight against international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations; the strengthening of international cooperation between states, international organizations to prevent, stop and eliminate all forms of international terrorism; ensuring, in accordance with the provisions of international treaties and domestic law, the detention and prosecution or extradition of persons who have committed or contributed to the commission of acts of terrorism; not granting asylum to persons who are involved in terrorist activities or contribute to them; the non-participation of states in the organization, incitement, provision of assistance or participation in terrorist acts in another state, or facilitating organizational activities aimed at committing such acts on its territory (Novoskoltseva, 2015, p. 119).

The international fight against terrorism includes mutual cooperation for the exchange of relevant information regarding the prevention and fight against terrorism; making joint efforts to prevent and stop terrorist acts; preventing and ceasing the use of the country's territory for the preparation of any

acts of terrorism; obstructing the financing activities of terrorists and terrorist organizations; expanding cooperation in the field of combating international terrorism by concluding special international treaties and their rapid implementation; aligning domestic legislation with international treaties in the field of combating international terrorism; providing comprehensive mutual assistance in connection with criminal investigations or prosecutions in the case of a terrorist act; preventing the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups across state borders (Antipenko, 2002, p. 25).

One of the priority directions of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism is the development of international legal norms. Currently, international cooperation in the field of combating terrorism takes place in the process of elaborating common norms of international legislation and aligning them with the norms of national legislation, as well as in coordinating efforts and initiatives in various international anti-terrorism organizations, both at the global and regional levels. An effective and productive fight against terrorism requires that all conventions, declarations, resolutions, and decisions of international organizations not only be of a declarative nature but also contain a truly broad practical aspect.

The current international legal framework for international cooperation in combating terrorism represents a certain system that includes sources at the universal, regional, and bilateral levels. This system can be addressed from several perspectives: special anti-terrorism agreements, agreements that affect individual aspects of the fight against terrorism, and documents of international organizations in the field of combating terrorism. The fundamental principle of international cooperation in this area is the principle of universal condemnation and recognition of the illegality of terrorism in all its manifestations, wherever and by whomever terrorist acts are committed.

2. UN as a global counter-terrorism center

Currently, under the auspices of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, 19 universal agreements have been developed that address distinct aspects of countering international terrorism and refer to certain types of terrorist activities (Office of Counter-Terrorism). In this regard, there are many acts adopted at the UN level that condemn terrorism as a method for solving political, economic, and other issues. Without a doubt, the UN is the only universal mechanism involved in maintaining international peace and global security, which collectively regulates international relations and ensures sustainable development and stability of states. The entire international legal system of the contemporary world order is built on the basis of the UN Charter.

The fight against terrorism has been at the center of attention of international organizations since 1934, when the predecessor of the UN, the League of Nations, took the first major step in

outlawing this phenomenon by discussing the draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. In 1937, at the initiative of the League of Nations, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and the Convention on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) were approved at the international conference in Geneva. The first convention never entered into force, although it was signed by 24 countries. However, the document laid the foundation for subsequent international acts. It should also be noted that at this conference, one of the first legal definitions of terrorism was formulated – “terrorist attack”, which referred to criminal actions against the state to provoke fear in certain individuals or groups of the population.

After the end of World War II, the number of terrorist attacks did not decrease. On the contrary, in the context of ideological confrontation and the rise of national liberation movements in former colonies, the problems associated with the terrorist phenomenon worsened even further. The spread of terrorist attacks throughout the world, in all its forms and manifestations that threaten the lives or lead to the death of huge masses of people, has led the international community to respond to global threats and challenges by creating international legal barriers against the escalation of terrorism and taking coordinated measures to eliminate it.

It is important to mention that, by that time, the distinctive and dangerous aspects had been highlighted, revealing the criminal nature of any manifestation of international terrorism. One of the most concerning aspects was the significant quantitative increase in terrorist attacks (since 1970, 5,534 terrorist attacks have been recorded worldwide) and the brutality with which they are committed, posing an escalating public danger that threatens both international and national security. Moreover, the increasing number of civilian casualties further emphasized the gravity of the situation. Adding to the complexity was high level of funding for terrorist activities owing to stable links with transnational criminal organizations involved in national and international drug trafficking and illegal arms trafficking. Another alarming trend was the desire and attempts of terrorist groups to acquire weapons of mass destruction for their possible use. Additionally, the interaction between domestic and international terrorism was more obvious. Furthermore, the new types of terrorism emerged that use information systems, especially electronic devices and high-quality technological equipment. One of these, for example, is cyberterrorism (Ledyah, 2013).

Various forms of terrorist attacks have led to the development of numerous sectoral conventions dedicated to different types of terrorist behavior. The oldest international treaty, the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, dates back to 1963. Subsequently, conventions on the unlawful seizure of aircraft (1970) and for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (1971) were adopted.

Later, the tragic events of September 1972, related to the Olympic Games in Munich, when members of the Israeli national team were taken hostage from the Olympic Village, became the reason for unifying the efforts of the international community in combating terrorism. As a result, in December 1972, based on UN General Assembly Resolution 3034, an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism was established, which included representatives from 34 states.

The 1970s and 1980s became a decade of tumultuous activity by all types of left-wing, right-wing, and nationalist groups, who chose hostage-taking as a means to achieve their goals. Thus, US ambassadors in Guatemala and Brazil, as well as ambassadors of the Federal Republic of Germany in Guatemala, Haiti, and Brazil, were kidnapped. In 1975, 70 people were captured by the Carlos group in Vienna, including 11 ministers of countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 1978, the famous politician Aldo Moro was kidnapped and then killed in Italy (Nigmatullin, 2005, p.17).

In 1973, three special committees of the UN reviewed the definition of international terrorism, its main causes and preventive measures applied in relation to it. Difficulties arose already in the stage of clarifying the definition of the “terrorism” concept. The committees could not prepare the necessary materials due to divergences regarding political positions on legal aspects: definitions of the concept of international terrorism, criminal prosecution norms, extradition of terrorists, granting political asylum.

Efforts to solve the problems that arose were made during the 27th, 31st, and 39th sessions of the UN General Assembly. Thus, states presented their own comments on this issue to the UN Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism during sessions in 1973 and 1977. In turn, this committee presented its reports on the results of UN sessions in 1973, 1977, and 1979. Between 1979 and 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted seven resolutions and a declaration on measures to eliminate international terrorism, namely Resolutions 34/145, 36/109, 40/61, 42/159, 44/29, 46/51, and 40/60.

In total, from the 1960s to the early 1990s, the UN and its specialized agencies developed 10 international agreements (8 conventions and 2 protocols) that represent legal instruments for combating terrorism: The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973; The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979; The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988; The Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1991; The Protocol for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 1988, which complements the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation; The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988, which refers to terrorist activities carried out on fixed offshore platforms.

In December 1994, the UN General Assembly once again drew attention to the issue of terrorism by adopting the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. As an annex to this resolution, the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (1996) was adopted. It states that: “the States Members of the United Nations reaffirm the importance of ensuring effective cooperation between Member States so that those who participate in terrorist acts, including their financing, planning or incitement, are brought to justice; they stress their commitment, in conformity with the relevant provisions of international law, including international standards of human rights, to work together to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism and to take all appropriate steps under their domestic laws either to extradite terrorists or to submit the cases to their competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.” (Dopolnyayushaya deklaraciyu o merah po likvidacii mezhdunarodnogo terrorizma, 1994)

In accordance with the 1994 Declaration, states are encouraged to take effective and decisive measures in conformity with international law and universally recognized human rights standards.

The Declaration also provides for a series of practical measures to enhance international cooperation, the implementation of which should be assisted by the Secretary-General of the UN. These measures include the collecting data on the status and implementation of existing multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements relating to international terrorism, including information on incidents caused by international terrorism, as well as on criminal prosecution and penalties, based on information received from depositaries of the agreements and member states. This involves gathering information on incidents caused by international terrorism as well as details on criminal prosecution and penalties, obtained from depositaries of agreements and member states. Another key initiative involves the preparation of a comprehensive set of national laws and regulations addressing the prevention and eradication of international terrorism in all its forms. This process relies on input received from member states. Additionally, the Declaration mandates an analytical review of current international legal instruments concerning international terrorism. This review aims to assist states in identifying aspects of the issue not covered by existing instruments, providing a basis for further exploration within the legal framework of conventions addressing international terrorism. Furthermore, the Secretary-General is entrusted with evaluating the United Nations system's capacity

to support states in organizing training and courses focused on combating international terrorism crimes. These measures collectively serve to enhance global collaboration and coordination in the fight against international terrorism (Dopolnyayushaya deklaraciya o merah po likvidacii mezhdunarodnogo terrorizma, 1994.)

The 1996 Declaration essentially reproduces the provisions of the 1994 Declaration. UN member states reaffirmed their unequivocal condemnation of all actions, methods and practices of terrorism, wherever and by whomever committed. At the same time, provisions were included stating that deliberate financing, planning of terrorist acts and incitement to commit them are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. In addition to the text of the first declaration, the second one states that in concluding or applying extradition agreements, acts of terrorism should not be considered as political offenses and, therefore, should not be excluded from the scope of such agreements. Furthermore, states are encouraged, even in cases where there is no treaty, to consider facilitating the extradition of suspects involved in terrorist activities to the extent permitted by national law (Chernyadeva, 2018, p. 87).

Recognizing the increasing role and major impact of the terrorist threat, the UN General Assembly established an Office of Counter-Terrorism within the UN Secretariat in 1999, which began its operations in April of that year. The main focus of the Office of Counter-Terrorism is on research and technical cooperation, as well as contributing to the intensification of international cooperation in the field of preventing terrorism.

Although in the late 1990s the UN took a series of measures to combat terrorism, these did not have a major impact on reducing the activities of international terrorist organizations. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, became a real impetus for the development of measures aimed at fighting international terrorism. The issue of countering international terrorism became one of the most important topics on the agenda of the 56th and 57th sessions of the UN General Assembly (in November 2001 and September 2002). The 57th session of the UN analyzed the results of the fight against terrorism one year after the events of September 11, 2001, and identified the further directions of activity of the international community in this area.

Resolution 1368 of the United Nations Security Council, adopted on September 12, 2001, called on the international community to intensify efforts to prevent and suppress terrorism, to promote coordination and full implementation of the anti-terrorism conventions and resolutions of the Security Council within national legislation. The implementation of these measures is mandatory, and their violation may result in the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council.

