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Culture and cross-border cooperation at EU's Eastern borders

Corina TURȘIE[*]

Abstract

The paper aims to offer an overview of the specific situation of culture as an investment priority of cross-border cooperation, part of the European territorial integration process, in the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy. The research is focused on the cross-border programmes involving Romania and its neighbours during the last two multiannual financial frameworks. Two financial instruments are of interest: the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, for the period 2007-2013 and the European Neighbourhood Instrument for 2014-2020. The analysis is based on the European Union's INTERREG database (keep.eu), filtered for seven CBC programmes, highlighting the role of culture for CBC, the intensity of CBC and the leading territories (cities and countries) in cultural projects involving cross-border partners in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Keywords: culture, cross-border cooperation, projects, Eastern Neighbourhood

Introduction

An important policy statement of the European Union (EU) highlights the fact that cross-border cooperation (CBC) on the external borders of the EU is a key priority in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). CBC is a part of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), a financial instrument of ENP during 2014-2020 (Regulation (EU) No 232/2014) and was a part of European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the similar instrument for the previous multiannual financial framework, 2007-2013 (Regulation (EC) No. 1638/2006). While ENI/ENPI target external relations with neighbouring countries, CBC puts the focus on equal cooperation across the EU external borders at local and regional level. It builds on the INTERREG experience of cross-border cooperation at the EU internal borders, as EU developed CBC mechanisms since the 90s.

The underlying concept of CBC offers a new perception of the border: away from its traditional ‚obstacle' dimension to the vision of the border as a place where people cooperate, develop a feeling of belonging to a shared cultural space and feel united in addressing common challenges together. In

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[*]Corina TURȘIE is Senior Lecturer at West University of Timișoara, Romania, Department of Politics, e-mail: corina.tursie@e-uvt.ro.

this vision, the border is an 'asset' to be exploited, brought by the EU political construction, doubled by the economic globalisation.

The 'barrier' to cooperation perspective has historical backgrounds, border regions facing a perceived insecurity, being also isolated from the decision-making centres. Nowadays, it is particularly difficult to overcome the legal and administrative obstacles raised by the EU external borders and to have the 'barrier to resource' transition (Sohn, 2014). Moreover, the challenges faced by Eastern European border regions are different from the ones faced by Western European internal border regions, consequently shaping the content of CBC in those regions. In fact, the nature of CBC depends on the level of cross-border integration, which differs (Decoville *et. al.*, 2015) considering several variables: cross-border interactions (dynamic of commuters and residents in neighbour countries) and dynamics of territorial convergence (GDP/capita, labour market integration, cross-border public services etc.)

A complete cross-border integration allows inhabitants to meet and exchange with the 'other', and for that purpose, the cultural dimension of CBC is important (Perrin, 2015). Border regions could be seen as laboratories of European integration and of co-creation of European identity (Sassatelli, 2009; Simionescu, 2021). In this sense, cross-border cultural projects that are visible and tangible for border populations can bring Europe closer to its citizens by making its reality concrete in everyday life (Durand, 2021). Culture as a policy area belongs to the least integrated type of European policy fields and it is part of the support competencies of the European Union, according to the Lisbon Treaty. EU supports the European cultural diversity by financing different actions, such as the European Capital of Culture competition or the Creative Europe programme. At the cross-border scale, culture is addressed through the regional policy and more particularly through the INTERREG programmes, but little attention is payed to this specific area. Durand (2021) previously offered a general overview of INTERREG CBC projects in the field of culture, taking into consideration all internal border areas of the EU. Rădoi (2020) analysed the cross-border cooperation between Romania and candidate country, Serbia, in the so called cross-border 'region of culture', in the context of winning the European Capital of Culture title by Timisoara and Novi Sad. Cultural CBC projects are to be valued especially at the internal EU borders involving old and new member states and also at the external EU borders, where the rationale for such projects would be to contribute to a deeper European integration, by changing borders, from barriers to bridges.

The aim of this paper is to examine the specific situation of culture as an investment priority of CBC at the Eastern external borders of the European Union, during the last two financial frameworks, 2014-2020 (with the support of ENI) and 2007-2013 (with the support of ENPI).

Our research was mobilized by several questions: what differentiates the CBC programme areas in terms of priority given to culture? What is the intensity of CBC in the field of culture (number of projects, budgets) and which territories lead the most cultural projects using INTERREG funds?

For this purpose, our methodology consists of an analysis of the financed projects from seven programme areas, at the Eastern borders of the EU. The data has been extracted from the EU INTERREG database[*], for the following seven CBC ENI/ENPI joint operational programmes: 2014-2020 Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine ENI CBC; 2007-2013 Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine ENPI CBC; 2007-2013 Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova ENPI CBC; 2014-2020 Romania-Republic of Moldova ENI CBC; 2014-2020 Romania-Ukraine ENI CBC; 2007-2013 Black Sea Basin ENPI CBC and 2014-2020 Black Sea Basin ENI CBC. For each programme area Keep.eu offers a list of projects, with data in terms of time (multiannual financial period), project theme, budget, lead partner (organisation, city and country) and partner organisations. From each programme database we extracted data on the project theme and budget, highlighting the importance of cultural projects among other types of financed projects. The data on leading organisations of cultural projects and their address (city and country) was used to highlight the territories where culture is most valued as a CBC topic. Moreover, the analysis was conducted in a comparative manner, between two multiannual financial frameworks 2007-2013 and 2014-2020, to capture the evolution of CBC.

Our paper is structured as follows: the first part consists in a brief presentation of the programme documents of ENI/ENPI programmes involving Romania and its CBC neighbours during 2007-2020; it concludes that culture was a strategic objective of CBC, being included in all the analysed areas. The second part consists in an analysis of the financed CBC projects during 2007-2020, for each of the respective programme areas; the thematic and budgets analysis shows the differences between timeframes and programme areas in terms of priority given to cultural projects. The third part concludes upon the intensity of cooperation in the field of culture (number of CBC projects and budgets) and discusses upon the leading territories (cities and countries) in CBC cultural projects.

A few terminological and procedural details are necessary. CBC programmes are open for cooperation between partners and Member States sharing a land or sea border. Cross-border cooperation actions are presented in joint operational programmes (JOPs), which are the implementation documents for CBC (Regulation (EU) No 232/2014). JOPs are prepared by participating countries following a consultative process, involving the local stakeholders, and are then

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[*] Further information is available at *keep.eu*

adopted by the European Commission and managed by a joint authority established, in principle, in a Member State (Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006).

1. ENI/ENPI – financial tools for territorial cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood

Territorial Cooperation is one of the goals of cohesion policy and it was introduced since 2007-2013 (Council Regulation (EC) 1083/2006 on Structural Funds). The overarching objective of EUs cohesion policy is to promote a harmonious economic, social and territorial development of the Union as a whole. The additional territorial cohesion goal, added to the previous economic and social cohesion goals, provides a framework for the implementation of joint projects between national, regional and local actors from different Member States. The goal is to be achieved through three strands of cooperation: cross-border (INTERREG A), transnational (INTERREG B) and interregional (INTERREG C). As a rule, the eligible regions for CBC are placed at NUTS level 3 along all internal and certain external land borders and maritime borders, separated by a maximum of 150 kilometres.

CBC functions in the European Neighbourhood Policy in a complementary way it functions in regional policy (Pop *et al.,* 2005). ENP extends the principles of CBC in the EU, as a specific strand of the INTERREG programmes, but adapted to the specificities of the EU external cooperation. ENPI CBC involves "cooperation between the Member States of the European Union and partner countries in regions adjacent to their shared part of the external border of the European Union for the development of an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness" (Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2007). ENI CBC aims to "promote cooperation across the borders between EU Member States and the countries on the European Neighbourhood and Russian Federation" in order to contribute to an "integrated and sustainable regional development and cooperation between neighbouring border areas" and to achieve the general ENI objective of "advancing further towards an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness" (Regulation (EU) No 232/2014) between EU Member States and their neighbours.

1.1. Thematic objectives of territorial cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood

Both ENI and ENPI were based on EU Regulations mentioning the general thematic objectives to be reached through cooperation between the Eastern Neighbourhood countries. Even though they are financial instruments meant to support EU's external policies, they are built following the model of EU's structural funds, available for the EU territorial units. Structural funds have a general

Regulation, detailing EU's investment priorities (IP), updated each seven years. The 2014-2020 Regulation (EU) 1301/2013 on European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) mentions eleven IP of structural and investment funds. Among them, there is a specific investment priority mentioning culture: *conserving, protecting, promoting and developing natural and cultural heritage (IP 6(c))*.

Complementary, the 2014-2020 Regulation on ENI mentions eleven thematic objectives, among whom we highlighted culture as thematic objective number three: *promotion of local culture and preservation of historical heritage.*

Our interest lays in the CBC strand of ENPI/ENI. From the general Regulation, each cross-border area is selecting, following a participative process led by the regional offices of CBC, a mix of investment priorities or thematic objectives, according to the assessed local needs. In this way, border areas develop own cooperation programmes (JOPs) with their own selection of strategic priorities and allocated funding, respecting the EU principle of thematic concentration. Following this imperative, each cross-border area can select a maximum of four objectives to be reached in seven years. In the following part of the paper, we will investigate upon the position of culture, as a strategic objective in the seven targeted programme areas.

1.2. Culture as a priority for territorial cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood

In all the seven before mentioned programme documents, culture was a financed measure (Table 1) showing the importance given to it as an incentive for European integration across borders, at the Eastern borders of the European Union.

Table 1. Culture as a strategic objective for CBC projects

Multiannual Financial Framework	ENPI/ENI CBC Programme	Priority ‚Culture'
2007-2013	Romania-Ukraine-Moldova	Priority Axis 3. Key area of intervention 3.2: Cultural, social, educational exchanges
	Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine	Priority 4. Measure 4.2 Small scale "People to people" cooperation
	Black Sea Basin	Priority 3: Supporting cultural and educational networks for the establishment of a common cultural environment in the Basin; Measure 3.1: Promoting cultural networking and educational exchange in the Black Sea Basin communities.
2014-2020	Romania-Ukraine	Measure 2.1 – Preservation and promotion of the cultural and historical heritage

Romania-R. Moldova	Measure 2.1 – Preservation and promotion of the cultural and historical heritage
Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine	Measure 3.1: Promoting local culture and historical heritage along with tourism functions.
Black Sea Basin	Measure 1.1.: Jointly promote business and entrepreneurship in the tourism and cultural sectors.

Source: own representation based on programme documents

While during the 2007-2013 culture was included in the 'people to people' type of CBC projects, meant to facilitate direct exchanges between the inhabitants on different sides of the borders, during 2014-2020 cultural cooperation across borders was to be found as a horizontal measure to be pursued in different priority axes, corresponding to the thematic objective no. three of ENI Regulation. If the document analysis offers an ex-ante perspective on CBC in the seven programme areas, the following part of this research, consisting in a quantitative analysis based on the keep.eu database, offers an ex-post perspective on the financed projects.

2. The importance of culture in CBC. An analysis of financed projects

In this chapter, we analysed each programme area in terms of financed projects, and we extracted from keep.eu data regarding the thematic objectives and corresponding budgets with the goal of offering a general overview of the importance of culture for CBC.

2.1. Black Sea Basin ENPI/ENI CBC

The Joint Operational Programme Black Sea Basin has a wide geographical coverage. Furthermore, larger, NUTS 2 units are eligible for CBC at maritime borders (Regulation (EU) No 232/2014, art.8). The eligible area for cooperation is composed by NUTS 2 regions from Romania (South-East) and Bulgaria (as EU Member States) and regions from Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, as well as the entire territory of Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (as partner countries). Despite the limited budget of the programme and the many challenges of the area, culture is one of the financed priorities, the region sharing a rich heritage, with 18 places recognized by UNESCO.

Figure 1. Black Sea Basin ENPI/ENI CBC programme area

Source: Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Programme (2007)

During 2007-2013, 59 projects were financed through ENPI, while between 2014-2020 ENI financed 54 projects. Keep.eu database contains an inventory of projects labelled by the applicants, according to a hierarchy of three thematic objectives. The thematic analysis, consisting in sorting the database against the first thematic objective (Figure 2 and 3) shows that the share of projects labelled as contributing to 'cultural heritage and arts' was bigger in 2014-2020, compared to 2007-2013. The region also registered an increase of the share of projects aiming to enhance tourism, agriculture, fisheries and forestry, waste, pollution, coastal management and maritime issues.

Figure 2. Thematic analysis of financed projects in the Black Sea Basin

Source: own representation based on data from keep.eu (2021)

The thematic analysis was complemented by an analysis of budgets: starting from the already sorted database on the criteria of first thematic objective of each project in the programme area, we summed up the total budgets of the financed projects grouped by theme, and we calculated their share in the total financed projects. When analysing the budgets allocated to the financed projects (Figure 3), we observe that the share of budgets of cultural projects in the total amount of allocated money within the programme multiplied three times from 2007-2013 to 2014-2020, when around 10% of the programme budget financed cultural projects. In absolute terms, this means that the budgets of cultural projects increased from 1,2 to 4,8 mil. Euro, between the two timeframes 2007-2013, to 2014-2020. Still, those 10% of cultural projects are below EU average in terms of share of cultural projects in the total programme budget: 15% in 2014-2020 and 14,5% in 2007-2013 (Durand, 2021). Other priorities are more important for CBC in this area: the sustainable management of natural resources and tourism remains the main topic for cooperation in this both in terms of spent money as well in terms of thematic objectives of selected projects.

Figure 3. Share of budgets of financed projects, by theme, in the Black Sea Basin

% of budget of thematic projects

Theme	2014-2020	2007-2013
Regional planning and development	0	0,76
Renewable energy	0	0,80
ICT and digital society	1,49	0,95
Logistics and freight transport	0	1,54
Rural and peripheral development	0	1,75
Improving transport connections	0	1,79
Managing natural and man-made threats, risk management	0	3,00
Water management	0	3,14
Climate change and biodiversity	3,82	0,00
Evaluation systems and results	4,03	0,00
Cultural heritage and arts	10,31	3,54
Education and training	0	4,26
SME and entrepreneurship	3,14	4,93
Waste and pollution	0	5,72
Coastal management and maritime issues	6,73	8,8
Clustering and economic cooperation	7,39	7,25
Institutional cooperation and cooperation networks	0	8,31
Agriculture and fisheries	10,75	0,00
Tourism	20,54	22,21
Sustainable management of natural resources	18,9	23,32

Source: own representation based on data from keep.eu (2021)

As a detail, ENPI financed cultural projects having smaller budgets than other types of projects (min. 50.000-max 250.000 Euro, while other priorities, such as environment protection projects had budgets between 100.000-700.000 Euro). Also, cultural projects had a reduced period of implementation (12 months instead of 24). Moreover, CBC in the field of culture at the external Eastern EU borders appealed to significantly lesser budgets. In comparison, the EU average budget per cultural project was 1,4 mil. Euro (2014-2020), respectively 844 thousand Euro (2007-2013) (Durand, 2021).