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001. This was an important moment in the global campaign against terrorism. The resolution was adopted in

accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter (threats to peace and international security) and is mandatory for all UN member states, with non-compliance leading to punitive measures against the state that violates its provisions. The resolution delineates several key features aimed at addressing the issue of terrorism. Firstly, it recognizes terrorism as a threat to peace and security. States must cooperate in the prevention and suppression of terrorism. Moreover, each state has the right to prevent and suppress the financing and preparation of a terrorist attack on its territory, taking all possible legislative and administrative measures. Furthermore, states are obliged to refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, or participating in terrorist attacks in another state or allowing the use of terrorists, to suppress the recruitment of members of terrorist organizations, and to refrain from providing weapons to terrorist groups. The resolution criminalizes the collection and provision of assistance in the collection of assets, including any funds, in any form for terrorist attacks and the freezing of such assets. In addition, states are urged to deny refuge to those individuals who finance, plan, support and commit terrorist attacks, either by prosecuting them on their own territory or by transferring them through a request for their prosecution, etc.

On September 8, 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, thereby creating a practical basis for providing effective assistance to states in their anti-terrorism actions at the national, regional, and global levels.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the form of a Resolution and an annexed Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288), represents a unique document aimed at improving national, regional, and international efforts in the fight against terrorism. Its adoption for the first time signaled that UN member states had coordinated and adopted a common strategic and operational basis for combating terrorism. This conveyed that terrorism is not accepted in any form or manifestation, and the decision was made to undertake collective and individual measures to eradicate this phenomenon. The Strategy represents a first complex, collective, and international institutional-legal basis aimed at approving measures to combat terrorism. It is based on the unconditional and strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, regardless of who, what, where, and why it is used (United Nations, 2010).

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy includes four main directions of action: Direction I: measures aimed at addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; Direction II: preventing and combating terrorism; Direction III: strengthening the capacity of states to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as strengthening the role of the UN system in that regard; Direction IV: ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism (United Nations, 2006).

The Strategy emphasizes that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization, or ethnic group. The document also confirms the responsibility of states to refuse to provide financial and operational asylum to terrorists and not to allow terrorists to abuse the national asylum system by bringing them to justice based on the principle “to extradite or prosecute.”

By adopting this strategy, the General Assembly has reaffirmed and consolidated its direct role in the fight against terrorism. All member states are required to take prompt measures to implement this strategy and to demonstrate the unwavering determination of the international community in the fight against terrorism.

The uniqueness of this document also lies in the rare unanimity regarding a common strategic approach in the fight against terrorism. This signal should be considered one of the most significant and positive results of international cooperation, as the UN member states have unanimously recognized that terrorist methods are unacceptable in any of their manifestations and will not be justified in the eyes of the international community.

Essentially, this document is the first act of the UN that defines the concept of this international organization in the fight against terrorism. It emphasizes the need “to pursue and reinforce development and social inclusion agendas at every level as goals in themselves, recognizing that success in this area, especially on youth unemployment, could reduce marginalization and the subsequent sense of victimization that propels extremism and the recruitment of terrorists.” (United Nations General Assembly, 2006)

The General Assembly reviews the strategy every two years, making it a living document that takes into account member states’ counter-terrorism priorities.

The latest review of the Strategy, the seventh in number, took place on 21-22 June 2021. The General Assembly reviewed the report of the United Nations Secretary-General (A/73/866) on the progress made in implementing the Strategy over the past two years. The Assembly adopted by consensus the resolution (A/RES/75/291) to review the Strategy, as well as the six previous resolutions to review it.

In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 70/109 “A world against violence and violent extremism,” which recognized “the need for a comprehensive approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and to addressing the conditions conducive to its spread.” The resolution also underlined “the importance of education, including human rights education, as the most effective means of promoting tolerance, in preventing the spread of extremism by instilling respect for life and promoting the practice of non-violence, moderation, dialogue and cooperation, and encourages all States, the specialized agencies of the United Nations and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute actively to this endeavour.”

Through this resolution, the General Assembly recommends UN member states to better understand the causes of violent extremism, especially among women and youth, in order to develop comprehensive solutions to counter this threat, and highlights the conviction that wars and armed conflicts can cause the spread of radicalism and violent extremism, as well as hinder the development of human society and harm the well-being of humanity.

An important event for the international community was the presentation on January 15, 2016, in front of the United Nations General Assembly, by the Secretary-General, of the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. The plan contains recommendations for member states to examine and adopt a more comprehensive approach in the fight against violent extremism and the factors that generate it at the local, national, regional, and global levels.

The Plan reports that violent extremism is a multi-faceted phenomenon that is not clearly defined. This phenomenon is neither new nor characteristic of a particular region, nationality, or religious system. However, in recent times, terrorist groups such as the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), “Al-Qaida”, and “Boko Haram” are attempting to form a general perception about violent extremism and raise the discussion about the means of countering this threat. The dissemination of ideas of religious, cultural, and social intolerance by these groups has serious consequences for many regions of the world, as they retain territories and use social networks.

In January 2017, António Guterres (Portugal) was elected as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but the change in leadership could not reverse the decline in the fight against extremism. December 1, 2017 the UN Secretary-General presented a report entitled “A world against violence and violent extremism”. The report contains statistical data on UN projects and initiatives aimed at preventing extremism, of which 40 projects aim to strengthen good governance, protect human rights and the rule of law; 31 projects aim to improve the quality of education, develop professional skills, and promote employment; 29 projects aim to promote expanded dialogue and conflict prevention; 27 projects aim to empower young people; 23 projects relate to the strategic communications, the internet, and social networks; 22 projects focus on gender equality and empowering women; 18 projects focus on community outreach and 33 projects address other areas of activity in preventing violent extremism, including the development of national or regional plans for preventing violent extremism at the request of member states and regional organizations (United Nations, 2017).

In 2017, the UN General Assembly also adopted Resolution No. 72/241 “A world against violence and violent extremism”, in which it reaffirmed its previous resolutions adopted in this regard, and called upon states to “respect and protect, in their fight against violent extremism, all human

rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law and to support all actions at the local, national, regional and international levels, in cooperation with civil society, to foster understanding, tolerance and non-violence” (United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 2017).

The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) was established in June 2017. The Office of Counter-Terrorism provides UN member states with the necessary political support and a plethora of information on the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, as well as taking action, when necessary, to accelerate the pace of technical assistance in four main areas (United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism). The first head of the Office was appointed the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Voronkov. The establishment of the Office is seen as the first major institutional reform undertaken by the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, following the report (A/71/858) on the capability of the United Nations system to support Member States in implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2018).

The Office of Counter-Terrorism performs five main functions within the United Nations framework. Firstly, it ensures leadership in implementing the General Assembly mandates on counter-terrorism entrusted to the Secretary-General within the United Nations system. Secondly, it enhances coordination and coherence among entities involved in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact for a balanced implementation of the four pillars of the strategy. Thirdly, the Office of Counter-Terrorism works forward improving the efficiency of UN assistance to member states in strengthening their counterterrorism capabilities. Additionally, it displays UN’s counterterrorism activities and fulfills the informational function of presenting and mobilizing resources. Lastly, the Office of Counter-Terrorism plays a pivotal role in ensuring that counter-terrorism concerns are appropriately addressed across the United Nations system, and it oversees vital efforts in preventing violent extremism, aligning strictly with the established strategy (United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2019).

Recognizing the fundamental nature of the UN conventions on combating terrorism, states have begun to create certain conditions and mechanisms to ensure them. These include: adopting relevant national legislation (criminal, fiscal, administrative, banking, etc.), developing harmonized norms, preparing relevant agreements at the regional level with the participation of other international organizations (especially, the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism), establishing bilateral working groups to combat terrorism, organizing cooperation between states with specialized institutions (especially, interaction with Interpol, FATF, the European Group for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, etc.).

Currently, international cooperation among states to combat terrorism has received a new impetus for development due to the difficult international political situation in the world, especially in Ukraine and the Middle East.

However, despite the intensification of international cooperation in the field of counterterrorism, there has been no agreed and unified legal regime for countering terrorism, there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism, and no comprehensive international treaty on counterterrorism has been adopted.

Overall, a substantive analysis of the principles of international cooperation in countering terrorism indicates that these principles must comply with the UN Charter, the universal conventions on this issue, and the UN Security Council resolutions. To ensure the most effective international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, it seems appropriate to practically implement international obligations in the field of combating terrorism, to reject the use of force in violation of international law, and to effectively monitor the development of regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism within international regional organizations that combat terrorism.

Conclusions

After studying international cooperation in the fight against international terrorism within the UN, it can be concluded that the international community has developed an extensive set of legal instruments to combat international terrorism. Starting with the 21st century, we can observe an increase in international initiatives in the fight against terrorism. The UN continues to be the platform for more productive and larger-scale cooperation in this area. The main achievement of the UN in the formation of non-violent methods to counter terrorism is the creation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, upon signing of which most states agreed on a common approach to fighting terrorism. In addition to developing the normative basis for countering international terrorism, the UN system operates a network of organizations that includes various committees, departments, specialized institutions for combating terrorist threats, as well as structures closely related to this field.

Despite the existence of international legal acts that qualify specific actions as terrorist, a universal definition of the term “terrorism” has not yet been developed at the international legal level. The last reliable way to overcome this problem was the process of developing the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, initiated by India in 1996. However, this process also faced disagreements in states’ approaches to defining terrorism and the issue of the interdependence between terrorism and peoples’ right to self-determination.

At the same time, a major problem is identified at the UN level – the lack of a common concept of terrorism, as well as an international “blacklist” of individuals and organizations suspected of terrorism. Probably, the main reason is the lack of unity among political elites in assessing the essence of this phenomenon.

Further studies in the field of countering and preventing terrorism within the United Nations should focus on analyzing state-sponsored terrorism and possible forms of state involvement in terrorist activities, establishing unified theoretical and legal criteria for defining the concepts of terrorism and terrorist activities. Additionally, they should analyze international legal measures to combat extremism.