Following ENPI experience, ENI programme documents acknowledged the need to concentrate on a limited number of themes in which concrete results can be obtained, such as business and development and environmental protection. Tourism has a rich potential to be encouraged, while culture represents a horizontal preoccupation for 'people to people' type actions in this programme area.

2.2.Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine ENPI/ENI CBC

The programme area covers NUTS 3 level units from three EU Member States and a partner country and it builds upon previous CBC between Hungary and Romania, which was highly seen as a success. There are seven UNESCO world heritage cultural sites in the cross-border area.

The programme area (Figure 4) is located on the Hungarian-Slovak-Romanian-Ukrainian border and includes the following territorial units: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (Hungary), Košický and Prešovský (Slovakia), Maramureş, Satu-Mare and Suceava (Romania), Zakarpatska, Ivano–Frankivska and Chernivetska (Ukraine). The programming area covers 32% of Slovak Republic, 14% of Hungary, 8% of Romania and 6% of Ukraine (Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine, Joint Operational Programme, 2008, p.9).

During 2007-2013 the programme financed 138 CBC projects, followed by 49 projects during 2014-2020.

Figure 4. Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine CBC programme area

Source: Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine Joint Operational Programme (2008)

The thematic analysis of the financed projects (Figure 5) reveals that culture was the main area of cooperation across borders in both timeframes, in terms of number of projects. The programme also allowed a significant increase of cooperation projects dedicated to health and social services, tourism, renewable energy and climate change, in 2014-2020 compared to the previous period. Almost 16% of the total number of financed projects were labeled as contributing to the development of health and social services in 2014-2020, compared to a significant smaller percent (2%) in the

previous financial perspective. Culture accounted as a thematic priority for 17-18% of the total number of financed projects, in both timeframes. For example, the most expensive cultural project, THRU-ART (1,2 mil. Euro) was led by the Slovakian city of Michalovce. The project aimed to save the cultural heritage monuments in the town of Michalovce and the city of Uzhhorod, filling them anew with a meaningful content and function; municipal galleries and professional tourist information centres of European standard were to be established.

The budgetary analysis (Figure 6) shows that, during 2014-2020 cultural projects had the largest share of spent money among all CBC projects, overpassing 'improving transport connections' – the CBC priority of the previous timeframe.

Figure 5. Thematic analysis of financed projects ENPI/ENI Hu-Slk-Ro-Ua

% of projects by 1st thematic objective

| Thematic objective	2014-2020	2007-2013
Green technologies	2,04	
Waterways, lakes and rivers	2,04	
Infrastructure	2,04	2,17
Health and social services	16,33	2,17
Governance, partnership		2,17
Construction and renovation		2,17
Clustering and economic cooperation		2,17
Agriculture and fisheries and forestry	2,04	2,17
Rural and peripheral development		2,90
Transport and mobility	4,08	
Improving transport connections	4,08	2,90
ICT and digital society	2,04	2,90
Cooperation between emergency services		2,90
Renewable energy	6,12	
Climate change and biodiversity	6,12	2,90
Water management	4,08	4,35
Tourism	8,16	4,35
Institutional cooperation and cooperation networks	4,08	4,35
Social inclusion and equal opportunities	4,08	5,07
Sustainable management of natural resources	4,08	6,52
SME and entrepreneurship		7,25
Education and training	4,08	15,22
Cultural heritage and arts	18,37	17,39

■ 2014-2020   ■ 2007-2013

Source: own representation based on data from keep.eu (2021)

Cultural projects were mainly focusing on *soft, people to people measures* (organising meetings, events, training, etc.) which were very popular among the applicants, but there were only a few numbers of projects which were really innovative kind, while cooperation was hard to maintain (since they were focusing on one or a series of events).

During 2014-2020 the total budget of cultural projects had the biggest share in the total spent programme budget (16,28%, compared to 8,65%). Expensive projects, aiming to build cultural infrastructure, as the example above, reflect this status quo. In absolute terms this means that in 2014-2020 compared to 2007-2013 the budget of financed cultural projects increased from 6,1 mil. Euro to 7,9 mil Euro.

Figure 6. Share of budget of financed projects, by theme, in ENPI/ENI Hu-Slk-Ro-Ua

% of budget of thematic projects

Theme	2014-2020	2007-2013
Traditional energy		0,61
Governance, partnership		3,00
Evaluation systems and results		0,69
Waste and pollution		1,33
Agriculture and fisheries and forestry		2,63
ICT and digital society	1,71	
Green technologies		
Renewable energy		
Infrastructure		2,61
Waterways, lakes and rivers		
Sustainable management of natural resources		2,17
Institutional cooperation and cooperation…		2,74
Social inclusion and equal opportunities	0,91	
Education and training		6,54
Tourism		2,90
Managing natural and man-made threats, risk…	5,49	0,21
Water management	10,75	7,54
Transport connections and mobility	14,93	32,42
Climate change and biodiversity	11,64	2,85
Health and social services	14,18	1,42
Cooperation between emergency services		6,76
Cultural heritage and arts	16,28	8,65

0,00 3,00 6,00 9,00 12,00 15,00 18,00 21,00 24,00 27,00 30,00 33,00 36,00

■ 2014-2020 ■ 2007-2013

Source: own representation based on data from keep.eu (2021)

The financial importance given to culture in this programme area, above EU average (15%) could be explained by the acknowledgment of the fact that the main challenge for CBC was to

establish partnerships at local level based on strong commitments. The need for helping cooperation of people and organisations was strong, hence funds allocated to these priorities were considered relatively high in 2014-2020. Several other problems needed to be addressed and appealed to the programme budget: inappropriate condition and lack of preservation of historical sites; lack of infrastructure to reach the touristic destinations; lack of skilled experts, language barriers, not enough information on sites and programmes (ICT based supporting materials).

The data also reveals an increased amount of money spent for non-cultural projects in the field of health and social services or climate change.

2.3. Romania-Ukraine-R. Moldova ENPI CBC 2007-2013, Romania-Ukraine ENI CBC 2014-2020, Romania-R. Moldova ENI CBC 2014-2020

The Joint Operational Programme Romania-Ukraine-R. Moldova, which was available during 2007-2013, was split into two CBC JOP in 2014-2020. Changing the area of the programme by splitting it in two different programme areas affects the comparability of our data and this a limit of the analysis. In this section we will compare them in terms of share of projects by priority theme and share of budgets of thematic projects.

**Figure 7. Romania-Ukraine-Moldova ENPI CBC**

Source: Joint Operational Programme Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova (2008)

The programme area Romania-Ukraine-R. Moldova was composed by a core area and several non-border adjoining regions. The core area covered, in Romania, the counties of Suceava, Botosani, Iasi, Vaslui, Galati, and Tulcea; in Ukraine, the oblasts of Odessa, and Chernivtsi, and in Republic of Moldova, the whole country. The programme area Romania-Ukraine consists of counties of Satu Mare, Maramures (both newly inserted), Botosani, Suceava and Tulcea from Romania, and from Ukraine, the oblasts of Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpatska, Chernivtsi, Odessa. The programme area Romania-R. Moldova consists of Romanian counties Botoșani, Vaslui, Iași and Galați and the whole territory of R. Moldova.

There was a number of 144 financed CBC projects in Ro-Ua-R. Moldova Joint Operational Programme 2007-2013, 46 financed projects in Romania-R. Moldova Joint Operational Programme 2014-2020 and 50 financed projects in Romania-Ukraine Joint Operational Programme 2014-2020.

Figure 8. Thematic analysis of financed projects Romania-Ukraine-R.Moldova, Romania-Ukraine, Romania-R. Moldova


Source: own representation based on data from keep.eu (2021)

The thematic analysis showed (Figure 8) that culture was one of the main themes of cooperation in all programme areas in terms of number of projects. Still, the biggest share of cultural projects belongs to Romania-R. Moldova Joint Operational Programme 2014-2020 (21,74%), followed by Romania-Ukraine-Moldova JOP 2007-2013 (16,67%) and Romania-Ukraine JOP 2-14-2020 (14%).

The data also shows the significant increase between the two timeframes of the number of projects dedicated to education, health services and safety, especially in the case of Romania-Ukraine, due to the geopolitical troubled context. Moreover, eligible projects for the purpose of institutional cooperation were reduced (collaborations being supposed to be set in the previous timeframe).

In terms of projects' budgets (Figure 9), which are only available for the 2014-2020 period, the analysis confirms the strong preoccupation for CBC enhancing safety in the region. Safety projects accounted for 47,68% of the programme budget in the case of Romania-Ukraine JOP 2014-2020.

Figure 9. Share of budgets of financed projects, by theme, in Ro-Md ENI CBC and Ro-Ua ENI CBC

Source: own representation based on data from keep.eu (2021)

Cooperation between emergency services and institutional cooperation was also a preoccupation of stakeholders from Romania-Ukraine JOP. Cultural projects had a bigger share of total budgets in the case of Romania-R. Moldova JOP in 2014-2020, compared to the previous timeframe.

In the last part of this paper we will sum-up the data and conclude on the general overview of cultural CBC following the implementation of the seven joint operational programme areas. We will conclude on the intensity of CBC, measured as number of cultural projects and their budgets and also on the leading territories (cities and countries) in CBC cultural projects.

3. The intensity of CBC in the cultural field

A comparative analysis of the financed projects in the seven analysed CBC programmes, shows that during 2007-2020 Hu-Slk-Ro-Ua programme area registered the highest share of cultural projects among the total number of financed projects and the largest budget awarded to cultural cooperation.

Between 2014-2020 the intensity of cooperation, measured as total number of projects, was similarly low in all programme areas (between 5 and 10 projects), while the share of cultural projects in the total number of projects was bigger in Ro-Md programme area, confirming the special relationship Romania has with the Republic of Moldova, considering "the common historical past, culture, spiritual nation" (Rădulescu *et.al.*, 2020, p.63).

As a detail, when analysing the direction of cooperation, measured as 'to which country belongs the project leader', Romania directed a significant share of cultural CBC projects, with partners from R. Moldova, in Ro-Md programme area and was the only initiator of projects with partners from Ukraine, in Ro-Ua programme area. This situation could reflect an unbalanced financial and management capabilities between organisations placed on different sides of the borders.

Table 2. Number of and budgets (Euro) of cultural CBC projects

	Black Sea Basin		Hu-Slk-Ro-Ua		Ro-Ua-Md			
	No.	Budgets	No.	Budgets	No.	Budgets		
2007-2013	4	1.225.704	24	6.108.015	23	Not available		
2014-2020						Ro-Ua		Ro-Md
	5	4.816.931	9	7.908.738	7	4.025.819	10	1.065. 151
Total	9	6.042.635	33	14.016.753	-	-	-	-

Source: own representation based on data from keep.eu (2021)

A limit of the analysis of intensity of cooperation as number of and budgets of cultural CBC projects, consists in the fact that the total number of projects depends on the total programme budget and on the types of projects (and their budgetary limits), as agreed by the stakeholders in the consultation phase of each JOP. For instance, in the case of Romania-Moldova programme area 2014-2020, a distinction was made between hard (expensive investment projects) and soft projects (not necessitating infrastructural work and investments, with budgets below 1 mil. Euro). Due to the limited programme budget, most of the projects, including cultural ones, were soft type. Still, a bigger number of projects, even with small budgets, represent an opportunity for networking, learning and building durable partnerships between stakeholders across borders, an important condition for successful CBC. The following part of the paper will highlight the leading territories (cities and countries) in CBC cultural projects.

3.1. Leading territories in cultural CBC

For this analysis, the leading territories in cultural CBC projects were counted as cities and countries hosting organisations playing most frequently the role of project leader of cultural projects during 2007-2020, in all the analysed areas. This understanding acknowledges the fact that the actual project leaders are public and private organisations (municipalities, NGOs, universities, schools, cultural public institutions etc.) placed in different cities and countries. A future more in-depth analysis would differentiate between types of organisations leading cultural projects across-borders, placed in different cities and countries.

As shown by Figure 10, the cities hosting the biggest number of organisations leading CBC cultural projects were Suceava and Satu Mare, with seven, respectively six led projects in 2007-2013. They are both Romanian cities, hence placed in an EU member state and the organisations placed there are eligible for financing from several programme areas' budgets. Suceava, for example, was a part of Hu-Slk-Ro-Ua (2007-2020), Romania-Ukraine-Moldova (2007-2013) and Romania-Ukraine (2014-2020).

For the timeframe 2014-2020, cultural projects were dispersed in territorial units hosting one or two organisations with leading roles, as it was the case of Suceava and Tulcea, from Romania and Nyíregyháza (Hungary). The situation reflects the dispersed presence of cultural projects in the analysed areas and the lack of strong preoccupations or capabilities of organisations from renowned cultural cities, with strong historical connections (such as Iași and Chernivtsi) to lead CBC projects in the field of culture. According to the stakeholders' analysis by Țigănașu *et. al* (2020) Romanian

beneficiaries are more critical towards the perceived effectiveness of CBC for cultural impacts, than their counterparts from Moldova or Ukraine. Another limit of our study is the fact that it analyses cross-border cultural cooperation only when financed through INTERREG programme, in order to exploit the useful keep.eu database, while other financing opportunities are also available, such as Creative Europe or the European Capital of Culture (ECoC) Programme.

Figure 10. Leading cities in cultural CBC projects in the analysed area (number of projects led by organisations grouped by cities)

Source: own representation based on data from keep.eu (2021)

This situation is contrasting with the one present at the Western borders of Romania, where Timisoara, future European Capital of Culture in 2023, has a higher intensity of connection in CBC projects, using INTERREG funds (Turșie and Boată, 2018) and a higher interest for the role of CBC for producing social and cultural impacts (Turșie and Perrin, 2020; Turșie, 2019). Organisations placed in Timisoara lead cultural projects developed especially with Serbian partners, financed

through the Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA CBC). In this case, the ECoC title functioned as an effective tool to stimulate the enthusiasm of the local stakeholders and to generate CBC partnerships.

Figure 11. Leading countries in cultural CBC projects in the analysed area

Source: own representation based on data from keep.eu (2021)

When grouping the organisations leading cultural CBC projects by country, and not by city, the results show (Figure 11) that Romania is the main actor of CBC in these areas in bothy timeframes, followed by Ukraine (for 2007-2013) and Slovakia (for 2014-2020), even though the number of led cultural projects was decreasing between the two timeframes, in both cases. EU countries, such as Slovakia and Hungary, who are particularly active in cultural cooperation at the internal EU borders (such as Slovakia-Poland CBC, as pointed by Durand, 2021) and Bulgaria and Greece, have a limited eligibility in the analysed programme areas, compared to Romania. These areas are composed by two NUTS 3 regions from Slovakia, other two from Hungary and eight NUTS 3 regions from Romania; also, two NUTS 2 regions from Romania, two from Bulgaria and other two from Greece were eligible for financing in the Black Sea Basin programme area, who, as we have seen does not finance culture as a main priority. Also, the whole territory of the Republic of Moldova and parts of Ukraine are eligible for CBC with Romanian border regions, and this is an important incentive and responsibility for European integration in these areas, in the geopolitical context of the beginning of 2022.

Conclusions

The paper shows in the first instance that there are significant differences in the intensity of cross-border cultural cooperation among INTERREG programming areas over the two investigated periods. Some countries are more proactive and emphasize culture in their cross-border cooperation actions (Romania and Moldova), while others give it less importance (Black Sea Basin programme area). These discrepancies result mainly from political priorities and the dynamics of cooperation at the regional or local level.

Our analysis showed that the largest share of cultural projects in the total amount of CBC projects was present in programme area Romania-R. Moldova ENI CBC, having the long historical cultural ties between the two countries as incentives for cooperation.

An increasing share of CBC projects in the field of culture, in terms of number of projects and budgets, was also observed in programme area Hu-Slk-Ro-Ua. This programme area allocated the biggest amount of its budget to cultural projects. With a share of 16,28% (2014-2020), Hu-Slk-Ro-Ua scored above EU average (15%) at the proportion of cross-border cultural projects in the total INTERREG programme budget. This situation could be explained by the interest of the programme's stakeholders to increase European integration between three EU new member states (Hungary, Slovakia and Romania) and a non-EU state (Ukraine). All other programme areas scored below EU average at financing CBC cultural projects, dealing instead with other expensive border integration priorities: natural resources and tourism (Black Sea Basin), transport connections (Hu-Slk-Ro-Ua during 2007-2013), health services and safety (Romania-Moldova, Romania-Ukraine).

The actors in CBC in the field of culture (leaders of projects) were mostly organisations from EU Member States, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia, who experienced better financial capability for co-financing and better management capabilities, being more socialized in European projects than organisations placed outside EU. Among the partner countries, Ukraine was the most active in leading cultural CBC projects, even though cultural cooperation was overpassed in programme area Romania-Ukraine ENI CBC by more stringent issues, such as safety, risk management and health services.

More money was spent on cultural projects in Romania-Ukraine ENI CBC compared to Romania-R. Moldova ENI CBC (Figure 8 and 9): a share of 14% of cultural projects financed by Romania-Ukraine ENI CBC consumed 10% of the total programme budget; cultural projects had a share of 21% in the total amount of projects Romania-Moldova ENI CBC and they only accounted for 2% of the total programme budget. This situation has several explanations.

There were more low-cost cultural projects in Romania-Moldova (with budgets below 100.000 Euro/project) and more expensive cultural projects in Romania-Ukraine (with budgets towards 1.000.000 Euro/project, such as the revitalisation of theatres in Satu Mare and Uzhgorod), while, as we have seen, the EU average budget of cultural projects was 1,4 million Euro for the period 2014-2020. At the Eastern EU borders, money was allocated to a few expensive strategic safety projects in the case of Romanian and Ukrainian border regions (combating cross-border criminality or cooperation among emergency services); in the case of Romania-Moldova, three out of the total of 46 projects accounted for 65% of programme budget: they were one health emergency services project and two safety projects.

In several programme documents the previous developed projects were criticized for not being innovative enough. It is, of course, difficult to have innovative projects when basic needs are not met, such as hard infrastructure or facilities in hospitals. After all, the programmes priorities and measures are the result of a public consultation process, they are consistent with each programme area's needs and reflect the level of maturity of cross-border cooperation.

Finally, all analysed programme areas selected culture as an investment priority and horizontal preoccupation of CBC. Culture is an attractive theme for CBC cooperation, prompting regions to gain greater understanding one another through generally low-cost projects, which could create further cooperation opportunities in other areas. The strong concern for safety issues at the external borders of the European Union is only to be increased in the new multiannual financial framework 2021-2027, transforming CB safety and criminality prevention into a horizontal preoccupation of the European funds.

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The Torres Strait treaty: a possible solution to the Aegean conflict

Panagiotis PANTAZIS[*]

Abstract

The Aegean conflict constitutes a dispute that has been affecting Greek-Turkish bilateral relations for the last five decades. It involves elements such as sovereignty, sovereign rights and national security. This paper suggests that the Torres Strait Treaty, an international agreement that provides the framework for the management of Australia and Papua New Guinea's (PNG) maritime boundaries, can be utilised to provide a possible solution to the Aegean conflict. The resolution of the Aegean conflict would improve the political and diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey, guarantee the security of the Aegean region and allow for the two countries to benefit from economic cooperation.

Keywords: international law, conflict resolution, bilateral relations

Introduction

The Aegean conflict constitutes a set of disputes which involves elements such as the exploitation of the Aegean seabed for natural resources, the extent of territorial waters and national airspace, territorial integrity and national security. It has caused tension in Greek-Turkish relations, with both countries contesting each other's sovereignty, sovereign rights and responsibilities in the Aegean Sea. This tension has led Turkey to issue a *casus belli* (threat of war) over Greece's intentions to exercise its legal rights according the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS), while both countries have engaged into a costly arms race to defend their territories.

The Torres Strait Treaty is an international agreement that provides a framework for the management of Australia and PNG's common border area, their respective sovereignty over certain islands in the Torres Strait and the protection of the way of life of the traditional inhabitants. Following PNG's independence from Australia in 1975, the Torres Strait Treaty was designed to deal with multiple issues that arose, including the territorial boundaries of both countries, sovereignty over

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[*] Panagiotis PANTAZIS is a PhD student at La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, e-mail: P.Pantazis@latrobe.edu.au.

hundreds of islands in the Torres Strait, the continental shelf,[2] fishing boundaries and the protection of the way of life of the Torres Strait Islanders (Parliament of Australia, n.d.). It was hailed "as one of the most creative solutions in international law to a boundary problem touching on the lives of traditional inhabitants" (Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d., p. 2) and offered a practical and fair solution despite the administrative difficulties during the negotiations.

The aim of the following study is to show that the Torres Strait Treaty provides a framework which can be utilized for the possible peaceful resolution of the Aegean conflict. As the dispute between Greece and Turkey raises international concerns for peace and security in the Aegean region, and by extension the Mediterranean Sea, the Torres Strait Treaty can be viewed as an example of a method which can help reduce tensions, prevent conflict in the Aegean Sea and initiate a period of positive bilateral relations between the two countries.

1. Background

1.1. The Aegean Conflict

The Aegean Sea is located between the Balkan and Anatolian Peninsulas, stretching from the coasts of the geographical region of Macedonia to the island of Crete. It connects the Eastern Mediterranean to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus. It contains over 1,400 islands, the majority of which are under Greek sovereignty and very few under Turkish sovereignty. Throughout history, the Aegean Sea has been considered a region of high geostrategic importance, as it has allowed for great civilisations, such as the Minoans, Greeks, Romans and Byzantines, to flourish through commerce, and for hegemonic powers and totalitarian states, such as the Ottoman Empire, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, to utilise it in order to realise their plans for territorial expansion through war (Diaconu, 2016).

The Aegean conflict constitutes a set of disputes that have been affecting Greek-Turkish relations since 1973 and comprises the following elements: 1) the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea; 2) the breadth of the territorial sea;[3] 3) the breadth of Greek national airspace;[4] 4)

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[2] According to Article 76.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), "The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured" (United Nations, n.d.).

[3] According to Article 1.1 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the state's territorial sea is defined as the belt of sea adjacent to the States coast (United Nations Treaty Collection, n.d.).

[4] According to Article 2.2 of the UNCLOS, the sovereignty of the coastal state extends to the airspace over the territorial sea.

the demilitarisation status of the islands in the eastern Aegean Sea; 5) the sovereignty of the two Imia islets or Kardak rocks and the grey zones; 6) the dispute regarding the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR);[5] 7) the maritime search and rescue region (SAR).[6]

Greece was established as an independent nation in 1832, following a violent revolution against Ottoman rule in 1821. It consisted of the Peloponnese, Central Greece, Euboea and the Cyclades Islands in the Aegean Sea. Over the following century, Greece would expand its territories by including Thessaly, Epirus, a large part of the region of Macedonia, Thrace, Smyrna and its surrounding area, and the majority of the islands in the Aegean Sea. The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, following centuries of its predecessor's - the Ottoman Empire - decline and the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923). Following a Greek-Turkish war from 1919-1922, the two countries signed the landmark *Treaty of Peace with Turkey*, also known as Treaty of Lausanne, in July 1923. The treaty established their common modern-day borders and inaugurated a period during which the two states would positively seek to ameliorate and normalise their bilateral relations. In the Aegean Sea, the treaty provided that "the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty" (Article 12), including the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands. Greece established sovereignty over the rest of the Aegean islands, except for the Dodecanese, which were under the control of Italy. The Dodecanese were ceded to Greece following the *Treaty of Peace with Italy* in 1947. One of the clauses, which later would become a cause of contention between Greece and Turkey, provided that the Dodecanese should be and should remain demilitarized (Article 14).

In 1973, and while Greek-Turkish relations had become particularly strained due to the Cyprus crisis, the Aegean conflict was triggered, shortly after Greece claimed that it had discovered oil off the coast of Thassos, in the north-eastern Aegean Sea. Turkey then awarded explorations rights to the state-owned petroleum company *Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı* (TPAO), in maritime areas west of the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean Sea. The issue for the delimitation of the continental shelf had surfaced, with Greece arguing that, according to the UNCLOS, the Greek islands afforded a continental shelf,[7] and Turkey arguing that "the submarine areas along and offshore the Turkish coast…constitute the natural prolongation of the Anatolian coast and therefore its continental shelf" (International Court of Justice, 1980, p. 3). In 1974, Turkey further raised the issue of the 12 nm of

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[5] A *Flight Information Region* (FIR) is "an airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information services and alerting services are provided" (p. 3), and it is "managed by a controlling authority that has responsibility for ensuring that air traffic services are provided to the aircraft flying within it" (p. 8). The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is responsible for appointing the controlling authority for a defined FIR (Skybrary, n.d.).

[6] An SAR is "an area of defined dimensions associated with the rescue coordination center within which search and rescue services are provided" (International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), 2007, p. 2).

[7] Article 121 of the UNCLOS affords a continental shelf to islands.

territorial sea, which derives from the UNCLOS,[8] stressing the need for a resolution through negotiations, and declaring that, despite the provisions of the UNCLOS, a unilateral extension of the Greek territorial sea to 12 nm would result in a Greek-Turkish war (Heraclides, 2010).

Following Turkey's military intervention and invasion of Cyprus in 1974, three more elements were added to the Aegean conflict: the militarisation and fortification of the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean Sea, the dispute regarding the Athens FIR, and the breadth of the Greek national airspace. Greece did not deny militarising and fortifying its islands due to the Cyprus crisis, while Turkey argued that Greece's actions were contrary to its treaty obligations. The Athens FIR, established by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 1952 to cover the Aegean Sea to the outer limits of the Turkish territorial waters, was disputed by Turkey in an attempt to extend its own Istanbul FIR over the Aegean Sea. Further, Turkey argued that Greek national airspace, which was extended unilaterally by Greece in 1931 to 10 nm, constituted a breach of international law (Heraclides, 2010).[9]

Thereafter, the Aegean conflict led to a series of impassable negotiations in search for settlement between Greece and Turkey, and produced several severe crises which brought the two states to the brink of war. The 1996 crisis, known as the Imia/Kardak crisis, added one more element to the Aegean conflict agenda known as the grey zones, an item related to the status of islets and rocks in the eastern Aegean Sea, and has led Turkey to issue a *casus belli* against Greece (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

A final element added to the Aegean conflict is the SAR dispute, which emerged following the 2015 migrant crisis, namely, the refugee and migrant flows towards Europe from the Middle East and Africa. This dispute concerns the delineation of maritime regions within which Greece and Turkey have the responsibility for providing search and rescue services in case of accidents at sea (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

For the last five decades, the Aegean conflict constitutes a source of tension which has had a negative impact on Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, their respective economies, as both states have engaged in a costly arms race, and persists as an irritant for their NATO allies who are interested in a peaceful resolution (Kassimeris, 2008).

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[8] According to Article 3 of the UNCLOS, "Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention".
[9] As noted earlier, Article 2.2 of the UNCLOS provides that the sovereignty of a coastal State "extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil".

1.2. The Torres Strait Border Issue

The Torres Strait Islands are a group of over two hundred islands stretching from the tip of Cape York Peninsula, Australia, to the southern coasts of PNG (Gab Titui Cultural Centre, n.d.). They are situated in the Torres Strait region, an area of great geostrategic importance to Australia's security in the north and a major international shipping route (Saltzman, 2002). The islands were annexed by the State of Queensland in 1879, when, according to the *Queensland Coast Islands Act* of 1879, the northern border was established a few hundred metres off the New Guinea mainland, thus including all the islands of the Torres Strait. Several islands, such as Kawa, Mata Kawa and Kussa, which lie as close as a kilometre (km) away from the coast of PNG, then came under Australian sovereignty. The south-eastern part of New Guinea became a British protectorate in 1888 and it was run by an administrator who was subject to the control of the Governor of Queensland. Following the *Papua Act* of 1905, the south-eastern part of New Guinea was declared a Territory under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Australia, known as the Territory of Papua. However, according to the *Acts Interpretation Act* of 1901, external Territories, such as the Territory of Papua, were excluded from the definition of "Australia"; accordingly, the islands annexed in 1879, remained part of the State of Queensland (McDermott, 2009).

Following World War I, the north-eastern part of New Guinea was administered by Australia as a League of Nations Trust Territory. After World War II, the Territories of Papua and New Guinea were unified under a single administration according to the *Papua and New Guinea Act* of 1949, forming the Territory of Papua and New Guinea; however, they still remained under the control of the Commonwealth of Australia. The *Papua and New Guinea Act* of 1963 stipulated that the Territory of Papua and New Guinea would have a House of Assembly consisting of members elected from a common poll (Doran, 2006). This represented the beginning of a process whereby PNG would seek to become an independent state. It eventually achieved its independence from Australia in September 1975 (McDermott, 2009).

By 1968, the need for the adjustment of PNG's common borders with Australia, the delimitation of the continental shelf, the establishment of fisheries zones and the protection of the traditional way of life of the Islanders in the Torres Strait arose. The top western group of the Torres Strait Islands, namely Boigu, Dauan and Saibai, are as far as 5 km away from the coast of PNG, but 140 km away from the coast of Australia (Doran, 2006). Australia had already fixed its own territorial sea at 3 nautical miles (nm), subscribing to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. PNG considered Australia's claims as undue, and also opted to invoke the 1958

Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone as a basis of negotiations with the latter. It was apparent to both states that, upon PNG's independence, the boundaries established unilaterally by Australia in 1879 would be nullified. However, the Convention itself complicated issues further, as it provided that islands have their own continental shelf which should be considered when determining a median line (Griffin, 1977).

Of the approximately eight thousand inhabitants of the Torres Strait Islands, the majority were of Melanesian descent, akin to the majority group in PNG. In the case of an independent PNG, islands which are several hundred metres away from the coasts of PNG and populated by people of the same ethnic origin and culture as those on the coasts, would be cut off from their kin. There were fears for the potential rise of Papuan irredentism, since there were PNG nationalists who argued that the Torres Strait Islanders should want to become citizens of PNG (Griffin, 1977). On the other hand, it was possible that an adjustment of the border would cause illegal immigration flows from PNG to Australia, as the latter argued that the Torres Strait Islanders wished to remain part of Australia, because of the social services, education, and employment opportunities provided by Australia (Doran, 2006). Therefore, it became necessary for Australia and PNG to recognise sovereignty over the many islands in the Torres Strait and establish their respective maritime borders, by considering history and the interests of the traditional inhabitants.