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Driving forces of labour migration as barriers to labour migrants' professional mobility: The case of Yugoslav labour migration

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Abstract

After consolidation following the Second World War, the Yugoslav regime began modernising the country and transforming means of production, which resulted in a fragile economy and increasing labour surplus. The reforms coincided with economic development and increasing demand for migrant workers in several countries in the western hemisphere. Consequently, the migration of Yugoslav labour emerged and expanded for more than a decade. This article discusses developments conditioning and sustaining Yugoslav labour migration and Yugoslav workers' labour market performance in industrial countries of Western Europe. This article draws on empirical literature and theoretical understandings of labour migration merged with the perception of temporariness of labour migrants' relocation. The article argues that Yugoslav workers' labour market performance in Western Europe was an outcome of interactions between driving forces of Yugoslav labour migration, practices of its main agents, and the surrounding socioeconomic contexts.

Keywords: labour market mobility, professional stagnation, occupational distribution, professional subordination, Yugoslavia

Introduction

In 1963, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia)² officially recognised and legalised the increasing labour emigration and embarked on constructing the mechanisms of its control, galvanisation, and utilisation. Embracing emigration was essentially the Yugoslav regime's way of accepting its inability to control the state's borders and populations' spatial movements and providing an economic and social development able to contrast the conditions in the countries of the industrialised West.³ Western countries were welcoming the labour of Yugoslav workers because of rapid economic and social developments which were invoking shortages in certain sectors of Western

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² Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia (today North Macedonia), Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, and two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

³ The term "West" is used as a collective designation of economically and industrially advanced countries.

labour markets characterised by working conditions increasingly unappealing to the domestic workforce.⁴ Since the labour migration was of mutual interest, the Yugoslav regime and the countries receiving Yugoslav labour designed various mechanisms to facilitate, sustain, and control migration currents and to utilise its economic contexts. Labour migration was declared, emphasised, and nurtured as temporary by Yugoslavia and by most of the receiving countries, and it was widely embraced by Yugoslav labour migrants.⁵ However, social and economic developments had reconditioned migration into enduring relocation for most migrating workers and their families. Despite their potentially permanent settlement, Yugoslav workers were forgoing major developments within receiving countries, experiencing insignificant professional progress and labour market mobility.⁶

This article aims to propose an understanding of Yugoslav workers' labour market performance in the labour-receiving countries of Western Europe between 1963 and 1991.⁷ By looking through theoretical lenses at empirical studies on Yugoslav labour migration and its main agents, the article frames and merges contexts and developments conditioning Yugoslav workers' occupational and hierarchical distribution within labour markets of Western European labour-receiving countries. The article bridges theoretical understandings of initiation and perpetuation of labour migrations and embeds in the framework the perception of labour migrants' temporariness, a hallmark strongly characterising the Yugoslav labour migration. The article argues that the narrow occupational distribution and insignificant professional progress among Yugoslav workers in Western labour markets were conditioned by the workers' perception of temporariness regarding their relocation, embedded in the social contexts of the Yugoslav society and societies of receiving countries, and sustained by the main drivers of Yugoslav labour migration.

⁴ The term Yugoslav, when denoting people, is used as a geographical term and does not connote ethnicity. Ethnic identifications of migrants from former Yugoslavia are irrelevant for this article. By "Yugoslav workers", the article refers to all workers originating from the former Yugoslavia and working in Western Europe, including labour migrants' spouses and children. The term "labour migrants" seems inappropriate for these latter categories since they migrated as family members. However, the majority was quickly integrated in the labour markets of Western Europe.

⁵ By "receiving countries" and "receiving societies", the article refers to countries and societies hosting Yugoslav labour migrants.

⁶ This article is not denying that other migrant groups were encountering similar conditions and outcomes. The perception of temporariness, occupational concentration, and multidimensional exclusion of labour migrants was common across labour receiving countries of the industrialised West. However, the history of other labour migrant groups is outside this article's scope.

⁷ The article focuses on this period and regards it as the period of 'Yugoslav labour migration' because the main principles and driving forces of Yugoslav labour migration analysed in the article operated between 1963, when Yugoslavia institutionalised labour migration, and 1991, when the country, its influence over labour migration and migrants' attachment to Yugoslavia ceased to exist.

The article examines empirical studies concerning the demographic, economic, political, and social dimensions of Yugoslav labour migration. The analysed studies explore social and economic conditions in Yugoslavia; general aspects of Yugoslav labour migration; particularities of labour migration to Austria, France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany); and the occupational distributions and workers' performances in the labour markets of the named countries. The selection of the studies was conditioned by their contribution to the understanding of social and economic aspects conditioning and characterising Yugoslav labour migration and positions of Yugoslav workers within labour-receiving countries of Western Europe. The article draws its arguments on empirical findings illustrating interactions and interdependencies between the main driving forces of Yugoslav labour migration and the frequent attitudes and practices of its main agents.

Unlike previous studies, which focus on a particular problem or a narrow geographic area, this article contributes to existing knowledge by identifying and framing frequent practices, major developments, and persisting conditions shared by Yugoslav workers in all major labour-receiving countries throughout the period of Yugoslav labour migration. Moreover, by employing the notion of labour migrants' temporariness, the article expands the understanding of Yugoslav workers' positions in major labour-receiving countries of Western Europe. Although recognised by several studies as a persisting characteristic of Yugoslav labour migration, the notion of temporariness was overseen as one of the fundamentals of Yugoslav workers' occupational distribution and labour market mobility in Western Europe. On a general level, the article expands understandings of migrant workers' career stagnation and the role of institutional and socioeconomic settings in creating and sustaining barriers to migrant workers' access to professional development opportunities that often seem inclusive and accessible.

The article is organised into six sections. After the introduction, the article presents the analytical framework and describes general conditions initiating and shaping the emigration of Yugoslav labourers. The third and fourth sections discuss driving forces of Yugoslav labour migration and practices surrounding Yugoslav labour migrants. The sixth section discusses the occupational and hierarchical distribution of Yugoslav workers and their labour market performance.

1. Analytical framework

As analytical framework, this article combines dual labour market theory, network theory, and the theory of cumulative causation of labour migration since these theoretical perspectives explain

the main economic and social driving forces of Yugoslav labour migration and the interactions between them. The article embeds in the framework the notion of the perception of labour migrants' temporariness, which is here defined as an individual, collective, and institutional expectation in the temporary character of labour migrants' relocation, embedded in social and economic contexts of labour-sending and labour-receiving societies.

The dual labour market theory (Piore, 1979) explains international labour migration as a process driven by developed economies' structural and perpetual need for labour eligible for jobs in lower layers of the labour market. These needs emerge from social and economic developments – such as increasing incomes, standard of living, educational levels, and professional aspirations among the domestic workforce – and invoke segmentation of labour markets into primary and secondary. Domestic workers mostly occupy the primary sector, where employees receive stable jobs, good and improving conditions, benefits, and opportunities for professional development. In the secondary sector, jobs are characterised by low wages, low social value, lack of stability, low working conditions, and almost non-existent opportunities for advancement, which gradually repels domestic workers. Migrants from developing countries – where job opportunities are limited, working conditions worse, and incomes notably lower – take these jobs because they believe their migration and employment are only temporary and because they usually compare their own positions with conditions in their areas of origin, rarely perceiving themselves as a part of the host society (Massey *et al.*, 1993). They ignore the social contexts of their jobs since working in the least prestigious sectors of the developed economies offers broad possibilities within their societies of origin, to which they mostly strive to return.

Migrant workers' economic progress and the corresponding elevation of their social status alter the conditions, values, aspirations, and economic capabilities within their communities of origin (Massey *et al.*, 1993). Newly accumulated economic capital – distributed through remittances and investments in agriculture, movable assets, and real estates – catalyses social prestige and migrants' upward social mobility and alters the economic conditions and perception of migration within the sending communities. Migration and its associated social and economic aspects become gradually ingrained in the repertoire of sending communities' values and practices, which increases migration aspirations and capabilities among their members. Eventually, knowledge and narratives about migration diffuse beyond these communities' borders, which motivates additional movements and invokes the cumulation of migration over time and space (Massey *et al.*, 1993). Coincidentally, peoples' interpersonal ties also have the capacity to sustain and expand migration and make it essentially independent from institutional mechanisms. By linking migrants and potential migrants, interpersonal ties become a phenomenon defined by social scientists as “migrant networks”, which

can increase people's capability for migration by reducing the risks and costs of the migratory process (Massey, 1993). Through such networks, working abroad becomes increasingly accessible to potential migrants and a reliable source of economic incentives within the sending society. In receiving societies, the jobs migrants increasingly occupy gradually lose social value and become labelled as "immigrant jobs", further repelling domestic workers and creating additional needs for immigrants (Massey *et al.*, 1993; Piore, 1979). Immigrant labour becomes anchored in the core functioning of the developed economies and labour markets. However, the perception of its temporary character endures and shapes the surrounding social contexts.

2. Preconditions of Yugoslav labour migration

After the Second World War, Yugoslavia was characterised by a fragile economy, dysfunctional labour market, underdeveloped industry and educational system, and antiquated agriculture (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2020a; 2020b). After two decades of a socialist regime, and a significant development in comparison with previous periods, the regime was not able to completely abolish these conditions and establish a well-functioning social and economic system, and a stable development. Its social, economic and financial reforms, as well as the modernisation of industry and agriculture lacked the cohesion between country's economic capacities and the development of society. Gradually, the reforms generated a significant surplus of labour and lack of job opportunities that large dismissals of industrial labour surplus during 1960's further increased. These outcomes affected foremost unskilled workers, peasants, and young people in rural areas. Coincidentally, inflation was constantly rising and causing a chronic devaluation of incomes, continuous economic uncertainty, and a widespread stagnation in the living standard (Brekalo and Penava Brekalo, 2018; Dobrivojević Tomić, 2020a; 2020b). However, the rapid transition to industrial economy and modern society correlated with notable developments within Yugoslavia, such as rising levels of equality, education, and economic capabilities among the Yugoslav population and the development of modern mass media. These developments tend to increase people's aspirations, freedoms, and mobilities and their desires to realise these aspirations through migration (de Haas, 2021).

After the regime's embracement of labour migration, the movement of Yugoslav workers towards Western countries steadily grew, turning to a massive emigration after the comprehensive socioeconomic reform in 1965. The reform exacerbated economic uncertainty, affecting foremost peasants and the working class and producing an even larger number of the unemployed. In contrast, Western countries were experiencing a fast-expanding industrial and economic progress, as well as

rapidly increasing living standards and educational and professional aspirations among domestic workers. These developments invoked labour shortages in certain sectors of Western labour markets since domestic workers were no longer as keen to take low-valued and non-prosperous jobs. To sustain the economic development and expanding industries and meet the growing demand for eligible labour, Western countries began supporting their employers' recruiting in developing countries, where labour was abundant and significantly cheaper. Yugoslavia was one of the main sources of eligible labour for several countries in Western Europe. By the beginning of the 1970s, approximately 1.3 million Yugoslav citizens were living and working in the industrial countries of Western Europe and overseas (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007).

The massive emigration was halted by the economic aftermath of the oil crisis in the mid-1970s. However, it did not completely cease because demand for migrant labour was still characterising Western economies. It continued as a more selective process, restricted to skilled workers, reunion of family members, and re-migration of previous migrants.

3. Towards the utilisation of migration's potentials

In the early 1960s, the Yugoslav regime was gradually abandoning the communist promise of full employment and the policy of extensive emigration restrictions, perceiving emigration as an opportunity to discharge the surplus of unskilled and poorly educated job-seekers (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007; Novinščak, 2012). After the reform in 1965, galvanising and sustaining emigration from rural Yugoslavia became a state policy and one of the main objectives of local employment offices (Baučić, 1971; Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007). The magnitude of this strategy is illustrated in the regime's negotiations of the labour recruitment agreement with West Germany and its repetitive demands to include unskilled workers in regulated recruitments, as well as its efforts to control completely the recruitment procedures (Ivanović, 2012; Novinščak, 2012; Shonick, 2009). While West Germany, Austria, and Sweden were able to influence regulated recruitments (Frank, 2005; Ivanović, 2012; Shonick, 2009), French employers completely depended on Yugoslav employment offices' selection of workers (Ivanović, 2012).

The Yugoslav regime also perceived labour migration and the surrounding context as a platform for the development of closer economic and political cooperation with Western Europe (Ivanović, 2012). Pillars of this strategy were bilateral agreements signed with most of the countries frequently recruiting Yugoslav labour. The agreements were officially presented as a caring measure for protecting migrant workers and their families by regulating recruitment processes and migrants' labour and social rights (Novinščak, 2009). Notwithstanding, the agreements enabled the Yugoslav

regime and the governments of receiving countries' institutional and interstate control over migratory processes and its agents and their institutional support for the fluent migration of desirable and eligible labour. For the Yugoslav regime, the agreements also enabled interference with the social and cultural life of its citizens abroad, which was important for ideological, political, and economic reasons. Fears that political emigrants will influence labour migrants and turn them against Yugoslavia forced the regime to be active and influential among the migrant cohorts. Yugoslavia's perpetual need for foreign currencies, meagre in national banks but substantial among migrant workers, required a constant nurture of their sense of belonging to their communities of origin. The presence of the Yugoslav regime among labour migrants frequently manifested through establishing informational offices in the receiving countries, interfering in migrants' cultural and social associations, distributing Yugoslav media, and implementing or participating in various educational programmes in the receiving countries (Brunnbauer, 2012; Ivanović, 2012; Molnar, 2022).

Deeper cooperation with capitalist countries was a significant shift in the principles of the Yugoslav socialist regime, which first had to pass several ideological, political, and institutional barriers (Novinščak, 2009). To the opposing voices, the regime explained emigration as a benefit for the workers, a process of acquiring knowledge and skills which will ease their integration into the Yugoslav labour market after their return (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007). In addition, migration restrictions were incompatible with the official conception of Yugoslav society and the state governing through "humane socialism", including the individuals' right of working abroad (Novinščak, 2012). However, this conception only officially included everybody since the regime had instructed local employment offices to limit the emigration of skilled and educated individuals (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007; Dragišić, 2014). Moreover, no matter the professional characteristics of Yugoslav labour migrants, their emigration was proclaimed and emphasised as temporary throughout the existence of socialist Yugoslavia. This was clearly stated in the Yugoslav regime's definition "workers on temporary work abroad", which also included those not working, such as children and unemployed spouses.

4. Cumulative causation and utilisation of labour migration

Although the Yugoslav regime and major receiving countries had considerable impact on the migration of Yugoslav workers (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007; Dragišić, 2012; Frank, 2005; Ivanović, 2012; Molnar, 2014; Novinščak, 2012; Shonick, 2009), institutional and interstate mechanisms were generally incapable of shaping and controlling migration flows and the recruitment of Yugoslav

workers. Migration was mostly driven by a cumulative nexus occurring on the micro and meso levels of the Yugoslav and receiving societies, supported by Western employers and by the inertness of Yugoslav authorities. As migration expanded in the second half of the 1960s, the Yugoslav labour migrants and the surrounding socioeconomic context became increasingly prominent within the Yugoslav society. Migrants' experiences and a perceived economic success, as well as narratives constructed around migration and conditions in the West, were changing society's values and perceptions of work in the West. The manifestation of accumulated wealth – in the form of tractors, cars, modern goods (Ivanović, 2012; Schierup, 1973; Slavnić, 2006), and the luxury houses labour migrants were erecting in their villages (Bratić and Malešević, 1982; Brunnbauer, 2012; Schierup, 1973) – was not only witnessed and admired by the migrants' relatives and neighbours but also reported by Yugoslav media and broadly depicted by Yugoslav cinema (Dragišić, 2015; Ivanović, 2012). Impressions of the West, “where the money falls from the sky” (Slavnić, 2006, p. 111), were spreading through Yugoslav society and increasing its migration aspirations.

Coincidentally, transnational networks between migrants, their communities of origin, and Western employers increased the migration capabilities of potential migrants and caused further cumulation of labour migration. Studies have shown both the exceptional abilities of Yugoslav interpersonal ties to sustain migration and facilitate the enrolment of countrymen in the new social and work environment and Western employers' utilisation of these networks' capacities (Ehn, 1975; Frank, 2005; Jurić and Vujević, 2020; Knocke, 1986; Lorber, 2017; Mežnarić, 1977; Schierup, 1973; Stiever Lie, 1983). Migrant networks often linked villages or municipalities with Western employers, who preferred to avoid institutional procedures by recruiting relatives and acquaintances of already employed migrants. Employing through unregulated channels was not only cheaper and faster but also guaranteed a sustainable flow of verified and eligible workforce. It also established social control within workplaces, since a person recommending a relative or a friend usually bears the responsibility for their behaviour and performance (Frank, 2005). Therefore, West German employers had developed a strategy of direct recruitments from specific Yugoslav areas identified as a reliable source of labour, which was considerably more efficient than the procedures determined by the recruitment agreement (Ivanović, 2012; Novinščak, 2012). Swedish and Danish employers seemingly practiced the same strategy: The cases of a village where almost all who migrated were working in Denmark (Schierup, 1973) and of an industrial town in rural Sweden where the majority of labour migrants originated from two neighbouring Yugoslav villages are clear examples (Ehn, 1975). Moreover, Swedish employers occasionally demanded labourers from certain Yugoslav areas even when they were recruiting through regulated channels (Frank, 2005).

Unregulated recruitments were facilitated by some Yugoslav local employment offices by either misinterpreting or overlooking the regime's emigration policy (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007; Novinščak, 2012). Many municipal authorities acted as representatives of Western employers, intentionally overlooking the emigration policy and recruitment regulations because they were dependent on the economy surrounding labour migration (Brunnbauer, 2012; Novinščak, 2012). Regardless of intentions, these institutional practices made work abroad additionally accessible to potential migrants, further contributing to the cumulative causation of Yugoslav labour migration. Consequently, some Yugoslav villages and municipalities were turning into "communities of labour migrants", where cars were outnumbering cows (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007) and where almost everybody was working abroad (Ivanović, 2012). Since these practices were widespread within rural municipalities, the local authorities, the migrants, and Western employers were ultimately complying with the regime's policy of galvanising emigration from rural Yugoslavia.

Since the Yugoslav economy was constantly fragile, the remittances, labour migrants' savings, and the economy that developed around labour migration became increasingly important on all levels of Yugoslav society. Although many migrants were not financially supporting their families and relatives or saving money in Yugoslav banks (Hoffgräf and Selnik, 2021), the economy surrounding labour migrants was crucial for the well-being of Yugoslav local and national economic systems and international trade (Baučić, 1974; Bernard, 2019; Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007; Dragišić, 2009; 2014; Ivanović, 2012; Novinščak, 2012; Shonick, 2009; Vedriš, 1981). To persuade migrants to transfer their savings to Yugoslav banks or to invest in the Yugoslav local and national economy, the regime employed its informational offices and migrants' social clubs abroad (Dragišić, 2012; Ivanović, 2012). The regime was constantly creating new mechanisms and strategies for extracting migrants' financial capital, such as enabling migrants to purchase shares in public companies and utilising their local patriotism by campaigning for donations to their communities of origin. The money was officially intended to modernise industry and establish new factories, develop local and national infrastructure, and build schools and similar projects (Ivanović, 2012; Vedriš, 1981). The small-scale consumption of a private household was equally important for the regime, since paying for certain products in foreign currencies was rewarded with an exchange rate increased by 20% (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007). Moreover, paying in foreign currencies gave precedence when purchasing scarce goods and products with a long delivery delay (Baučić, 1974). But the utmost proof of desperation for labour migrants' money is illustrated in the regime's abandonment of the ground principle of the labour market's functioning by allowing labour migrants to, through purchase of shares, "buy" an employment for themselves or for a family member (Ivanović, 2012).

By establishing a web of mechanisms to encourage consumption and investments in the Yugoslav financial system and socioeconomic development, the Yugoslav regime nurtured migrants' sense of belonging to Yugoslavia and their perception of the temporariness of their migration. For migrants, contributing to the development of the villages, towns, and municipalities of their origin gave social meaning to their work and confirmed the temporary character of their migration (Ivanović, 2012). Through these contributions and the manifestation of purchasing capacities, migrants' jobs gained the value, recognition, and prestige lacking in the host societies, while the accumulation of economic capital in Yugoslav banks and enterprises promised an effortless return and re-integration. Moreover, these practices strengthened migrants' orientation to Yugoslav society, further distancing them from social contexts in the receiving countries. Nonetheless, migrants' contributions and consumption had a limited effect on the Yugoslav economy and the development of rural communities (Baučić, 1971; 1974; Bernard, 2019; Brunnbauer, 2012). Many who returned faced difficulties in integrating into society and its socioeconomic conditions and experienced discrimination by labour market authorities, forcing them to re-emigrate (Brunnbauer, 2012).