By 1953, Australia had claimed sovereignty over its continental shelf and in 1968 made claims to oil exploration in the Torres Strait (Griffin, 1977). As PNG rejected these claims, it was necessary to establish a Seabed Jurisdiction Line, considering the codes and mechanisms of the UNCLOS.[10] PNG suggested a Seabed Jurisdiction Line south of the top western group of islands, requesting that the uninhabited islands north of the line, such as Kawa, Mata Kawa and Kussa, were transferred to it. This position implied that the inhabited islands of Boigu, Dauan and Saibai would remain an Australian enclave north of the proposed border, something to which the Australian government agreed, under the condition that their respective territorial seas remained at 3 nm (Parliament of Australia, n.d.).

Another issue to be resolved was the establishment of a fisheries zone, as, by 1968, Australia had legislated for a 12 nm limit regarding its fisheries zones. PNG argued that there should be a border established at 10° South, as the marine wealth north of that area traditionally belonged to PNG. In the end, the two states agreed to establish a Fisheries Jurisdiction Line, which would form a 'top hat' enclosing the three islands of Boigu, Dauan and Saibai, up to 3 nm from their coasts. Australia

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[10] Article 77.1 provides that "The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources", while Article 83.1 suggests that "The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law".

suggested to control the fisheries south of the line, whereas PNG would control the fisheries north of the line (Griffin, 1977).

A possible resolution of the fisheries zone issue was tied to a proposed Protected Zone, within which freedom of movement and traditional activities would be allowed, while the marine environment and indigenous fauna and flora would be protected and preserved. This arrangement was unique, as, while not related to international boundaries, it provided that the traditional inhabitants who lived within the Protected Zone would be able to "maintain their traditional customary associations with the area or in the vicinity of the Protected Zone" (Parliament of Australia, p. 2). That also meant that, under the treaty, PNG traditional inhabitants would be entitled to free movement within the Protected Zone without passports.

Australia and PNG released a Joint Statement in 1976 declaring that they reached an agreement: PNG accepted that Australia would retain all inhabited islands south of the proposed Seabed Jurisdiction Line; Australian territorial sea around the top western group of islands would be at 3 nm; a Protected Zone would be established to protect and preserve the traditional way of life of the Torres Strait Islanders, including fishing and freedom of movement both north and south of the boundary (Ryan and White, 1977).

2. The Framework of the Torres Strait Treaty

The Torres Strait Treaty, officially known as the *Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea*, was entered into force in February 1985, concluding negotiations which lasted six years. It defines two separate maritime boundaries; a Seabed Jurisdiction Line is defined as the main boundary between the two countries, dealing with the issue of sovereignty over several islands in the Torres Strait and delineating who has control over the seabed (continental shelf). Australia recognised the sovereignty of PNG over the islands of Kawa, Mata Kawa and Kussa, settling thus PNG's concerns about Australian borders being too close to its coasts, while PNG recognised the sovereignty of Australia over several inhabited islands north of the line, including the islands of Boigu, Dauan and Saibai. Both countries agreed that sovereignty over the islands included sovereignty over their respective territorial sea, limited to 3 nm, the airspace, the seabed and any other rock or low-tide elevation within their territorial sea (Articles 2-3). The decision to limit their claims to 3 nm, while according to the UNCLOS they could make a claim to territorial seas up to 12 nm, was adopted by taking into consideration the proximity of the Australian islands north of the Seabed Jurisdiction Line and in respect of the PNG coastline in the central Torres Strait area. This seemed

for both sides to be a sensible and fair resolution regarding the territorial seas issue (Ryan and White, 1977).

In regard to the exploitation of seabed mineral resources, the treaty provides that Australia and PNG should equitably share the benefits from exploitation (Article 6). This has led to the drafting of a number of projects concerning the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in the Torres Strait and the heightened interest of Australian oil companies to operate in PNG, contributing thus to the Australian economy and the PNG income taxes (Nicholas and Lyons, 2021). A freedom of navigation and overflight clause is linked to this part of the treaty, ensuring that vessels and aircraft remain subject to the laws and regulations of each country, that they do not need to obtain permission to navigate through the Torres Strait or for overflight, that they enjoy the right of innocent passage[11] and that they are subject to the provisions of the UNCLOS (Article 7).

A separate Fisheries Jurisdiction Line is defined in the treaty, establishing the areas "in which each country exercises sovereign jurisdiction for swimming fish and sedentary species on their respective sides of the agreed jurisdiction lines" (Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, n.d., p. 6). The two countries agreed to prioritise traditional fishing, to work together on the conservation and management of commercial fisheries within a separate Protected Zone, and to share the catch of commercial fisheries (Articles 22-23). Article 23 of the treaty determines each state's respective percentages regarding the commercial fisheries catch, with Australia sharing 25% of the catch with PNG in areas under Australian jurisdiction, and PNG sharing 25% of the catch with Australia in areas under PNG jurisdiction (Article 23). This settled PNG's concerns regarding the marine wealth and commercial activities north of the Seabed Jurisdiction Line.

An element of the treaty, considered to be "the most striking and original feature" (Ryan and White, 1977, p. 103), is the establishment of the Protected Zone. This provides that, despite the existence of national borders between Australia and PNG, the Torres Strait Islanders, including the residents of some of the villages along the southern coast of PNG, are afforded, as noted above, freedom of movement between the islands and the PNG coast. The treaty states that the purpose of the Protected Zone "is to acknowledge and protect the traditional way of life and livelihood of the traditional inhabitants including their traditional fishing and free movement" (Article 10), but also "to protect and preserve the marine environment and indigenous fauna and flora" (Article 10). Most importantly, it provides that neither of the two countries are allowed to undertake or permit mining or drilling of the seabed or subsoil within the Protected Zone for the purpose of exploration or

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[11] Article 19 of the UNCLOS describes passage to be innocent as long as "it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State".

exploitation or natural resources, a clause which was valid for ten years from the date of entry into force of the treaty. So far, the moratorium on seabed mining in the Protected Zone has been maintained.

Australia and PNG signed the Torres Strait Treaty as "good neighbours and in a spirit of cooperation, friendship and goodwill" (Preamble). Although it is considered one of the most complicated maritime boundary delimitations, and unique in emphasising the importance of protecting the interests and traditions of the local inhabitants, it achieved success in resolving a "potentially dangerous border dispute" (Griffin, 1977, p. 224) and helped prevent a local war between the PNG nationalists and the Torres Strait Islanders, with the latter desiring their lands to remain under Australian sovereignty (Griffin, 1977).

3. The Current Status of the Aegean Conflict

Greece maintains that the only outstanding difference between itself and Turkey is the delimitation of the continental shelf, which it wishes to resolve in accordance with the regulations of the UNCLOS. It argues that the dispute over the continental shelf constitutes an attempt by Turkey to violate Greece's sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea and asserts that the delimitation must be governed by the principle of the median line, namely, that, in the absence of a delimitation agreement with Turkey, "the outer limit of the continental shelf is the median line between the Greek coasts and the coasts opposite or adjacent to those" (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d., p. 12). Further, Greece adopts the UNCLOS provision that all islands have a territorial sea and a continental shelf. Thus, two thirds of the Aegean continental shelf are awarded to Greece, denying Turkey any continental shelf west of its borders. Turkey, on the other hand, contends that the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean are formations on Anatolia's natural prolongation; accordingly, they do not possess a continental shelf (International Court of Justice, 1980). It suggests that the principle of the median line does not apply in this case and argues that any solution regarding the continental shelf should be mutually agreed upon, so that both states should enjoy a continental shelf in the Aegean Sea (Heraclides, 2010).

The breadth of Greece's territorial sea in the Aegean is currently set at 6 nm. Greece maintains that, according to the UNCLOS, it has the right to unilaterally extend its territorial sea claims to 12 nm. It claims emphatically that a possible extension to 12 nm is "not subject to any kind of restriction or exception and cannot be disputed by third countries" (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d., p. 3). Greece further contends that Turkey's reaction to a possible territorial sea

extension undermines the peaceful resolution of disputes and peaceful coexistence between two states. The breadth of Turkey's territorial sea in the Aegean Sea is also set at 6 nm. Turkey maintains that Greece's claim to a 12 nm territorial sea is unlawful, as it disregards the UNCLOS, which provides that two coastal states, adjacent or opposite, would not extend their territorial sea unless they have reached agreement to do so (Article 15). Further, it argues that a possible extension to 12 nm "will alter the balance of interests in the Aegean Sea to the detriment of Turkey" (Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d., p. 8), increasing Greece's sovereignty to 65% of the Aegean Sea, with Turkey's territorial sea remaining at 10%, and limiting the latter's access to high seas,[12] which will be reduced at 25%. To prevent a unilateral act by Greece, Turkey has issued a *casus belli* threat (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

Greece contends that it chose to extend its national airspace and exercise its sovereignty in the air within 10 nm for aviation purposes. It claims that the unilateral extension to 10 nm is legal, as it has issued a presidential decree in 1931 which has never been contested,[13] and that the national airspace does not exceed the 12 nm limit provided by the UNCLOS (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Turkey rejects the 10 nm Greek national airspace and has been demonstrating its disapproval by sending its military aircraft to enter the areas between 6 and 10 nm. It rejects that it violates Greek national airspace, by maintaining that no one recognises the 10 nm regime in the Aegean Sea (Heraclides, 2010).

Greece maintains that it has fortified and militarised its islands in the eastern Aegean Sea as the demilitarisation status imposed by the *Treaty of Peace with Italy* in 1947 has lost its *raison d'être,* following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, to which Greece had to respond by fortifying and defending its islands, and the *casus belli* issued by Turkey. Greece also claims that Turkey is systematically violating Greek national airspace by sending armed military aircraft over inhabited Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, raising serious security concerns (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Turkey claims that the islands in the eastern Aegean Sea should remain demilitarised according to the Treaty of Lausanne and the *Treaty of Peace with Italy.* It argues that Greece violates its treaty obligations, and that the militarisation of the islands constitutes a security threat (Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

A major issue, which has brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war, is the grey zones dispute, which concerns the sovereignty of some smaller islands, islets and rocks in the eastern

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[12] According to Article 86 of the UNCLOS, high seas are considered "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State".

[13] The United Kingdom formally protested the extension of Greek national airspace to 10 nm in 1932 (Heraclides, 2010).

Aegean Sea. Greece maintains that, according to the Treaty of Lausanne, all islands beyond 3 nm of the Turkish coastline belong to Greece, except for Imbros, Tenedos and the Rabbit Isles. It further argues that, according to the 1932 Border Protocol between Italy and Turkey, certain islets and rocks, including the controversial Imia/Kardak rocks, were under Italian sovereignty; these came under Greek sovereignty following the *Treaty of Peace with Italy* in 1947. Greece considers Turkey's intentions regarding the Imia/Kardak rocks to be a clear indication of undermining Greek sovereignty in the eastern Aegean Sea and of its expansionist designs in the eastern Mediterranean region (Heraclides, 2010). Interestingly, Turkey claims that it "does not have any claim over the islands, islets or such features which were unambiguously ceded to Greece by internationally valid instruments" (Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d., p. 21). Nevertheless, it contends that there are some disputed islets and geographical features which lie close to Turkey's coast and whose sovereignty is undetermined. It further argues that there are certain islets and rocks which are closer to the Turkish mainland than the Greek mainland, and, therefore, belong to Turkey (Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

Greece considers the Athens FIR to be indisputable, as it has been delimited by the ICAO and has been accepted as such at the European Regional Aviation Conferences in 1950, 1952 and 1958 (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Turkey's main argument regarding the FIR is that Greece treats it like a national boundary and that it fails to uphold its FIR responsibilities, namely, the management of air traffic, the provision of flight information services and alerting services (Heraclides, 2010).

Greece argues that its SAR areas coincide with the Athens FIR, designated by an ICAO Regional Air Navigation Agreement in 1952. It maintains that Turkey's SAR areas overlap parts of the Athens FIR, presenting a large part of the Greek territory as being within the Turkish SAR area. This, Greece argues, is contrary to international practice and violates Greek responsibilities entrusted by the ICAO (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Turkey does not deny that its SAR areas overlap with Greek SAR areas. However, it contends that it offers SAR services according to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue of 1979, which provides that an SAR region cannot be established unless the parties concerned "reach an agreement upon appropriate arrangements under which the equivalent overall coordination of search and rescue services is provided in the area" (Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d., p. 26). This implies that Turkey rejects Greece's notion that its SAR area coincides with its FIR.

This paper also explores the dispute between Greek and Turkish fishermen, who find themselves competing for a better fishing catch in the areas between the Turkish coasts and the Greek

islands. Ratti (2017) contends that a "fishing war" commenced in 2016, with fish farming being increased intensively on both sides, but Turkish fishermen exporting fish at a very low prices, thus creating bitter competition. Reports in the Greek media maintain, however, that Turkish fishermen enter Greek territorial waters and operate illegally, plundering and threatening the local Greek fishermen by producing weapons (Kontogiannidis, 2019). Greek fishermen argue that this has become a daily occurrence, while it has impacted their livelihood severely (Polizou, 2021). Contributing to the overall tension, Turkish media report that the Greek Coast Guard has been harassing Turkish fishermen operating in international waters (high seas) by causing material damage to their boats (Anadolu Agency, 2021). Turkish media also report that Turkish submarines have been employed in the past in order to prevent Greek fishing boats from entering and casting their nets inside Turkish territorial waters (Doğan News Agency, 2015).

4. The Torres Strait Treaty as a Framework for the Resolution of the Aegean Conflict

The Torres Strait Treaty provides a framework through which the following elements of the Aegean conflict can be resolved: 1) the delimitation of the continental shelf; 2) the breadth of territorial sea; 3) the breadth of national airspace; 4) the sovereignty of the islets and rocks in the grey zones, an issue linked to the national borders; 5) a potential fisheries zones issue, which, albeit not an element of the Aegean conflict, affects the lives of the local inhabitants in the Aegean Sea. Regarding the FIR and SAR issues, and assuming that Greece and Turkey are performing their FIR duties according to the ICAO protocols, it is suggested that both countries should abide by the decisions and frameworks of the ICAO and the outcomes of the European Regional Aviation Conferences. On the question of the militarisation of the islands in the eastern Aegean Sea, this paper suggests that both countries, as NATO allies and in good will, can agree to limit the concentration of army personnel and the accumulation of arms on both sides of the border, in order to avoid an accidental or incidental armed conflict. Although not an element of the Torres Strait Treaty, Australia and PNG have developed a defence relationship which materialised into the Defence Cooperation Arrangement (DCA) in 2013 (Australian High Commission, Papua New Guinea, n.d.). A similar agreement between Greece and Turkey can be achieved, considering that both countries share the same strategic and security interests in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean Seas. Further, such an agreement would allow for the two neighbours to strengthen their bilateral relations, share intelligence and to deal with threats and challenges in the region such as terrorism and undocumented immigration flows.