5. Yugoslav workers and the realities of dual labour markets

Yugoslav workers migrated for a variety of reasons. The desire for emancipation and personal development, as well as a quest for adventure and new experiences, was a common migration motive among Yugoslav migrants (Ehn, 1975; Knocke, 1986; Lorber, 2017; Mežnarić, 1977; Morokvašić, 1972; Svanberg, 2005). However, they migrated predominantly for economic reasons – to escape potential poverty, purchase a vehicle, build a house, or start a business after they return – perceiving their migration as temporary and striving to return as soon as they accumulate enough money to realise their aspirations (Čačić, 1988; Hoffgräf and Selnik, 2021; Jurić and Vujević, 2012; Lorber, 2017; Morokvašić, 1972; Slavnić, 2006; Svanberg, 2005). Despite their search for economic prosperity, the majority of migrants did not originate from Yugoslavia's poorest areas, nor were they representatives of the least educated Yugoslav population. This applies foremost to pioneering labour migrants, who often migrated from the most developed parts of Yugoslavia, and to those recruited selectively by Western employers based on their vocational training and work experience. However, the majority were of modest background, originating from rural Yugoslavia, and migrated as young, poorly educated, unskilled, and without significant work experience (Baučić, 1973; Brčić, 1990; Čačić and Kumpes, 1989; Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007; Dragišić, 2014; Knocke, 1986; Lorber, 2017; Morokvašić, 1972; Pepeonik, 1975). These characteristics largely determined their positions within Western labour markets. Among the minority who migrated as vocationally trained and with

experience of working in Yugoslavia, professional degradation was common, as well as misrecognition of their educational achievements (Brčić, 1990; Frank, 2005; Lorber, 2017; Meurle and Andrić, 1971; Paulson *et al.*, 1994; Stiever Lie, 1983).

Regardless of sociodemographic characteristics, Yugoslav workers were least desirable for their educational and professional capacities. Swedish employers perceived them as eligible for heavy labour and monotonous work (Augustsson, 1995; Frank, 2005; Meurle and Andrić, 1971; Paulson *et al.*, 1994) and as a national group that generally accepted subordination and inequality (Frank, 2005). Austrian employers sought almost exclusively low educated and unskilled workers from the Yugoslav periphery (Ivanović, 2012). The West German government and employers favoured Yugoslav workers because of their general lack of interest in labour movements, politics, and communist propaganda (Molnar, 2014; Shonick, 2009). Yugoslav workers' opposition to workers' union campaigns for decreasing the length of the working week, and their official requests to work overtime (Ivanović, 2012) made them certainly even more desirable to West German employers. Similar patterns of excessive work, passive participation in workers' unions and other social associations, and indifference in own working positions and in the social contexts and developments in the receiving countries were common among Yugoslav workers in other major receiving countries (Čačić, 1988; Dragišić, 2009; Drobnić, 1990; Frank, 2005; Ivanović, 2011; Knocke, 1986; Meurle and Andrić, 1971; Morokvašić, 1972). These attitudes are understandable because Yugoslav workers perceived their life in the West as temporary and invested rather in social development of their societies of origin. However, these attitudes made them constantly eligible for the work in secondary labour market and are explicit reflections of their occupational distribution and a widespread labour market immobility.

5.1. Occupational distribution and career development

In Western labour markets, Yugoslav workers mostly occupied sectors and jobs where skills, work experience, and proof of vocational training were irrelevant. However, they were neither proportionally concentrated in the same occupational sectors nor solely occupied lowest ranking positions. The latter was common among male workers, who were more often recruited selectively, based on their education and skills. In general, Yugoslav workers' occupational distribution was dependent on their passage to employment and the needs of a particular labour market. Regardless, they commonly experienced subordination and low labour market mobility. Throughout their working lives, the majority occupied manual jobs in subordinate categories of secondary labour

markets. Their widest subordination was in Austria, where approximately 90% of the first generation of Yugoslav labour migrants were working as unskilled or low-skilled labourers (Fassmann *et al.*, 1997). Even their descendants experienced low professional progress, with approximately 50% working as unskilled in the secondary labour market (Fassmann *et al.*, 1999). In West Germany and Switzerland, Yugoslav workers experienced slightly higher mobility, but even in these countries, the overwhelming majority were unskilled or low-skilled labourers (Fassmann *et al.*, 1999; de Coulon, 1999). In contrast, workers of native origin, as well as immigrants from Western European countries, experienced greater upward labour market mobility in all three countries, no matter the level of education and years of work experience. While Austrian, West German, and Swiss labour markets were strongly ethnically segregated, Swedish and Norwegian ones were largely stratified on the basis of gender. Certain ethnic stratification was manifested through a strong concentration of some immigrant groups in a few particular occupations (Leiniö, 1988; Stiver Lie, 1983). In Sweden, Yugoslav workers experienced moderately higher upward labour market mobility than in other countries, but in the course of the 1980s, during the transition to post-industrial society, their professional progress and income development became insignificant while their traditionally high labour market participation degraded (Ekberg, 1994). Declines were especially high among Yugoslav men since they were mainly distributed within heavy industry, in jobs that were steadily disappearing from the Swedish labour market.

Professional progress was especially low among Yugoslav female migrants, regardless of the receiving country. They often experienced intersectional subordination and discrimination based on class, gender, and ethnicity, and they lacked professional ambitions, opportunities, and strategies to change their positions (Knocke, 1986; Lorber, 2017; Morokvašić, 1979; Stiver Lie, 1983). The overwhelming majority spent their entire working lives as unskilled workers in low-paid and labour-intensive jobs in service sectors, seasonal occupations, and assembly lines in the heavy or garment industry, often working illegally and unprotected by the welfare system (Brčić; 1990; Ivanović, 2012; Knocke, 1986; Lorber, 2017; Podgorelec, 1990; Švob and Brčić, 1985). Consequently, many experienced severe health issues (Podgorelec, 1990) since extensive physical labour, poor working conditions, and uneven working times traditionally characterised these jobs. According to Ivanović (2012), one of the main reasons for the often illegal work and exploitation of Yugoslav women in West Germany was the state's policy of denying work permits to women who immigrated to join their husbands. However, Brčić (1990) found that even in the 1980s, after the official abandonment of the guest working system, approximately one third of Yugoslav women included in the study did not sign contracts with West German employers. Illegal work, as a primary or secondary source of income, was also common among Yugoslav men, especially during the most intensive years of

Yugoslav labour migration (Dobrivojević Tomić, 2007; Ivanović, 2012; Jurić and Vujević, 2020). Working extra hours, in shifts and during weekends, was common among both genders (Ivanović, 2012; Lorber, 2017; Morokvašić, 1972; Stiever Lie, 1983).

Yugoslav workers' participation in Western labour markets, in terms of both gainful employment and working hours, was high throughout the entire period of Yugoslav labour migration. Remarkably high was labour market participation among women, often reaching similar proportions as male workers (Leiniö, 1988, Lorber, 2017; Stiver Lie, 1983; Švob and Brčić, 1986). They mostly worked in typical "female branches" – namely, in service-oriented sectors (such as cleaning, housekeeping, and maintenance) or in the garment and food industries. However, Yugoslav women often neglected the conventional, gender-based occupational segmentations within developed economies, where the primary and secondary labour markets eventually divided horizontally, making certain branches restricted to minorities and immigrants or only to women (Reich *et al.*, 1973). It was common among Yugoslav women and men to perform jobs in the same occupational categories, mostly in industrial sectors characterised by a strong concentration of male workers (Brčić, 1990; Leiniö, 1988; Stiver Lie, 1983; Švob and Brčić, 1985). This is partially due to the pursuit of higher salaries in heavy industry sectors (Leiniö, 1988), where employers with highly standardised production and assembly lines targeted cheap labour, traditionally abundant among immigrant women. However, the convenience of migrating and finding employment through networks, as well as Western employers' perception of Yugoslav workers as eligible for certain jobs, certainly contributed to a gender-based occupational equality among Yugoslav workers.

5.2. Barriers to professional progress

Yugoslav networks were an immensely valuable resource for solving migration issues and finding employment. This is clearly demonstrated in the rapid galvanisation of Yugoslav labour migration and in institutional inability to control it. However, within the host societies, these networks turned Yugoslav workers into a static social group and workforce. They experienced a widespread isolation from the social contexts of host societies and a strong orientation towards their countryman (Čačić, 1988; Dragišić, 2009, 2012; Ivanović, 2011, 2012; Jurić and Vujević, 2021; Knocke, 1986; Meurle and Andrić, 1971; Morokvašić, 1972). The clearest example is that of a Swedish manufacturing company where the most effective to acquire higher skills and advance through the hierarchy was to connect with supervisors of Swedish and Finnish origin (Paulson *et al.*, 1994). Those connections enabled employees to participate in internal courses for skill improvement, which usually

brought a promotion to a higher position. Because of Yugoslav workers' ethnically framed social networks and disinterest in expanding them, supervisors generally mistrusted their loyalty, reliability, education, and skills. Consequently, Yugoslav workers predominantly performed manual jobs at the bottom of the company's hierarchy, seldomly engaging in internal courses and experiencing promotions.

The effect of expanded social networks is illustrated in Lorber's (2017) study of Yugoslav female workers in Austria. The study shows that only women who established and maintained strong social connections with their employers and supervisors of native origin acquired higher educational merits and advanced professionally. However, these women were a rare exception, since the overwhelming majority of Yugoslav women worked in the lowest layers of Western labour markets (Brčić, 1990; Ivanović, 2012; Lorber, 2017; Švob and Brčić, 1986; Pepeonik, 1975).

Constrained by their belief of the temporariness of their migration and their focus on acquiring social and economic assets that were only relevant in their area of origin, Yugoslav workers largely failed to invest in social and professional capital valuable in the receiving countries and convertible during economic crises and changes in means of production. Many failed to invest in the social and professional development of their descendants, who often experienced similar patterns of educational stagnation, occupational distribution, and low labour market mobility (Čačić and Kumpes, 1989; Fassmann *et al.*, 1999; Ivanović, 2012; Paulson *et al.*, 1994; Vegar, 1986;). However, seeing these outcomes only from Yugoslav workers' perspective means ignoring the social and economic practices characterising modern economies with segmented labour markets. Social isolation, occupational concentration, and professional immobility of labour migrants (and racial and ethnic minorities) are deeply embedded in the nature of segmented labour markets. These conditions are the main pillars in sustaining social hierarchies and economic stability and are therefore favoured by employers and acceptable for governments (Massey *et al.*, 1993). Namely, improving conditions in the secondary labour market would invoke a chain reaction of demands and necessities to improve conditions on all levels of hierarchy (Piore, 1979). Therefore, employers would rather recruit within social categories that conform to the existing system, while governments are satisfied with juridical equality within the labour market. Migrants' labour is also a key component in sustaining the service sectors of modern economies, as well as branches and industries employing cheap labour to remain competitive in the global market. Identified as eligible for lowest working positions and perceived as temporary labourers throughout their work lives, Yugoslav workers were one of the migrant groups sustaining Western secondary labour markets during the immigration restrictions invoked by the oil crises of the 1970s and throughout the transition from industrial to post-industrial economies in the 1980s. They fulfilled a structural demand for migrant labour in modern economies (Massey *et al.*, 1993).

Moreover, most of the receiving countries at the time were avoiding the complete inclusion of labour migrants, perceiving them as guests, and reducing them to the simple category of “temporary worker” who will return home when their labour becomes redundant (Castles and Davidson, 2000). Accordingly, the social exclusion and educational and professional immobility of migrant workers were of trivial significance in comparison with receiving countries’ social and economic interests and their economies’ perpetual demand for migrant workers. Combined with the conditions of dual labour markets (such as ethnic and occupational segregation, intensive labour, and overtime work), this institutional attitude fostered the exclusion of Yugoslav labour migrants from the developments of host societies and, subsequently, amplified both their sense of belonging to the society of their origin and their belief in eventual re-migration.

A few institutional initiatives to increase labour migrants’ educational capacities included programmes in primary and secondary education or courses in native languages. Alternatives offered by employers included official adult education and courses for skill improvement, both of which were conducted in the languages of the host societies, which Yugoslav workers rarely mastered.

Scholars have mostly overseen educational and professional opportunities and barriers that Yugoslav workers had experienced in the receiving countries, as well as their attitudes and perspectives regarding their own educational and professional progress. Several Swedish qualitative studies have provided some knowledge by showing that Yugoslav workers’ attitudes spanned from completely indifferent to ambitious and that they experienced continuous discrimination by their employers regarding opportunities for professional development (Augustsson, 1995; Knocke, 1986; 1994; Paulson *et al.*, 1994). However, as limited investigations, these studies do not provide a wider understanding of the opportunities and barriers Yugoslav workers have experienced in Sweden. A brief description of educational opportunities in Austria and West Germany was provided by Ivanović (2012), who found that both countries had several educational programmes for adults available to immigrant workers; however, only a small proportion of Yugoslav workers engaged in these programmes, which Ivanović (2012) ascribed to their commonly poor knowledge of the German language. Notwithstanding, their eagerness to work overtime, by taking extra shifts and working during weekends, further reduced their possibilities of pursuing education and professional development. According to Ivanović (2012), Yugoslav workers who learned German and acquired higher skills were usually promoted to higher positions of responsibility. However, the study did not focus on their educational paths and the extent of their professional advancement. Brčić (1990) found that until the mid-1980s, approximately 10% of Yugoslav women and roughly 30% of men in West Germany had increased their professional skills and experienced certain professional advancement.

However, compared to native workers and immigrants from other European countries, this mobility was mostly insignificant (Fassmann *et al.*, 1999). Brčić (1990) believed Yugoslav workers were participating in courses provided by employers and designed to train employees for positions they were already holding. In other words, the purpose of the courses was to verify the skills Yugoslav workers already possessed. Since the courses were neither officially acknowledged nor transferable to other workplaces (Brčić, 1990), we can fairly argue that certifications additionally bound workers for their workplace and hierarchical position while their further professional advancement was largely dependent on the employer's will.

During the 1970s, Yugoslav educational institutions had been engaging in the education of Yugoslav workers in Austria and West Germany (Ivanović, 2012), implying that migrants would not acquire considerable skills by working abroad. The results of quantitative studies (Fassmann, 1997; Fassmann *et al.*, 1999) indicate that these educational initiatives were of minor significance for Yugoslav workers' professional capacities and upward labour market mobility. These programmes may have distanced Yugoslav workers even further from the West German and Austrian educational contexts and, therefore, even from opportunities for social inclusion. Nevertheless, by allowing Yugoslav institutions to implement teaching on their soil, West Germany and Austria were confirming the perception of Yugoslav workers as temporary settlers whose educational capacities are the concern of Yugoslav institutions. West Germany even offered education to labour migrants' children in history, mother tongue, and geography, conducted by teachers appointed by the Yugoslav regime, officially preparing pupils for their eventual return to Yugoslavia (Ivanović, 2012). Similar educational programmes, designed with arguably similar intentions, were implemented in all major receiving countries to nurture the social and cultural distinctiveness of labour migrants and their descendants and their geographic attachment to their countries of origin. For the Yugoslav regime, these programmes were an instrument of mediating its propaganda and shaping the educational development of labour migrants' descendants (Dragišić, 2014; Ivanović, 2012); they also constituted a durable platform for constant interference with Yugoslav citizens abroad. Arguably, these educational programmes affected not only pupils but also their parents, additionally strengthening their sense of belonging to Yugoslavia and fortifying the perception of the temporariness of their migration.

Conclusions

This article has drawn connections between the economic and social factors conditioning Yugoslav labour migration and Yugoslav workers' career development in Western European countries during the period between 1963 and 1991. The article has shown a strong correlation

between the driving forces of Yugoslav labour migration, the perception of its temporariness, and a narrow occupational and hierarchical distribution among Yugoslav workers in Western labour markets. As the article demonstrated, Yugoslav workers' widespread professional stagnation was shaped by social and economic conditions characterising Yugoslav labour migration and the societies of receiving countries, and it was governed by the practices and attitudes of regimes, institutions, and Western employers. Yugoslav workers perpetuated these conditions and practices with their own perspectives regarding their migration and working positions and with their attitudes toward the social contexts of Yugoslavia and the receiving countries.

Furthermore, the article has illustrated how the correlation between Yugoslav workers' indifference to the social contexts of receiving countries and the principles of the dual labour market excluded them from the educational systems of receiving countries and the opportunities for career development. Migrating predominantly in search of economic prosperity, with limited educational capacities and low professional aspirations, and guided by the perception of temporariness of their migration, Yugoslav workers mostly invested in social and economic possessions valuable in their communities of origin. These attitudes and practices perpetuated their occupational concentration in the lowest positions of the secondary labour market and the corresponding social exclusion. Accordingly, they ethnically framed their social environment within the receiving countries, continuously attaching themselves to Yugoslav socioeconomic contexts and nurturing the sense of belonging to their area of origin and the belief in the temporary character of their migration. The Yugoslav regime, guided by its own economic and political interests, constantly encouraged these attitudes, practices, and outcomes, often with support, or indifference, from the receiving countries.

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Opinion mining and socializing networks

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Abstract

The context of this article is a larger, ongoing postdoctoral research that looks into the relationship between opinion mining – more precisely sentiment analysis – and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that started in February 2022. The postdoctoral research aims to analyze political speeches in the context of the war by using available sentiment analysis tools, the purpose being to discover the real emotions behind the speeches per se: are they indeed negative as they pretend to be, or are they rather neutral, in fact, or perhaps even positive. Furthermore, the political speeches selected, coming from official bodies and governments, are focused on the sanctions applied to Russia since invading Ukraine, so both context and sentiment should converge. This article has therefore meaning in the larger context of that research and it aims to offer a short exercise into using a sentiment analysis tool for investigating the presence on social media, this time, of the realities of this conflict. For this purpose, a couple of relevant key words were selected and they were analyzed using opinion mining in the framework of social media platforms and their numerous users. The article investigates the results of this search, discusses them and offers a personal perspective on the topic.

Keywords: opinion mining, Russia, Ukraine, conflict, sentiment analysis

Introduction

The context of this research is mainly related to several issues of concern nowadays: the conflict in Ukraine, which has already lasted far too long and the overwhelming amount of fake news surrounding it, linked to the immense popularity of social media and its considerable influence on people's opinions and in the end, mentality. It has been stated that 'The emergence of social media enables billions of people to share their content and in doing so they influence others and are being influenced themselves' (Snijders and Helms, 2014). This symbiotic influence can become problematic when fake news prevail and tend to be considered as true. Authors have talked about the 'convergence of conspiracies' during the pandemic period, which polarized the society and created an unfaithful trend of disinformation worldwide (Jankowicz, 2020). In her book entitled *How to lose the information war: Russia, fake news and the future of conflict*, Jankowicz discusses sensitive

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aspects like the Twitter wars which spread Russian messages directed against Ukraine way before the armed conflict itself began or the ‘troll factory’ of news and posts on social media (Jankowicz, 2020). These not only spread rumors and fake news, but proved to be ‘relentless, offensive and misleading’, an intrinsic part of Russia’s information war against Ukraine. A major problem, according to the author, is that misinformation and fake news are not clearly defined and categorized as phenomena, so as ‘to successfully understand and counter them’. This ‘confusing landscape’ needs clarity and to be placed under close scrutiny. Because the problem is much larger than it appears – real online influence operations take place and these ‘involve the weaponization of emotion’ while ‘the effect of disinformation and online influence campaigns [...] is anything but fake’ (Jankowicz, 2020).

This article is part of an ongoing postdoctoral research that looks to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine from the perspective of opinion mining, more precisely sentiment analysis. The postdoctoral research aims to analyze political speeches in the context of the war by using available sentiment analysis tools, the purpose being to discover the real emotions behind the speeches per se: are they indeed negative as they pretend to be, or are they rather neutral, in fact, or perhaps even positive, contradicting the speech itself. Sentiment analysis can easily analyze that, as it will be explained further on. To this purpose, a large number of speeches were gathered directly from official bodies and governmental institutions, speeches focusing on the sanctions applied to Russia since invading Ukraine. These speeches were analyzed using opinion mining in order to discover if the words of the speech itself and the general emotion, as highlighted by the sentiment analysis, converge and to what extent. This article, part of the larger context of the research, represents only a short excursion into opinion mining, using a free, online-available sentiment analysis tool for investigating the presence on social media of this conflict. The article investigates the results of this search, discusses them and offers a personal perspective on the topic.