Greece and Turkey can deal with the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf by establishing multi-stratified boundaries: 1) a main national boundary as provided by the Treaty of Lausanne, which designates the areas over which each country has sovereignty; 2) a Seabed Jurisdiction Line, similar to the example set in the Torres Strait Treaty, which can be established in a precise way to designate where each country has sovereign rights. A legal arrangement can also be achieved where both countries can share the benefits from the exploitation of mineral resources in the continental shelf. Alternatively, Greece and Turkey can agree on prohibiting mining and drilling on the continental shelf, a provision similar to Article 15 of the Torres Strait Treaty. This allows for the protection of the marine environment in the eastern Aegean Sea and offers opportunities for both countries to improve their bilateral relations through tourism cooperation. So far, a Memorandum of Cooperation has been signed which reduces bureaucracy and facilitates travel from Greece to Turkey and vice versa ("Tourism an Area", 2021). This sets a precedent for greater cooperation through tourism, which can provide both countries with significant economic benefits. Further, a decision to prohibit mining and drilling in the Aegean Sea allows for the two countries to invest in sustainable, renewable energy sources, in accordance with the European Energy Roadmap 2050, whose objective is to reduce the use of carbon dioxide and invest in new energy systems (European Commission, 2012).

As discussed earlier, both Australia and PNG have agreed to limit their territorial sea to 3 nm, given the proximity of the Australian islands to the PNG coasts. While Greece and Turkey can claim territorial seas up 12 nm, they are not obliged to do so, given the complexity of the issue and the proximity of Greek islands to the coasts of Turkey. It is suggested that the interests of both countries are met under the current 6 nm regime and that there is no reason to perpetuate a conflict based on the interpretation of a customary provision by the UNCLOS, which, in this case, can cause more issues rather than resolve them. Retaining the territorial sea at 6 nm will also put Turkey's concerns regarding the alteration of balance in the Aegean Sea to rest, as its access to high seas will remain unhindered (Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

Australia and PNG resolved the national airspace issue by merely subscribing to the provisions of the UNCLOS, which provide that the sovereignty of a state extends to the airspace over the territorial sea, as well as to the seabed and subsoil under the territorial sea (Article 2). Greece and Turkey can resolve the national airspace issue by similarly agreeing that they have sovereignty over the airspace above their respective territorial seas. This is based on the presumption that Greece would withdraw its claim to 10 nm of airspace. Such an agreement is beneficial for both countries, as it

would essentially put an end to the Turkish military overflights and, subsequently, reduce both countries' defence budgets (Heraclides, 2010).

Australia and PNG dealt with islets, rocks and low-tide elevations in Article 2 of the Torres Strait Treaty, which provides that sovereignty over an island includes sovereignty over "any island, rock or low-tide elevation that may lie within its territorial sea" (Article 2). Such an arrangement is possible for Greece and Turkey, however, it should take into consideration the main national boundary and be limited to it, as Turkey argues that certain islets and rocks are from 2 to 4 nm away from its own islands or mainland (Heraclides, 2010). It is also possible that such an arrangement would compel Greece and Turkey to draw a new national boundary in the eastern Aegean Sea. This paper suggests that the grey zones issue should be resolved by compromising and in good faith, as sovereignty over islets, rocks or low-tide elevations should not constitute a valid reason to exercise sovereignty politics that cause tensions. Alternatively, the two countries can agree to strictly abide by the Treaty of Lausanne, which provides that all islands beyond 3 nm of the Turkish coastline belong to Greece, therefore compromising and giving up any other claims, and by the *Treaty of Peace with Italy* which has ceded certain disputed areas to Greece.

The Torres Strait Treaty settled PNG's concerns regarding commercial fisheries by setting up a Fisheries Jurisdiction Line where the parties share the catch of commercial fisheries and a separate Protected Zone where traditional fishing is prioritized (Articles 20-23). It is possible for a Fisheries Jurisdiction Line and a separate Protected Zone to be established in the eastern Aegean Sea which would protect the interests and fishing activities of the local inhabitants and put an end to incidents where the Greek and Turkish Coast Guards or military intervene to prevent or enable fishing in certain disputed areas. Thus, the "fishing war" in the eastern Aegean Sea would be resolved by setting up each state's respective jurisdictions and the parameters for cooperation between the Greek and Turkish fishermen. Such an arrangement would be economically beneficial for the local economy and would provide the conditions for a healthy competition.

Conclusions

This paper suggests that the Torres Strait Treaty constitutes a legal precedent which can serve as a model towards a possible resolution of the Aegean conflict. A similar legal arrangement would allow Greece and Turkey to establish multi-stratified boundaries, thus achieving a fair resolution regarding their respective territorial seas and continental shelves. This can ultimately lead to an economic cooperation between the two countries, which can choose to benefit from the exploitation

of mineral resources in the Aegean Sea, or to expand cooperation through tourism and trade. Through the same framework, the resolution of the national airspace and grey zones disputes can be achieved, essentially ending the utilisation of military resources as a means of contesting each country's respective sovereignty or sovereign rights, and guaranteeing the security of the region. The resolution of the Aegean conflict would limit the probability of a military conflict. This would secure not only Greece and Turkey's strategic interests in the region, but also those of their NATO allies, who favour an equitable solution in the Aegean. The restoration of friendly bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey would also reinforce the latter's efforts for accession to the European Union, a development which would allow for greater bilateral cooperation and further economic possibilities. Finally, a legal arrangement similar to the Torres Strait Treaty would protect the interests and livelihood of the local inhabitants and would provide for the management of the fisheries and marine resources, ending localised conflict and setting the parameters for collaboration and fair competition.

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The effect of disinformation on democracy: the impact of Hungary's democratic decline

Jonathan REISHER[*]

Abstract

Hungary's democratic backsliding demonstrates that the Cold War era notion that more access to information will accelerate the spread of democracy is dying. For authoritarians, social media enabled disinformation is the weapon of choice because it challenges democratic institutional legitimacy. The popularity of the Sputnik V vaccine in Hungary indicates that, before Russia's invasion of Ukraine Russian influence was growing in the EU's backyard. By exploiting social, political, and economic inequalities in Hungary, Russia disinformation facilitated Victor Orban's consolidation of power ahead of the April 2020 elections. Democracies should adopt a new paradigm of state power projection that views robust domestic institutions as the way to confront the issue of social media enabled disinformation. Democracy's most effective weapon against disinformation is institutional legitimacy, socio-economic equality, and public participation in government.

Keywords: Hungary, Viktor Orban, Democracy, Disinformation, COVID19, Russia

Introduction

Much of the discourse related to disinformation on social media has focused on the critical work of understanding its technical and psychological implications. While these are vitally important components of the problem, more research is needed on the effects of social media on governmental legitimacy and the deterioration of democratic institutions (Rosenbach and Mansted, 2018). The COVID19 pandemic provides a unique example as people's interactions worldwide were dominated by the internet. Concurrently, nations were developing their pandemic policy responses and vaccinations. These circumstances provide state and non-state propagandists ample opportunity to foment discord about the role of government amongst social or political sub-groups (Roth, 2020).

Hungary presents a unique case study. Its membership in the European Union (EU) and its position as the only EU country to authorize Russia's Sputnik V vaccine has allowed Putin's Russia

[*] Jonathan Reisher is a master's student at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States, e-mail: jreisher@andrew.cmu.edu or at Jonathan.reisher@gmail.com.

and the democratic West to directly compete for influence in Hungary. Russian strategy has long been to divide European organizations and degrade the legitimacy of European institutions (White House, 2021). This divide and conquer tactic has repeated itself during the Cold War and more recently with the annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, information has been a historically dominate feature of Russia's arsenal (GEC, 2020). In the wake of the COVID19 pandemic, prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Hungary was a target for disruptive Russian influence campaigns seeking to prove the effectiveness of authoritarianism.

This paper argues that the rise of authoritarianism in Hungary is due, in part, to foreign influence operations aimed at undermining Hungarian democracy. The other cause of Hungarian authoritarianism is a function of Victor Orban's deliberate decisions to increase his own power at the expense of democracy. The paper begins by discussing topic of democratic institutions to evaluate social media's impact on representative governance. The next section discusses Viktor Orban and the political ramifications of the COVID19 pandemic. The following sections of the paper will show that the COVID19 pandemic gave Russia a new opportunity to degrade democratic institutional legitimacy and gain influence in Hungary. The analysis uses vaccine efficacy and vaccination rates in Hungary as a proxy indicator that Russian influence is increasing in Hungary. The paper continues by arguing that Hungary is in a critical stage of democratic deterioration given Orban's emergency COVID19 legislative powers and the upcoming 2022 elections. The paper also explores the implications of Hungary's democratic deterioration for the long-term viability of democratic institutions. Finally, the reader should keep in mind that the analysis presented in this paper ends in December 2021 and does not explore the impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on Hungarian Democracy.

1. Institutional Legitimacy of Democracy

Democratic governments do not always end in violent coups or dramatic revolutions. Increasingly, governments slowly deteriorate into authoritarianism (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 5). Democracy's primary components are its institutions and the legitimacy of those institutions. Together legitimate democratic institutions exercise the rule of law over the people to conduct the affairs of state (Przeworski, 2019, p. 3). Authoritarians wishing to co-opt democracy need only to fill institutions with adherents and redefine political norms to gain legitimacy from citizens. Also called "democratic backsliding," democratic deterioration is the gradual erosion of institutions and norms (Przeworski, 2019, p. 103). Like a lobster who does not realize it's being cooked, authoritarians

gradually apply heat and pressure until democratic institutions are subverted and the connective tissue of public legitimacy is severed.

1.1. Institutions- Democracy's Muscle

The elected members in a democracy are always far too few to properly administer a country. Therefore, effective institutions are vital for a democracy to function. Institutions are also crucial in democracies because they retain the human capital to produce the work required for policy development and implementation. Institutions also maintain the political norms of a government. Norms are necessary because, in theory, they control the power of individuals or parties to subvert a free and fair society. Constitutional documents and judicial precedent provide democratic 'guardrails' for acceptable political activities (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 112). Generally, all democratic institutions maintain two norms which are forbearance and mutual toleration. Forbearance is the exercise of restraint from antagonizing an opponent to the point they no longer wish to participate in democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 106). Mutual toleration is the concept that if rivals adhere to constitutional rules, all sides accept that their opponents have an equal right to exist in the system (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p. 101). Ultimately, these institutional guardrails are vital for bolstering a government system against a top-down overthrow by authoritarian leaders.

1.2. Legitimacy- Democracy's Connective Tissue

Since the Enlightenment, the concept of political legitimacy has evoked numerous philosophical debates about the morals and virtue of government (Rothstein, 2009, p. 311-313). However, Rawls and Ripstein's assertion that legitimacy refers to the justification of coercive political power and the public's obligation to comply is meaningful in a modern context (Fabienne, 2017). Another useful definition describes legitimacy as an expression of community recognition of a political system (Bekkars and Edwards, 2013, p. 49). While the concept of governmental legitimacy is complex, the public must accept democratic political systems. Otherwise, democracies are susceptible to bottom-up coups because the government institutions are no longer legitimate to the masses.

There are numerous sources of political legitimacy. The traditional form of legitimacy was the religious right of a ruler to exert power over their people (Hoffman, 2018). Other forms include legal, cultural, traditional, results, fact, or consent-based legitimacy (Fabienne, 2020). In the case of

democracy, consent-based legitimacy is by far the most important because it is predicated on the idea of public acceptance which is the public's freestanding judgment of government decisions (Fabienne, 2017).

Legitimacy as a system is derived from the input, throughput, and output of the democratic process. Input legitimacy refers to the participatory quality of the government process for voting and creating laws (Schmidt, 2013). Input-oriented legitimacy is also related to the concept of a participatory government "by the people" where normal citizens have a variety of ways to interact or join the government (Schmidt, 2013). Throughput legitimacy refers to the procedural aspect of government decision making that is transparent, fair, and accountable (Schmidt, 2013). Throughput legitimacy acknowledges the need of governments to use efficient decision-making processes (Schmidt, 2013). Finally, output legitimacy is based on the results of a government. Output legitimacy builds on the idea of a government "for the people" in that governments should generate meaningful solutions for citizen's problems (Schmidt, 2013). Thus, legitimacy should be thought of as a relationship between the government and the people.

In addition to its relational nature, legitimacy can also have a direct or indirect approach. Direct forms of legitimacy are exercised by the state and the elected representatives who are part of governing bodies. However, indirect legitimacy can be exercised by multilevel governance (Bekkers and Edwards, 2013, pp. 59-60). Many nations have a version of the United States federalist system where the national government exercises control over states or providences. Indirect legitimacy also occurs at the multi-national level. Organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) exert influence in their member nations due to a collective agreement to make collaborative decisions (Bekkers and Edwards, 2013, p. 60). Indirect legitimacy demonstrates that the international community effects democratic legitimacy alongside domestic actors.

Democracy's reliance on legitimacy is fickle and delicate. Public opinion is susceptible to unforeseen and sudden changes. Additionally, the internet enables state and non-state agents to directly engage with foreign public audiences. That unfettered access can and does allow for the legitimacy of a government system to be challenged by other countries and by groups. If an adversarial country can influence the legitimacy of democratic institutions, then that hostile country can use a country's citizens against it. Finally, when the legitimacy of a government is undermined, people are far more likely to use violent means to overthrow illegitimate institutions (Rothstein, 2009, pp. 319-322).

1.3 Democracy's Legitimacy Problem

The decline of democracy is not a new topic. Think tanks like Freedom House have studied democratic backsliding for decades (Zselyky, 2021). Democracy's systematic weakness since the end of the Cold War has focused on input legitimacy. For example, after the fall of Saddam's regime, Paul Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority prioritized voting (Rothstein, 2009, pp. 319-322). The principal idea was that if the Iraqi government was fully representative, output legitimacy or government effectiveness would follow. In contrast, authoritarians and populists alike contend that democracy's overemphasis on the democratic process has led to failure.

There are generally two kinds of democratic opposition. China's rivalry with the West has recently dominated state-to-state opposition. China's centralized 'state capitalist' model, led by a single party, prioritizes the output side of governmental legitimacy instead of individual rights (Morrison, 2017, p. 29). State-based competition, however, is characterized by competing institutions operating primarily within established international norms. The other form of democratic opposition is internal erosion. Autocrats and populists co-opt democracy's institutions while simultaneously reframing public opinion and attacking institutional legitimacy (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, pp. 80-82). The anti-democratic movement in Central Europe started in the mid-2000s with Vladimir Putin's "sovereign democracy" and then spread to "ill-liberal democracies" in Poland, Hungary, and Italy throughout the 2010s (Zselyky, 2021). Furthermore, former Soviet Bloc countries, like Hungary, have lower public trust in government institutions than countries in the rest of Europe (Ghodsee and Orenstein, 2021). In former communist European Countries less than 30% of citizens trust the government (Ghodsee and Orenstein, 2021).