1. Context

Marketing has always been interested in obtaining feedback from customers and has always taken into consideration the opinions of consumers, because of the symbiotic relation between user and the product. This has reached new heights in fields like advertising and tourism, for instance. As early as 1980s, Richard L. Oliver proposed a famous theory of customer satisfaction and its relation to cognitive processes, including expectations, what the actual purchase meant, and post-purchase feedback. In his words, ‘satisfaction remains a worthy pursuit among the consumer marketing community’ (Oliver, 1980). The Oliver model discusses consumer’s feedback under the name of ‘Post-Purchase Evaluations’, meaning that a satisfied customer will probably repeat the purchase over

and over, becoming a loyal consumer, whereas a dissatisfied customer will not only refuse to buy the product again, but will also offer negative feedback (Oliver, 1980).

With the advent of internet and social media, people have become more vocal about their likes and dislikes and the expression of opinions on platforms in plain sight have become an overwhelming force, capable of enticing advertising campaigns and bringing change to products and services. The classic feedback form in writing or the occasional survey have been slowly replaced with the voice of the consumer, to be heard large and wide from the comments' sections, forums, social media websites etc.

Modern studies like the concept of Marketing 5.0, following the precursors 3.0 and 4.0, all concepts developed by Kotler, creator of the 4Ps of the Marketing model and his co-authors Kartajaya and Setiawan state there are no longer barriers to stand in the way of social media today; nowadays, people connect and communicate continuously, turning purchasing into a social phenomenon, becoming customers who 'are increasingly wary of marketing communications from brands and instead rely on the f-factor (friends, families, fans and followers). [...] They look for advice and reviews, both online and offline' (Kotler *et al.*, 2021). This type of behavior emphasizes the increasing importance of feedback and its analysis through performant tools.

Over time, several marketing theories have emerged to analyze customer behavior, including the need for feedback: from the old, yet still relevant theory of Lewis' customer journey or the AIDA formula, referring to customers' behavior patterns and motives, their preferences and habits to Kotler's modern concept of Marketing 5.0, describing the Human-Centric Approach, which means that customers represent the center of all marketing: their needs, preferences and emotions influence and finally determine the marketing strategies. (Kotler *et al.*, 2021). All theories have shed light on the importance of feedback and the technologized world of today offers feedback a central position, due to its spread and influence.

In order to be able to analyze the enormous quantity of posts and comments available online, specialists have come up with various solutions of what is today called opinion mining. NLP stands for Natural Language Processing and represents the use of natural language processing technology to search for and extract opinions (hence the name of opinion mining), feedback, impressions, evaluations and even emotions from various written texts like reviews, comments on social networks, blogs or any available online information sources. Out of the many types of opinion mining tools, this paper will focus on one in particular: sentiment analysis.

Sentiment analysis basically extracts and analyzes people's opinions, sentiments, attitudes, perceptions, regarding various topics, and offers a fast instrument to navigate through the 'enormous

‘heaps of opinions and reviews about products, services, and day-to-day activities’, acting like a ‘powerful tool for businesses, governments, and researchers to extract and analyze public mood and views, gain business insight, and make better decisions’ (Birjali and Kasri, 2021).

Sentiment analysis can be used by any interested party to detect and assess feelings, opinions and emotions embedded in a written text, like a comment, review, social media post or any other type of text. Using this useful instrument allows the analyzer to determine whether the sentiment expressed is negative, neutral or positive. These are the three possibilities envisaged by this tool which has proved extremely useful in marketing research and not only there. It has eased the work of many people, as gathering hundreds of opinions and researching them could have been an exhausting work. Nowadays, artificial intelligence can extract opinions from numerous sources, and analyze them in large numbers, offering quite accurate evaluations for them. Sentiment analysis has been used before to analyze social media posts – for instance the correlation between the Brexit phenomenon and Twitter posts’ sentiments towards Brexit: ‘SA of tweets has potential as a real-time barometer of public sentiment towards negotiating outcomes to inform government decision-making [...] Our findings indicate that the preferred or least preferred Brexit outcomes could have been inferred by the emotions expressed by Twitter users’ (Georgiadou and Angelopolous, 2020).

Other authors connected public opinion polls with sentiment measured from the accompanying texts, as well as analyzed several surveys on consumer confidence and political opinion over a longer period of time, and also correlated Twitter messages to sentiment analysis, discovering a large percentage of correlation (O’Connor *et al.*, 2010).

This article aims at performing an exercise and assess the sentiments and reactions of social media users in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as a measure of how it reflects into the comments of the worldwide community.

2. How it works

The way sentiment analysis functions is rather simple, as the tool is meant for wide use. ‘The principal approaches to sentiment analysis are the use of sentiment lexicons, machine learning techniques, or combinations of both’ (Alnashwan *et al.*, 2023). First of all, the tool identifies the sentiments expressed in a text and then quantifies them by using special processing algorithms. The degree of sentiment present in a text also determines the percentages of positive, negative or neutral feelings. For instance, in a touristic website like booking.com, the sentiment analysis tool would be employed to determine whether the clients’ reviews are positive, negative or neutral in the case of a certain hotel. The hotel’s standing will modify on the site according to the customers’ reviews. The

processing algorithms are used to identify expressions, words and sentences associated with sentiments. This also considers certain key words and even nuances expressed by the clients. The more sensitive the tool, the better the results, as it can analyze subtler differences of language used in context. In the end, the software will generate analyses indicating whether the text in question expresses a positive or negative point of view. In other words, after looking into hundreds, sometimes thousands of reviews of a hotel on booking.com, sentiment analysis will offer a clearer picture of the quality of that particular hotel. As said, this will modify its standing and the number of stars it is awarded for its quality and services. This is important in the context of customers searching for good hotels, with a higher score. So, the better the score of a hotel, the more future customers.

The same with any other product marketed. The more positive the reviews of customers, the larger the sales. Furthermore, the negative or even neutral comments can add value to the marketing process by incorporating feedback in future developments of the product, or by adjusting the advertising campaign, for instance. Feedback is a valuable tool, essential in the development of products and services, and sentiment analysis is a useful auxiliary, allowing the management of large quantities of comments and written feedback and offering, at the same time, a general image on categories: positive, negative or neutral. The help of machine learning algorithms, trained to recognize sentiment tags in various types of text is essential in this respect.

Nowadays there are numerous, various types of sentiment analysis tools available. All perform an automatic process and provide the same types of results, offering the needed analysis of feedback and texts, and ultimately the needed insight for any marketing campaign, advertising promotion or media monitoring activity. This article will investigate briefly the last one, prompting a sentiment analysis software with some keywords in order to analyze its results.

Opinion mining or sentiment analysis tools are, as said, numerous today. However, they are not always free. In fact, the best ones, which are more advanced, are usually rather expensive. Some platforms offer more Artificial Intelligence tools, sentiment analysis being just one of them. Different tech websites and magazines also offer classifications of this analysis tool, grouping platforms on categories like price, or lack of it because some of them are completely free, performance or complexity. One such classification retrieved from a publicity website entitled *Brand24* mentions several such useful platforms, along their description and offered services. In order to use them, one must pay a fee, if the case, and register on the website, the contact form being the starting point for an eventual subscription and also for securing the results of the analyses. Some of these become unavailable the moment one exits the site, as this is often a feature of the free services. For a company needing those results and analyses, it is important to be able to save the results. Hence the

subscriptions available on most of these platforms. The cost-free ones are also mentioned. It appears that some of the most popular ones today are: Clarabridge, OpenText, Lexalytics, Social Mention, Social Searcher, Sentiment Analyzer, Tweet Sentiment Visualization, Rapidminer etc.

The manner in which sentiment analysis tools are being evaluated by tech experts is detailed for instance on the popular website CX Lead, where editor Hannah Clark asks some pertinent questions on how one can choose the best opinion mining tool for one's needs. Such pertinent questions include the value for money offered by the tool, but most importantly, how user friendly the interface of the tool is, how easy is it to use, its features and functionality, how complex is the text analytic software 'in order to analyze sentiment across a wide variety of conversation types', if it includes features like Social Media Analysis and last but not least, if the reporting tools are 'robust, customizable, flexible, and visually appealing' and also 'easy to connect with other tools.' (Clark, 2023)

For the purposes of this research, we investigated some of the sentiment analysis tools available on the world wide web, choosing one that is free, in order to observe its performance and usefulness. For this article in particular, we stopped at one of the free platforms mentioned above, more precisely, Social Searcher. We decided to interrogate the opinion mining tool using two very actual keywords, that refer to a sensitive reality the world is dealing with at the moment: the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The 2 words were 'Russia' and 'Ukraine'. Social Searcher only looks into social media platforms, 11 of them more precisely, and displays various aspects related to the search, such as how often the keywords are mentioned and on which particular social media websites, if these mentions are positive, negative or neutral, what are the trends related to the selected keywords and which users have discussed about them. As a novelty that indicates how fast technology is advancing, it also displays results concerning videos or images related to the chosen keywords.

3. Case study

Social Searcher, a free AI tool in the form of a social engine researching all social media sites available, no less than 11 and offering real time results, is a popular engine used by people worldwide. It is a user-friendly, straightforward tool, offering three types of searches, as obvious from the picture above: mentions, users and trends. Within seconds after being prompted with a certain topic, being asked about 'mentions', it displays a screen offering various type of info, more or less relevant.

For the purpose of this research, the keywords used were 'Russia' and 'Ukraine'.

Figure 1. Social Searcher website - interface






Figure 2. The first set of search results prompted by the keywords ‘Russia-Ukraine’




As figure 2 indicates, Social Searcher displayed, for the above-mentioned keywords, several types of useful data. Starting with a short analytics at the top of the screen, as a general overview, it continues by providing 6 categories of information to be perused: from a general graphic indicating which social media was most active related to the keywords, to a sentiment analysis, names of users and even key words most frequently mentioned. However, for the purpose of this research, not all categories were relevant: for instance, the names of users discussing the topic have little significance. On the other hand, the sentiment analysis section, which is quite detailed, does offer some interesting information.

Figure 3. A classification of most popular hashtags used on social platforms



This classification indicated by figure 3 above indicates what hashtags users have been employing when discussing or referring to the keywords ‘Russia Ukraine’. A hashtag is a well-known tool, using a pre-existing key on all electronic devices, which was made highly popular by the social platform Twitter. The main purpose of this keyword, the “#” sign placed in front of one or more words is to group more posts with the same topic, in order to make them easier to follow, as well as to help users find them and interact on the same topic of interest. When a user clicks on such a hashtag, he or she is allowed to see all other posts referring to the same discussion topic, that particular event or piece of news. In the case of this article, the most widely used hashtags prompted by the keywords on this platform were, obviously, ‘Russia’ and ‘Ukraine’.