While structural attacks on democratic institutions and legitimacy are central to the anti-democratic movement, it is not the only element. Democratic institutions have also degraded due to public perceptions of inefficiency and corruption. The concept of institutional or political legitimacy is much like John Locke's economic principle of the invisible hand (Bekkers and Edwars, 2013, p. 48). There is an unseen, often ill-defined, force keeping a country's institutions legitimate to the people. However, attitudes around political legitimacy are also subject to changing social norms. To maintain public legitimacy, democratic institutions must reflect society. Absent the consensus that democratic institutions are legitimate, representative forms of government will not exist.

Another element that influences the public perception of democracy is the role of the social contract. In democracy the rules of the Enlightenment still apply. Rousseau in *The Social Contract* articulated that "the social order is a sacred right which serves as a basis for all other rights. And it is

not a natural right, it must be one founded on covenants" (Lazar, 2021). In non-authoritarian governments, an understanding exists between the government and the people. The understanding is that people agree to adhere to laws, even if they do not always agree with them, in exchange for capable, responsive governance. "Understandings" are codified in law and legal precedent, which serves as the basis for political cohesion and popular support for governing bodies (Berg, 1978, pp. 151-152).

Furthermore, Aristotle sharply delineated the 'good citizen' and the 'good man' (Perry, 1978, p. 39). Educated citizens understand that democratic rule often requires them to make concessions in their right to self-determination. Put another way, living in a democratic society means that an individual's optimal policy solution is not always society's optimal policy solution (Perry, 1978, pp. 39-40). Moreover, an effective social contract requires good governance and a public that is knowledgeable and engaged in politics. Absent public input, a government's only recourse is to resort to autocracy or oligarchy because the government's legitimacy is derived from the people.

1.4 Social Media: The Anti-Legitimacy Super Weapon

The last century has seen many technological innovations in warfare. In the information age, social media is a revolution in military affairs because it allows adversarial nations or actors to directly engage with citizens of rival nations. Direct state engagement of foreign citizens subverts the notion of national sovereignty as defined in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia because sovereigns no longer have the exclusive preview over their citizens (Patrikarakos, 2017, p. 9). Additionally, the internet allows state and non-state actors to directly interfere with the function of democracies by attacking consensus, questioning voting, and stoking sectarian conflict within targeted segments of a population. While the internet and social media were not intended to be weapons of repression, they are consistently used to assault institutions, legitimacy, and the social construct in democratic nations (Baer-Bader, 2020).

Authoritarian degradation of democratic tents is enabled by social media companies that consistently use content algorithms that prioritize revenues (Orlowski, 2021). Social media profits from user engagement because it provides marketable data and advertisement opportunities (Orlowski, 2021). A specific example is Facebook's "angry" emoji, which in 2017 was weighted five times more than the other emotional post responses (Marrow, 2021). This suggests that Facebook was knowingly promoting divisive content to drive engagement. While the company has since provided equal weight to the angry emoji, Congressional testimony of Facebook insider, Frances

Haugen, asserts that the company has made a concerted effort to prioritize profits over safety (Marrow, 2021). Absent regulation there is little incentive for social media companies to facilitate civil discourse.

Another aspect of social media's profit maximizing algorithms is to establish reaffirming silos of information within sub-groups of a nation's citizenry. Facebook uses its 'community' concept to connect people with similar interests through solidified groups, whereas Twitter uses hashtags to connect users with related worldviews (Orlowski, 2021). Social media executives understand that users prefer to consume information that reaffirm their beliefs. Monetizing confirmation bias ensures that people will return to the platform when an event occurs to see how other like-minded people react. Eventually, the algorithms 'learn' a person's attitudes and avoids providing them information that conflicts with their ideas. This is very damaging to public discourse as is reduces a person's capacity to engage with opposing viewpoints (Orlowski, 2021).

A combination of reaffirming algorithms and partisan news platforms created segregate constitutions of knowledge with their own facts and value judgments of those facts.[14] In a society with very different conceptions of reality, there is little hope that the society can arbitrate between groups to form political solutions because they cannot agree on the nature of an issue (Rauch, 2021). As an example, climate politics in the United States is divisive because much of the debate centers around the issue of "is the climate changing" versus arguments over solutions.

Finally, Facebook alone has 2.8 billion global users (Chappell, 2021). However, social media platforms lack the capacity to monitor non-English conspiracy theories and disinformation. The primary reason is that platforms have prioritized disinformation mitigation efforts targeting American audiences (Chappell, 2021). Furthermore, social media platforms cannot accurately translate languages that have varied vernacular or use non-English characters. Researchers estimate that of COVID19 conspiracy theory videos in English, up to 70% of the Spanish versions of the video persist on Facebook (Vice News, 2021). Ignoring non-English disinformation enables it to flourish, unopposed in places like the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America (Vice News, 2021).

The disaggregation of information is optimal for personal liberties but corrosive for democracies. This is because democracies can no longer control the quality of information citizens consume without engaging in autocratic behavior. Conversely, democracies are held accountable for maintaining legitimate institutions and upholding the social contract even as the social media undermines the civic knowledge required for healthy interactions between a government and its citizens. This dynamic is simply unsustainable.

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[14] Constitution of Knowledge is meant to denote that there are shared, unquestioned facts that exist.

2. Post-Soviet Hungary and the Rise of Victor Orban

Hungary remained under the yoke of Soviet control until 1989 after Gorbachev permitted Eastern European countries to pursue their own political and economic futures (Kulcsar and Domokos, 2005). In Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party was abolished and the country adopted a new constitution in October 1989 (Bunce and Csanadi, 1993, p. 247). The new constitution created a representative multiparty unicameral parliamentary system, free elections, and a separate judiciary system. The 1989 constitution also established individual and civil rights for all Hungarians, including ethnic minorities (Bunce and Csanadi, 1993, p. 253).

Hungary's first free elections in 1990 saw the consolidation of Victor Orban's Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) Party. Though the post-Soviet Communist Party remained dominant, Fidesz consisted of young Hungarians pushing to advance individual freedom and democracy (Schwartzbrug and Szijarto, 2019). The Fidesz party was founded in Budapest in 1988 by a group of students, including a young Victor Orban. Throughout the late 80s, Fidesz party chapters spread across Hungary as political clashes with police intensified. In the first democratic election, Fidesz earned only 22 of 378 seats, establishing it as a fledgling but energetic reform party (Schwartzbrug and Szijarto, 2019).

In 1990, Victor Orban, a law graduate of the University of Budapest and an Oxford scholar, was one of the first Fidesz Party Members elected to the National Assembly (Schwartzbrug and Szijarto, 2019). By 1993, Orban became the Fidesz Party leader. As party leader, Orban decided to shift the party center-right in the mid-90s to ally with right-leaning political organizations (Schwartzbrug and Szijarto, 2019). Through tactful coalition building, Orban created a Fidesz lead government in 1998, which placed him in his first term as prime minister. During Orban's first term as prime minister from 1999-2002, he pushed Hungary towards a free-market economy and facilitated Hungary's NATO membership (NATO Member Countries, 2022). After being ousted as prime minister, Orban led the opposition against the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP). During his time out of power, Orban oversaw Fidesz's march to the political right as government corruption and social policy disputes provided him an opportunity to gain supporters (Schwartzbrug and Szijarto, 2019). Additionally, the economic turmoil of the 2008 recession and accusations of deceit by the MSzP revitalized Orban and his Fidesz Party (Szikra, 2014).

Orban won reelection as prime minister in April of 2010, this time with a Fidesz supermajority in the National Assembly. Fidesz won 68% of the seats in parliament and 53% of the popular vote (Zoltan, 2021, p. 9). In 2012, Orban used his legislative advantage to adopt a series of constitutional

amendments that embodied conservative moral and religious beliefs. Additionally, Orban began to curtail the independence of the judiciary system (Szikra, 2014) and notoriously implemented the 2011 citizenship law which extended citizenship to Hungarian speaking peoples living in the pre-1920s borders (Toomy, 2018). During the 2010s, the Fidesz party became increasingly partisan and focused on degrading democratic institutions.

As the Arab Spring turned to Arab Winter, hundreds of thousands of refugees passed through Hungary fleeing the Middle East due to civil war, famine, and ISIS. The refugee crisis enabled Orban and the Fidesz Party to increase their rhetoric around nativist identity politics to bolster support for making radical policy changes (Schwartzbrug and Szijarto, 2019). Riding a populist wave Orban wielded his mandate to fundamentally change the Hungarian relationship with government. Orban began the process by slashing social programs, altering loan financing requirements, and implementing a flat tax that advantages the wealthy (Zoltan, 2021, p. 9). The constitutional loophole that allowed Orban's subversion of Hungarian democracy in many ways mirror's Hitler's leveraging of Article 48, or the "authoritarian gap," in the Weimar Constitution allowing the president to rule by decree (Przeworskit, 2021, p. 111). Orban is not Hitler. Still, the playbook is familiar in that democratic deterioration is often a constitutional process.

Historically, an economic crisis is the most common reason for democratic deterioration (Przeworskit, 2021, p. 22). The economic recession of 2008 was the pretext used by Orban and the Fidesz Party to institute subtle but dangerous institutional reforms that facilitated more radical, future changes to the political landscape (Przeworskit, 2021, p. 104). Altering the financial system and elevating identity politics was the second step that began the process of Hungarian democratic deterioration. The current phase, discussed in a later section, is using the COVID19 pandemic to further alter the social contract to justify authoritarian policies.

3. "Russian New Generation Warfare"

The concept of Russian New Generation Warfare (RNGW) demonstrates that the rules of war have changed.[15] Russian military thinkers contend that non-military means of achieving political or military goals are equal to or have exceeded the effectiveness of traditional weapons (McMaster, 2020, p. 40). Increasingly, Russia uses cheap forms of war like energy coercion, cyber, and information warfare to meet its political objectives (Vasilyeva and Huggler, 2021). RNGW affords a financially and resource constrained Russia the opportunity to interfere with a government's elections

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[15] RNGW is a Western term to describe Russia's Information Confrontation

or policy objectives below the threshold that would typically elicit a military confrontation (Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, 2018, p. 114).

The genius of RNGW is that it allows Putin to expand Russian influence and shape world events while maintaining anonymity when convenient. For example, days before the 2014 Ukrainian election, a pro-Russian group with ties to Russian intelligence called CyberBerkut compromised the country's central election system by rendering the tally system inoperable (Henin, 2021). Russian doctrine uses the term "information confrontation," or *informatsionnoe protivoborstvo*, instead of RNGW. This distinction is important because information confrontation denotes a peace or wartime effort to exploit social vulnerabilities in democratic societies that degrade social, political, and intergovernmental cohesion (Kurcharski, 2019, p. 3).

Russian use of information differs from Western conceptions of information operations or psychological operations. Russia's information confrontation encompasses the technical aspects of communication and extends into the sphere of human cognition (Kurcharski, 2019, p. 4). Additionally, Russia's information wars are both a defensive and an offensive measure to counter Western influence. Finally, Russia views information confrontation as an asymmetric, indirect deterrence measure against conventional American or NATO military power (Kurcharski, 2019, p. 4).

Consequently, RNGW, or information confrontation, has metastasized into an "ecosystem" of disinformation meant to weaponize public opinion against adversarial or democratic countries (GEC, 2020, p. 5). Russia uses a mixture of state media, proxy platforms, unattributed channels, social media pages, and bot farms to create and propagate falsehoods (GEC, 2020, p. 5). Functionally, the disinformation ecosystem usually contradicts other media components. State media can have one narrative and an unattributed page can create a counter-narrative simply to stoke partisan division (GEC, 2020, p. 6). Furthermore, the disinformation ecosystem has no need for consistency. The more chaos injected into a democracy's consensus-seeking dialogue, the better (Valeriano, Jensen, Maness, 2018, p. 111).

RNGW allows Russian disinformation practitioners to use a variety of tactics. The following is by no means an extensive list of RNGW tactics:

- "Active Measures" or *Aktivnye meropriyatiya* is a Soviet term to describe covert or deniable actions to subvert pro-democratic governments or organizations and support pro-Soviet entities (Galeotti, 2019).
- Troll Armies or the use of bots and humans, who knowingly or unknowingly, amplify, spread, or create false narratives (Henin, 2021).

- Impersonation is the purposeful emulation of a respected organization or personality to undermine credibility or spread fake news. In the future, deepfakes will play a greater role in impersonation (Henin, 2021).

- "Hack and Leak" is a tactic where cyber espionage uncovers harmful information about a person, company, or organization that is then leaked to the public. Troll armies then amplify the leak (Henin, 2021).

- "Ampligana" or amplified propaganda is the technique of amplifying a falsehood or a harmful narrative to such an extent that social media users experience confirmation bias, in that people begin to believe the lie because they see it everywhere (DiResta, 2019).

- Infiltration of domestic conversations which intends to steer or subvert organic public discourse towards divisiveness rather than consensus (GEC, 2020, p. 8).

- Hashtag hijacking, which is related to the infiltration of domestic conversations, in which RNGW practitioners co-opt a hashtag to represent a different narrative from the original purpose (Patrikarkos, 2017, p. 142-145).

- State-funded media, like Russa Today, is meant to compete with local media outlets under the auspices of propagating the "real truth" (GEC, 2020, p. 8).

3.1. RNGW in Hungary

Hungary is a prime target for Putin's Russia. As an Eastern European country with proximity to Ukraine, membership in the EU and in NATO, Budapest represents the ideal geopolitical pawn to disrupt alliances and degrade democratic institutions. Geographically, Hungary resides on the edge of the Great European Plain, which has historically been a superhighway for Russia's invaders. In the past 500 years, Russia experienced five invasions from the European plain: Poland in 1605, Sweden in 1618, France in 1812, and Germany during WWI and WIII (Marshall, 2016, chap 2).

Ideologically, RNGW has supported Orban and his Fidesz party by systematically weakening Hungarian democratic institutions, especially the judiciary and independent media. Increasingly, pro-Russian sentiment is split along partisan lines (Havlicek and Yeliseyeu, 2021, p. 138). In fact, Hungarian support for the EU is around 52% leaving a near perfect divide between the pro-European and pro-Russian supporters (Latvia Public Broadcasting, 2019). A divided Hungary is important for Putin as it provides an opportunity to fully transition Hungary from a Western democracy to a pro-Kremlin authoritarian state.

The polarization in Hungarian politics creates the perfect ecosystem for RNGW. Hungarian State media has replaced pro-Western sentiment with messaging on topics like Christianity, social conservatism, and anti-immigration with a tenor that reflects Russian, not EU values (Havlicek and Yeliseyeu, 2021, p. 140). The Fidesz dominated Hungarian Media Council has expanded state-media apparatuses in recent years by creating the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA) which includes over 500 government influence media platforms (Szicherle and Kreko, 2021). Orban's steady shift toward a centralized information environment is not only Russian in form but provides Russian media and troll armies ample local voices to propagate disinformation. Homegrown disinformation is far more effective and manipulative than externally produced content (Szicherle and Kreko, 2021). Localized disinformation is far more effective because native content makers better understand the domestic audience.