Figure 4. Reactions indicated by the sentiment analysis software: negative, positive and neutral



As already mentioned, the most important purpose of this exercise was to highlight the sentiment analysis preponderance regarding the keywords ‘Russia’ and ‘Ukraine’. The tool employed in this case indicated, perhaps surprisingly, that at the time this article was written, the reactions of people on social media websites were mostly neutral, with a staggering 337 points

(79% of the total reactions). The negative trend was much lower, at 65 (15% of the total reactions) and the positive ones a mere 10% of the total. Figure 5 also indicates the ratio of these reactions as appearing on various websites, like Twitter (mostly written comments) or Vimeo (a platform providing mostly videos) or Reddit (with a mix of the two, as well as links or images).

As described in the beginning, the main purpose of the software called sentiment analysis is to analyze a large quantity of written content in order to highlight the positive, negative or neutral side of it. The tool perfected in a short period of time, and it can now analyze video content, images, links and other types of content in order to provide a more accurate response. The online tools that require a fee are more accurate and provide more complex answers, of course. For a most precise response in relation to a certain research topic, the best idea would probably be to employ several of these payable tools, as well as a free one per comparison. Finally, the human touch will make the difference, because results need not only interpretation, but also filtering and categorizing.

Figure 5. Popular posts related to the selected keywords

Popular Positive Posts	Popular Negative Posts	Popular Neutral Posts
PIS fuels new conspiracy theory Zelensky to overthrow the P... 49	WSJ Scholz blocks transfer of Taurus missiles to Ukraine due... 57	ALTALTALTALTALTALTALTALTALTALT Putin and the Presidents Marie Yova... 5
Ukraine War Weekly Update 2.9282023 Hello fine people of rde... 47	shocking levels of delirium of these people 27	Combats sur le flanc d'Artyomovsk la 123e brigade de l'ar... 1
[OC] Satellitedetected fires in Eastern Ukraine past 24 hour... 38	115 destroyed artillery pieces in the last 3 days alone as U... 11	Les forces armées russes frappent un train militaire ... 1
Free Russia Movement "We'll talk about this with Caesar in 2... 37	Regarding all the posts about the war in Ukraine Look lots o... 8	"Route de la mort" pour les combattants Ukrainiens qui ... 1
Roboquest Progress Playtest Pricing amp Preparing for Launc... 16	The ruble value somehow holds and yet it creates problems in... 8	Un tireur d'élite russe ayant traqué un mitrailleur... 1
Jan. 30, 2023 - Ukraine Under Attack Documenting the Russia... 732	Holy Russia, Moscow Architecture, Russian Orthodox Old Beli... 807	Russia's air force has lost 90 planes in Ukraine and is beco... 10.7K
red call on top This woman was hiking in front of us over th... 343	Wie gehen die Kriegsparteien Russland und Ukraine mit Kriegs... 2.7K	Moscow by Christmas is back on the menu 1.6K
At least one civilian was injured during the Russian bombard... 378	Der russische Außenminister Sergej Lawrow hat erklärt dass R... 539	NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg The stronger Ukraine... 179
Super Sixer Ukraine और America से F16 विनाश Ukraine 3 F16... 6	Trudeau apologizes for honoring Nazi war veteran in Canadian... 122	Italiano explains flat Earth 176
Brentford vs Arsenal 01 CARABAO CUP HIGHLIGHTS 2023 Nelson... 3	Um avião soviético explodiu ao pousar em uma pista no Mali A... 69	Ukraine's drone warfare strategy has brought war home to 'Mo... 88
Visit our website Like us on Facebook Follow us on Twitt... 1	ministro de Minas e Energia Alexandre Silveira disse nesta q... 57	UR-GAH 2 Boeing 737-32QW Ukraine International Airways MAN 2... 2.6K
Inter Miami vs Houston Dynamo 12 Final Highlights All Goals... 1	9sec of Rafal Milach The Archive of Public Protests Museu... 1	Feb. 14, 2023 - Ukraine Under Attack Documenting the Russia... 2.3K
28th September 2023 Moscow Russia Briefing of the offici... 2	Ukraine wants to fight until the "death of the Russian empir... 5	Feb. 12, 2023 - Ukraine Under Attack Documenting the Russia... 2.2K
Average Wake Up Time By Countries 1 South Africa 624... 1	Russia's "Big Push" Next year by JULIAN MACFARLANE Everyone... 3	Feb. 20, 2023 - Ukraine Under Attack Documenting the Russia... 2.2K
	OS NEOCONSERVADORES AMAM A GUERRA NA UCRAÍNIA Escrito por Ca... 3	Holy Russia, Moscow Nature & Architecture, Golden Autumn nea... 1.4K
	"It seems to me that this war concerns not only the proble... 2	Le secrétaire général de l'Alliance a effectué une visite su... 14.7K
	THE MEDIA FORGOT TO TELL YOU THAT UKRAINE LOST ABOUT 85 OF L... 1	Laut dem ukrainischen Militärportal "Defense Express" hat da... 4.7K
		Comment l'armée russe se réinvente dans la guerre face à l'U... 4.2K
		Port of Odesa sa Ukraine napinsala sa panibagong drone strik... 797

Figure 5 highlights the most popular positive, negative or neutral posts prompted by the search of the Russian-Ukrainian keywords used. These posts are grouped on social media platforms, and categories. The classification indicates the first lines or title, if any, of the post itself and the number of likes that post has received. They are ordered according to the time of the post, the most recent on top. These categories

are user-friendly and easy to employ: a simple click will enlarge the respective posting for an easier reading and will also offer the link to the integral article or comment. For instance, the first one in the positive reactions’ column dates from September 2023, comes from the popular comments site Reddit and states: ‘PiS fuels new conspiracy theory: Zelenskyy to overthrow the Polish government? I respectfully inform you that the [PiS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_and_Justice) media are already claiming that Zelenskyy wants to overthrow the Polish government’ and continues with offering more explanations on the topic (reddit.com).

On the other hand, the most popular mention in the neutral mentions, gathering more than 2500 appreciations from users, is a post from former airline manager Ken Fielding, who posts about the football team of Donetsk, who played against the team Manchester City FC the previous day. and about the gloomy weather conditions of their trip back home. This posting is in fact quite irrelevant for any research on the war in Ukraine, and this indicates, at the same time, the need of human intervention in such cases, as well as the limitations of this software tool. The human intervention is not just needed, but required in such cases, in order to filter the results and select the relevant ones. Searching closer, there are many neutral postings which gathered a lot of online attention, even if less than the previous one, whose merit might have been to be connected to yet another popular topic worldwide: football.

Figure 6. Users and platforms indicating the analytics of this search topic





Figure 6 displays the users’ section of this search item, indicating the most popular social platforms in the recent period, the number of mentions on that particular social media: 72 on Reddit, 54 on Dailymotion or 46 on Vkontakte etc., along with a pie chart to clearly show the percentages.

Figure 7. Types of postings on social media platforms. The red color represents Dailymotion, yellow Vkontakte, grey stands for Vimeo and blue color represents Tumblr, all social media platforms



An interesting aspect is highlighted by figure 7, which indicates what types of postings have been popular on social media platforms and other online websites dealing with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The most viewed were the photographs, with 159 visualizations, followed by videos, with 137 views by various people. This indicates the preponderance of users' preferences, and it is in line with worldwide trends showing that internauts favor video and photographic content and tend to read less.

An empirical study on internet usage showed as early as 2008 that highly intelligent people, even some higher education persons tend to scan a text, rather than read it properly (Weinrich *et al.*, 2008). Another interesting study (Nielsen, 2008), looking into the results of the previous one and completing it, asserts that people are not used to reading 'pages containing between 30 and 1,250 words' whereas 'Pages with a huge word count are probably not "real" pages anyway — they're more likely to be either academic papers or "terms & conditions" pages' which are of little interest to internet users/readers.

Conclusions

The use of a sentiment analysis tool proved satisfactory and straightforward, offering a clear image of what is going on social platforms, how often the keywords appear, in which contexts and

what reactions do people actually have. Furthermore, such an analysis can be used to monitor not just social media platforms, but also online forums, in order to gauge public sentiment and reactions connected to a conflict, like in this case, or other sensitive topics. Sentiment analysis can help differentiate between genuine public sentiment and propaganda. It can even identify manipulative campaigns and sentiments on social media and other platforms, indicating a clear understanding of how a sensitive situation is perceived online. To a certain extent, it may even be possible to predict escalations of conflicts and perhaps. Identifying fake news and propaganda can also be very useful for authorities. And last but not least, policy makers may employ sentiment analysis in order to test the opinion of population regarding some policy interventions and then adjust their actions accordingly. There are numerous uses of opinion mining and the one described in this article is just one of them. As already mentioned, it seems surprising that in this particular case, the reactions and comments are mostly neutral when it comes to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict news. In this respect, however, sentiment analysis proved useful and very fast. The entire search through all 11 social media platforms it investigates lasted under 3 minutes. This would definitely constitute an asset for the marketing teams who are looking for fast and reliable solutions.

The tool employed for this article is free of charge, and some other ones, that require a fee, would probably offer a more comprehensive perspective. However, for a first impression, the outcome was reasonable. Some results of the search may prove to be irrelevant, and they must be looked into. However, most of the results are not only useful, but also quite relevant, as they refer directly to the conflict between the two countries, as opposed to mentioning any other, less important, things. That means, obviously, that users on all platforms are very much aware of what is going on in the world. Furthermore, the general tone of all posts is in favor of Ukraine, which again is a good thing. However, there are large numbers of neutral posts or pieces of news distributed on social media. Beyond that, a further study which would analyze 2 or more different sentiment analysis tools by comparison would be welcome. Such an overview of social media may prove useful, depending on the topic researched and the purpose of the study. Perhaps for a more thorough research, various combinations of keywords might be required, too. Also, gathering data from more than one sentiment analysis tool would provide more accurate results. Analyzing trends and the general sentiment correlated to a political event such as an armed conflict etc., might be very useful in itself or part of a larger research. Techniques based on Artificial Intelligence are relevant in understanding public sentiments on different topics of interest, and the discussions, reactions and comments from different social media platforms indicate the general opinions of online users. Further research projects dedicated to social media platforms is needed, perhaps in a larger context.

Acknowledgement: This work was co-funded by the European Social Fund, through Operational Programme Human Capital 2014-2020, project number POCU/993/6/13/153322, project title “Educational and training support for PhD students and young researchers in preparation for insertion into the labor market”.

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