Concurrently, Fedesz opposition members are increasingly forced to consume non-Hungarian media or obtain news over social media. Over 85% of Hungarians are internet users and over 67% of internet users have a social media profile to read news (Medve, 2020). Facebook is overwhelmingly the predominant social media platform in Hungary, with over 6 million users in 2020 (Medve, 2020). The opposition's reliance on social media for news provides the perfect scenario for RNGW because there are segregated media environments that are dominated by opposing political factions. This is not to say that Fidesz supporters do not use social media but rather that their most important news source is state ran media because it aligns with their values. Finally, as previously discussed, social media algorithms and overweighting emotional content ensure that supporters and opposition members never engage with opposing viewpoints and are bombarded with divisive content.

The divisive Hungarian media environment provides a tremendous opportunity for RNGW to engineer partisan Hungarian politics. Russian efforts increase the perceived legitimacy of President Orban's steady degradation of democracy and individual rights. A more authoritarian Hungary enables Russia to indirectly disrupt the EU and NATO at the strategic level. A divided NATO facilitates Putin's territorial acquisitions in the Crimea and the Donbas region of Ukraine by providing an ideological buffer state between Western Europe and Russia. An authoritarian Hungary also aids information confrontations across Europe and in the United States because it provides yet another example of democratic backsliding in contrast to authoritarian 'effectiveness.'

Domestically, there is a symbiotic relationship between RNGW and President Orban's consolidation of power. Orban has incentives to allow divisive social media enabled propaganda to flourish. Disinformation allows for a convenient pretext to attack democratic institutions by claiming illegitimacy, silence opposition, and rewrite the social contract through popular consensus (Roth,

2020). The COVID19 pandemic is the perfect black swan event for authoritarianism because it provides a public health pretext to implement rapid change.

4. COVID19 pandemic in Hungary

Orban exploited the COVID19 pandemic to justify the next phase of Hungarian democratic deterioration. Simultaneously, the pandemic created additional opportunities for RNGW to stoke partisan divides in Hungary by cementing ideological differences between political parties on the issues of vaccination, COVID19 mitigation measures, and the role of government during crisis.

In March 2020, the National Assembly passed, by a vote of 137 to 53, a coronavirus measure allowing Prime Minster Orban to rule by decree with no time limit placed on the expanded powers (Walker and Rankin, 2020). The bill also introduced a provision enabling Orban to sentence people to up to five years in prison for spreading COVID19 related misinformation. In advance of the April 2022 elections, Orban's administration has used the new law to spread his own misinformation about the opposition party (Deutsche Welle, 2021). Specifically, government media outlets accused the pro-opposition think tank Political Capital Institute of encouraging people to refuse vaccination. The reported purpose was to increase the COVID19 death toll and, by extension, increase criticism of Orban's handling of the pandemic. Orban also made personal statements about this case, stating that "evil has no bounds" (Deutsche Welle, 2021).

In addition to diminishing support for the opposition, Orban has used the pandemic to further disrupt free press (Deutsche Welle, 2021). Pro-opposition media outlets are concerned that the pandemic law could silence reports critical of Orban or the Fidesz Party. Limiting negative news reporting is crucial for Orban and Fidesz to retain their super majority in the National Assembly. While the law provides a legal avenue to trample free speech, a contrived government concern for misinformation provides the mechanism for Orban's suppression of free speech to seem genuine.

Furthermore, in July 2021, Orban's pandemic powers were used to suppress LGBTQ rights as part of his "Hungarian family values" messaging intended to increase conservative support. On its face, the law is intended to protect children against pedophiles and place parents in charge of sexual education (Gile, 2021). However, in practice the law contains clauses that ban any content with homosexuality or sex reassignment in minors. The sub context of the law links the LGBTQ people to pedophilia and increases stigma towards the LGBTQ community. The Orban Government maintains that such criticism is "fake news" and that the law does not target one social group above others (Gile,

2021). Ultimately, Orban has demonstrated he will use his COVID19 legislative powers offensively and defensively to justify persecution of minorities and opposition groups.

4.1. Vaccination as Proxy Indicator of State Legitimacy

The pandemic has enabled Hungarian democratic deterioration and elevated authoritarianism based on recent political events. However, what has the effect been on the Hungarian people's support for such measures and how effective has RNGW been in achieving Russian political objectives? This paper uses vaccination type by percent utilized as a proxy indicator for Hungarian public sentiment of state legitimacy.[16] Vaccines are a proxy indicator because Hungary allowed citizens to choose between six vaccines: AstraZeneca, Johnson&Johnson, Moderna, Pfizer/BioNTech, SinoPharm, and Sputnik V. Additionally, these vaccines are from different countries: AstraZeneca is from Great Britain, Johnson&Johnson and Moderna are from the United States, Pfizer/BionTech is a German and American vaccine, Sinopharm is Chinese, and Sputnik V is Russian. Finally, all but Johnson&Johnson are two dose vaccines.

Uniquely, the Hungarian Government is the only EU nation that allows citizens to take the Russian Sputnik V vaccine (Licskay, 2021). Because Hungarians choose the vaccine they receive, people select the available vaccine and the vaccine they are most comfortable with receiving. Vaccine "comfort," in this context, is a function of a person's perception that the country producing their chosen vaccine can produce an effective, safe product.

4.2. COVID in Hungary

State-affiliated media claims that as of November 2021, there are 5,777,331 Hungarians fully vaccinated against COVID19, or just under 60% of the population (Cseresnyes, 2021). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Hungary has experienced 976,432 cases of COVID19 since March 2020 and 32,514 deaths (WHO, 2022). These numbers parallel the European Centre for Disease and Prevention Control data as well (European Centre for Disease Prevention, 2021).

A peculiar facet of the Hungarian pandemic is that the most significant spike in cases and deaths occurred after vaccines were available (See Figure 1.1 and 1.2). Hungary has instituted a series of indoor mask mandates, restrictions on travel, limits on indoor dining along with the other EU nations (European Centre for Disease Prevention, 2021). However, a combination of vaccine hesitancy, lack

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[16] A proxy indicator is an indirect measure that approximates a value in the absence of a more direct measure.

of trust in authorities, and misinformation leaves Hungary at a 60% inoculation rate, well behind the EU average of nearly 75% (Reuters, 2021).

Figure 1.1. COVID19 cases peaked in Hungary after vaccines became available in January 2021

Figure 1.2. COVID19 deaths peaked in Hungary after vaccines became available in January 2021

The WHO reports that almost 11.5 million doses of the six available vaccines have been administered in Hungary. The most readily available vaccine has been the Pfizer/BionTech and the SinoPham vaccines (European Centre for Disease Prevention, 2021). However, the total numbers of vaccinations mask the percentage of each vaccine used. American-German and Chinese vaccine diplomacy efforts may seem aggressive. But Russian vaccine diplomacy is more effective if considering the percent of each vaccine used (See Figure 2). The Sputnik V vaccine has an 89.9% utilization rate as compared to Pfizer/Biontech's 85.6% and SinoPharm's 39.2% utilization rate. This data suggests that many Hungarians prefer Russian vaccines to Western or Chinese vaccines.

Figure 2. Shows the percentage of each vaccine utilization by type. Of the vaccines Russia sent to Hungary, almost 90% of them were used by October 2021

Additionally, when vaccination data is disaggregated to account for time, important patterns emerge. In February 2021, only 5% of Hungary's population was vaccinated. However, five weeks after introducing the Sputnik V vaccine, Hungary's inoculation rate increased to nearly one-fifth of the country's population (Reuters, 2021). This suggests that once Hungarians had choices, they flocked to the Russian vaccine. Additionally, Sputnik V's first doses were consumed in four months from February to May 2021, further indicating their popularity as they were rapidly utilized. In comparison, the first dose of the SinopPharm vaccine, available in January 2021, were consumed over five months. Moreover, other vaccines, like Pfizer/BionTech were consumed over a longer

period. (See Figure 3) If Sputnik V was less popular, the data should show a more even first dose distribution.

Figure 3. Shows a Steam Graph of 1st Doses which depicts each vaccine as a proportion of the total vaccines used overtime. Sputnik V was extremely popular in February to May 2021

Source: Own Representation of European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control data

Admittedly, there are some limitations to using vaccines as a proxy for state legitimacy. While Hungarians were free to choose the vaccine they received, not every vaccine had equal availability. For example, Sputnik V had 2.1 million compared to Pfizer/BionTech's 5.4 million first dose vaccines available from January to October 2021 (European Centre for Disease Prevention, 2021). The lack of availability of Sputnik V could have limited the number of Hungarians inoculated with the Russian vaccine. However, Sputnik V remained a dominant national choice by the percentage used, not accounting for supply chain issues. Sputnik V's popularity demonstrates the ability of RNGW to simultaneously stoke partisan division and increase pro-Russian sentiments in Hungary.

In September 2021, Hungary signed a letter of intent to begin production of China's SinoPharm (Deutsche Welle, May 2021). Then in October 2021, Hungary backtracked and announced that they

would soon produce the Sputnik V vaccine thanks to increased cooperation and technology transfer with Russia (Deutsche Welle, May 2021). The Russian competition with China is a clear indicator that Putin wished to capitalize on the initial success. Long-term vaccine cooperation between Hungary and Russia would have allowed Orban and Putin to solidify the relationship into more formal relations. Hungarian Sputnik V vaccine production also hands Orban a critical policy victory ahead of the April 2022 elections. Critically, domestic production provides the Fidesz Party to claim to protect Hungarians from the virus without 'any' outside assistance.

5. Lessons and Reflections

This paper has reviewed the salient literature on social media, democratic institutions, and how RNGW has increased pro-authoritarian sentiments in Hungary. Furthermore, Russia has demonstrated an ability to leverage Victor Orban's authoritarian tendencies to create an ideological buffer state. The mechanism for Hungarian democratic backsliding is the ability of social media to alter the social contract between the government and the people. The altered social contract between citizens and the political system then enables Orban to degrade democratic norms like forbearance and mutual toleration to consolidate his power. The result is institutions that are staffed with Fidesz Party adherents rather than public servants and the freedom to create legislation that destroys civil liberties. The popularity of the Sputnik V vaccine is just one critical indicator of Russia's influence in Hungary. The next significant indicator will be the upcoming elections.

5.1 Lessons for Hungary

Hungary's backsliding democracy is entering a critical phase. The April 2022 national elections will either be a rebuke or embrace of Orban's brand of authoritarianism. A renewed Fidesz supermajority would provide Orban a mandate to continue his nativist march toward dismantling Hungarian democracy. With a supermajority in the National Assembly and the ongoing pandemic legislation allowing Orban to rule by decree, there will be very few remaining means for Hungarian opposition leaders to resist.

Hungary's situation also demonstrates that citizens play an active role in democratic backsliding. In addition to external actors, social media enables domestic authoritarian supporters to propagate anti-democratic sentiments. Historians have emphasized the role of despotic leaders in crushing democratic institutions, but they fail to appreciate that segments of a country's population

might also support autocracy (Norris, 2021). While Putin and Orban clearly play a role in Hungary's democratic backsliding, segments of the Hungarian population support the transition to a more nativist, conservative, and ill-liberal government. Unchecked, support will continue to grow until democracy deteriorates entirely to dictatorship and public opinion no longer matters.

A Fidesz win in 2022 could also embolden Putin's Russia. The technology transfer to produce Sputnik V would have afford the Kremlin additional opportunities to become intertwined in the Hungarian political and economic architecture. The more entrenched Russia becomes in Hungarian life, the more Hungary will become a liability for European stability. Political friction is critical for expanding RNGW further into Europe's democratic countries. Additionally, Hungarian dissent in NATO could prove decisive in delaying a response to Russian territorial aggression in the Baltics or Ukraine. At the very least, Putin's Russia gains one more authoritarian ally in their 'winner takes none' strategy of mutual misery.

5.2 How Democracy Fights Back

The world's democracies should view Hungary's backsliding toward authoritarianism as a warning. Hungary's political situation is not unique in that most democracies experience disruptions in institutional legitimacy. However, the addition of social media enabled disinformation represents a threat to democracy everywhere. For the ideas of representative governance and individual liberties to prosper, democratic governments must contend with information age threats.

To survive in the 21st century, democracy must view domestic institutional legitimacy as a function of its overall ability to project power. There cannot be a strict division between domestic and foreign policy because the internet connects humans globally. For example, military theory assumes that a nation will have unfettered access to its population. Domestic policy is important only because it helps project military power outside its borders to achieve a policy objective. Institutional power is the strength of a government's institutions to endure crisis, produce results for its citizens, and reflect changing public opinion. Institutional power can also be a perception. For example, some countries might feel that forfeiting individual rights is a worthwhile trade for government efficiency; thus, institutional power is not unique to democracies.

While institutional power assumes a realist approach to policy, the recommendation to include it as part of national power is more liberal in its implementation. The key to robust institutional power is to strengthen democratic institutional legitimacy by promulgating more responsive, equitable, and fair governance. This change in focus is decisive because disinformation thrives in segments of the

population that experience inequality, poverty, and substandard education. Together they create a situation where entire communities feel they must look outside established norms and the social contract to find a system that works for them. Examples of domestic policies that increase institutional power include:

- Decrease inequality among subsections of the population by race, ethnicity, gender, geographic disposition, or religious affiliation. Low inequality decreases the effectiveness of disinformation because public grievance is not identity or values based.

- Increase funding for public education to include programs that improve digital literacy. A more informed public can act as Aristotle's 'good citizen' that constructively engages in democracy.

- Increase public engagement with democratic institutions through constructive dialogue, voter protections, and decreased barriers to citizen election into government. A public with agency over institutions is harder to propagate disinformation in because citizens can make change within, rather than outside, of the political system.

The hard power and soft power constructs are still viable. However, for a nation to truly exercise smart power in the information age, they must recognize that institutional power is now an integral part of national strength because it insulates a country from subversion by disinformation and plays a complementary role to traditional forms of power.

Conclusion

Although the consequences of disinformation can be mitigated, disinformation is not a solvable problem (Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, 2018, p. 212). Social media enables state disruptors like Russia to leverage a new form of political warfare known as Russian New Generation Warfare. Direct access to the populations of democratic countries allows nations like Russia to use disinformation to subvert democratic institutional legitimacy, rewrite the social contract, and undermine democratic norms. This strategy allows Putin's Russia to achieve with institutional power what he cannot with hard or soft power, creating a Hungarian ideological buffer state that is amenable to authoritarian ideas. Concurrently, Orban uses the threat of COVID19 related disinformation to consolidate power through silencing opposition and suppressing minority rights.

In sum, Hungary's case demonstrates that the Cold War era idea that access to more information would accelerate the spread of democracy is dying (Rosenback and Mansted, 2018). Furthermore, the internet's empowerment of individuals through unfettered access to information can be highly toxic

for democracies. More information does not equate to more freedom because the difference between trusted and malicious information sources becomes harder to discern when a person is overwhelmed with content.

Democratic backsliding due to disinformation is not a Hungarian phenomenon. Democracies from Ukraine, Germany, Norway, Latvia, Moldova, Canada, and the United States, among others, have experienced informational threats ranging from overt political warfare to electoral subversion. The events of the last decade demonstrate that democracy's battles against authoritarianism are no longer constrained to economic and philosophical debates. But instead, domestic institutional capacity to insulate citizens from adversarial propaganda and provide responsive, effective governance has become far more critical. Authoritarians know that if they cannot rival democracy in direct state-to-state competition, the internet allows them to subvert democracy from afar.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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The French policy of immigrant integration - return to laïcité

Xuedan YAO[*]

Abstract

After the 2015 European refugee crisis, immigrant integration has reemerged as a pressing issue endangering France's social and political stability. France is one of the main asylum host countries in Europe. In the past few years, terrorist attacks have become more frequent in France, and the spread of xenophobia has led to a social crisis that threatens the country's national security. It has prompted France to consider returning to Laïcité in response to this situation. So the purpose of this paper is to analyze France's immigrant integration policy in 2020 and reveal the discourse of Laïcité and republican values in France.

Keywords: Secularism, French Muslims, Immigrant integration

Introduction

After the 2015 European migrant crisis, France has become one of the most important asylum host countries and has taken in many migrants from Islamic countries, including Afghanistan, Sudan, and Syria, making up around 5.7 million Muslims (8.8 percent of the French population) (Pew Research Center, 2017). With the growing numbers of Muslim immigrants in France, the conflict between secularism and Islam, or multiculturalism, is becoming more evident. Furthermore, the rise of Islamophobia in the country has exacerbated confrontations, especially in light of the country's recurring attacks by Islamic terrorists. Anti-Islam sentiment has contributed to a stronger identity with Islam among Muslim immigrants (Kaya, 2021, p.213). To accomplish this, France promotes a return to Laïcitéin order to strengthen French cohesion.

What is Laïcité?

Laïcité, also known as secularism, provides a place for a secularism state to be religiously neutral. Secularism (Lacité) separated the Republic from religion, making room for religious plurality

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[*] Xuedan Yao is a graduate student at the Academy of International and Regional Studies in Beijing Language and Culture University, Beijing, China, e-mail: cynthiayao1019@gmail.com.

and supporting religious freedom (Jansen, 2006). The goal is to provide a place for a Secularism state to be religiously neutral, to guarantee that state power does not take a position on religion and instead maintains a "hands-off" approach toward religion in the realm of "individual conduct." Thus, secularism has been viewed as a place where the government does not take a position on religion. Consequently, secularism is also utilized to guarantee freedom of conscience, defend the right to believe or not believe, and guarantee that everyone can peacefully and freely express and practice their views without endangering others (Gunn, 2004, p.475).

Based on the Law of 1905, this principle calls for secularism that respects freedom of religious belief. Nevertheless, even though secularism appears in several relevant social and legal practices to find its way into the text, its meaning remains ambiguous (Sajó, 2008, p.616). This is also true in France, where the meaning of secularism still remains ambiguous.

Discourse in policy analysis

Recent years have seen a great deal of interest in new forms of discourse analysis. Discourse theorists have drawn on the work of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and Žižek to emphasize both the contingent and historical nature of objectivity as well as its relationship to politics and power (Jason, 2009, p.7).

An important component of integrating discourse analysis and political science in policy analysis. The term policy can generally be defined as a "policy statement," "policy release," or "policy initiative." Such a policy is intended to outline an exemplary position, with the language chosen primarily to attract or persuade. It rarely invites or accepts rebuttals, especially when taking a stance with high ethical standards. But public policy and analysis regularly adopt "polar words" and then make judgments based on elements of dualism that appear to have importance. (Gasper and Apthorpe, 1996, p.7) For example, Lazar Annita analyzes President Bush's speeches since 11 September through an intertextual analysis. Rather than distinguish between these different kinds and degrees of threat, she believes that dualism accommodates the fudging between them, constituting a largely undifferentiated enemy. What's more, binarism further makes it possible to sketch a clear, simple, and unidimensional picture of 'them' and 'us' by strategically omitting words (Lazar Annita, 2004, p. 239).

Discourse analysis has dramatically changed the way policy-making is analyzed. We tend to give more weight to what the story itself has to say rather than what can be inferred from the "coding" of the story in discourse analysis. In policy analysis, the stories themselves are considered more

important than what can be inferred from the "coding" of the stories. (Hajer, 2004, p.62) Foucault posits that government rules are not defined by traditional notions of sovereignty, the rule of law, and political dominance, which are themselves integral parts of a universal discourse of the state, but rather by the rules of knowledge and power that govern the practice of government. Institutions and academic disciplines are governed by norms of behavior, roles, structures, and hierarchies. The phenomenon of social construction is considered real in discourse. (Hewitt, 2009, p.6) Murray Edelman refers to Foucault's analysis of madness, crime, and sexuality to "trace changes in discourse that constitute a problem." In his view, problems are rarely solved, except when they are sometimes removed from common discourse or discussed in different legal, social, or political terms as though they were different problems. (Bacchi, 2010, p.48)

Numerous excellent papers have been published exploring the relationship and contradiction between secularism and religious freedom in France (Jean, 2003) and the factors that influence the integration of Muslim immigrants in France (Adida, 2010). Despite this, only a few studies exist in the field that examines French policies of migrant integration during Macron's presidency. So the purpose of this paper is to take into account policy discourse theory to contextualize and explain these events, focusing primarily on the return of secularism and the requirement that Muslims must embrace republican values in France in 2020, as well as to analyze Emmanuel Macron's anti-Islamic separatist speech.

1. Macron's approach toward Muslim immigrants has shifted

Macron founded La République En Marche (Republican Forward) in early 2016, positioning it as a moderate emerging party to meet the demands of the French people at the moment. La République En Marche surged to prominence in just two years and achieved unprecedented electoral success. In 2017, Macron and his party adopted relatively liberal immigration and economic growth policies (Floren, 2017, p.304). In contrast, Marine Le Pen, who has been President of the National Rally, is a vehemently anti-immigrant candidate. She has proclaimed her commitment to more robust border controls and resistance to dual nationality (Berdiyev and Can, 2022, p. 6). Ultimately, Macron and his party won the French presidential election, defeating France's conventional left and right-wing parties.

However, Macron did not follow through on his promise to embrace liberal policies. The murder of Samuel Party by an 18-year-old pupil in October 2020, followed by the violent murder of a French citizen in a Nice church, resulted in a considerable shift to the right in attitude against

Muslim immigrants in France. These two heinous acts of religious extremism have shattered France's social stability. Macron has shown his willingness to fight against religious extremism by advocating for anti-religious separatist legislation to enhance state secularism and protect republican values ((Minister of the Interior, 2020). After weeks of heated discussion, French Muslim leaders backed a "Charter of Republican Values," also known as "Charte des principes pour l'islam de France" on 18 January 2021. Subsequently, the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) that will train imams preaching in the country was created. And French anti-separatism strategy has therefore reached a watershed moment.

2. Return to secularism: reasons and background

France returns to secularism due to the intensification of social tensions in France today. The prevalence of Islamic terror and the spread of Islamophobia in society have led France to seek to reinforce republican values to glue French society. France has made it clear that it aims to reinforce French society's cohesiveness by sticking to French secularism and republican values and combating religious fanaticism.

2.1. The Rise of refugees and terrorist attacks

The Arab Spring resulted in political upheaval, economic collapse, and population relocation in the Middle East. As a result of its proximity to the Middle East, Europe has emerged as one of the destinations for Middle Eastern and African refugees seeking asylum. According to Eurostat, asylum applicants in EU member states peaked in 2015, with 1,326,000 people seeking asylum. Since 2014, the number of first-time asylum applicants in France has increased every year, reaching a high of 138,000 overall applications in 2019. Due to the pandemic, the number of first-time asylum applicants in the EU declined in 2021. France placed third with 81,800 first-time asylum applicants, representing 20% of the overall number of first-time asylum applicants (Eurostat, 2021).

During the early phase of the European migration crisis, France saw a high rate of terrorist incidents. The influx of migrants seeking asylum in France in 2015 was incompatible with the ideas and lifestyle of French culture, resulting in a series of collisions and a more radical refugee feeling at the time. In 2015, there were 36 terrorist acts in France, with the Paris attacks in November being the deadliest and most injured. The number of terrorist incidents in France dropped after adapting from

2017 to 2020. However, terrorist assaults in France continued in 2020, including the beheading of a teacher, which was a horrible atrocity.

Because Islam is the most common religion among asylum applicants, the enormous number of migrants threaten France's national security. Islamic extremism and Muslim assimilation have emerged as a pressing concern for French society. To combat the spread of extreme terrorist attacks and Islamophobia in France, France hopes to promote France's secular principles in order to resist the growth of Islamic radicalism, thereby promoting the social integration of French Muslim refugees, in addition to taking necessary measures with the European Union to deal with the refugee crisis.

2.2. The facilitation of distribution channels enables the spread of religious extremist ideology

Religious extremists have endangered the security of society with their ruthless techniques in recent terrorist incidents. According to Macron's speech, the problem of religious extremism in France is due to "Islamic separatism," which has caused French society to stray from republican norms and undermine the lawful order. (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2020) So would reinforce secularism based on the "The Law of 1905" and develop a bill to combat "Islamic separatism" in the country because the Islamic extremist organizations have strayed dramatically from French republican values and are incompatible with France's national identity.

Additionally, the emergence of media such as the Internet has facilitated the spread of extremist religious ideas. Social media, such as Youtube and Twitter, are used by terrorist groups to spread extremist ideas and recruit members. There are already several terrorist groups making use of new media and messaging tools, hoping to appeal to believers and recruit new members by spreading extremist ideas (Scrivens and Conway, 2020, p. 305).

France is concerned about Islamic extremists' ability to polarise the thinking and conduct of French Muslims, particularly the younger generation. In addition, France is a modern country founded on the separation of religion and state. Fundamentalists who promote "orthodoxy" and a return to Islamic religious traditions will undoubtedly significantly influence the secular principle. Radical Islamist groups promote separatism and extremist ideas, and their influence enters French society through refugees and immigrants, jeopardizing France's national security and social stability. If religious extremism is not combated, violent clashes between religion and secular politics will undoubtedly arise, causing instability and a severe threat to national security.

As a result, the French National Assembly enacted a bill on 16 February 2021 to "strengthen respect for the Republican values." The Republican Values, or French Republican Tradition, are

encapsulated in the French motto of liberty, equality, and fraternity. As a legacy of the French Revolution, Republicans establish collective sovereignty and representative powers. (Cohen-Almagor, 2022, p.9) In the aftermath of the Revolution, republicanism gained popularity as its advocates argued for strong egalitarian, anti-clerical (laïque), and opposed monarchy. These values have become part of the republican values of France today (Hollifield, 2010, p.3).

2.3. Domestic disputes have erupted as a result of the development of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes

France is a historically Catholic country, with 37.94 million Catholics making up about 58 percent of the population. However, following several large waves of Muslim immigration from the Middle East, Islam has become France's second most common religion. According to the Pew Research Center, there were 5.7 million Muslims in France in mid-2016, accounting for 8.8% of the population, making it the country with the highest Muslim population in Europe. In the future, the number of Muslims in Europe might more than double to 11.2 percent or more by 2050 as a result of increased Muslim immigration seeking asylum and education (Pew Research Center, 2017). Muslims' social integration has become a more important political and social issue in France as the country's Muslim population has grown.

At the same time, because of a rise in terrorist assaults in France, Islamophobia in French society has grown since the Charlie Hebdo shooting. Despite academic cautions against indiscriminate Islamophobia, stigmatization of Muslim immigrants has increased in France since 2015 (Mondon and Winter, 2017).

In France, on the other hand, there has been a continuous increase in violence against Muslims. According to the French Ministry of the Interior, anti-Muslim incidents increased by over 54% in 2019 compared to 100 in 2018. Most of these actions involved incursions on the religious property (Minister of the Interior, 2020). Anti-Muslim assaults are on the rise, despite being statistically less common than anti-Jewish (687) and anti-Christian (1,052) attacks. According to the French Council of the Muslim Faith's (CFCM) annual report for 2020, there will be a 53 percent rise in attacks and anti-Muslim activities in 2020 compared to 2019, i.e., 235 events, with three-quarters of these being "threats" (CFCM, 2021). The rise of it indicates that the growing number of Muslims, Islamists' religious behavior in public (shared space), and the visible nature of Islam contradict the secular values in France that regard religion as a "private activity," which has led to a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment. This has sparked widespread fear that Islamic culture may erode French values in France

and abroad. The "mutually reinforcing" rise in Islamic terrorist attacks and anti-Muslim violence in France is a sign of the country's rising societal tensions brought on by religious extremism.

3. The political and cultural significance of laïcité

France is the only country in Europe that declares secularism as the foundation of its national identity, and secular values have long been ingrained in French culture. Secularism in the French Republic means that all French citizens have the freedom to practice the religion of their choice and the space not to practice any religion, as long as it is based on maintaining social order and compliance with the Law. For France, secularism is a manner of expressing the principle of the state's neutrality concerning religious belief. Still, it does not imply the total eradication of religion from society and the public arena.

3.1. Historical origin of Lacité

French society has traditionally stressed that only through respecting universal human equality and rationality can people of various races, ethnicities, languages, and faiths live together in harmony in the same community, as influenced by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789. Rousseau, an Enlightenment thinker, advocated that the monarch acknowledge only the state as a whole without distinguishing between any of the state's components. This indicates that under a secularist state and society, national identity is established by each individual's citizenship, and no differentiation between ethnicities, faiths, or other peculiarities exists or should exist. Secularism arose from the French Enlightenment's anti-clericalism, which liberated the person from enslavement and led to the foundation and prosperity of the modern French state (Daly, 2012, p.584). The secular, non-religious nature of the French national identity was revealed because the French Republic was formed on an anti-clericalism foundation.

The legislative embodiment of this was the Law of 1905 on the Separation of the Church and State (la loi sur la séparation de l'Église et de l'État). Secularism is a constitutional idea that separates political authority from religion from the standpoint of the legal system. The Republic's laws retain a "hands-off" approach to religion, ensuring that religious activities and manifestations are protected as long as they respect public order and authority. To put it another way, the secularism administration values religious freedom. The secular Republic ensures religious plurality by guaranteeing freedom of opinion and religion.

According to the official interpretation of the French government (French Government, 2015), secularism consists of the following four aspects: first, it guarantees freedom of conscience, the freedom to express one's convictions or beliefs based on respect for public order; second, it guarantees believers and non-believers the same right to freedom of expression of their beliefs or convictions, and it ensures that citizens have the freedom to believe or not to believe in a religion and the right to change and renounce their religious beliefs; third, implies the separation of the state and religious organizations; and fourth, it is not an opinion among others but the freedom to have one. It is not a belief but the principle that authorizes them all, subject to the respect of public order. In conclusion, the present French government's definition of secularism is to respect people's right to religious freedom while guaranteeing the state's neutrality toward religion; and the basis of citizens' freedom of religious belief is to protect public order.

3.2. The specific content of the principle of the French Republic

The national motto of the French Republic is liberty, equality, and fraternity (Liberté, égalité, fraternité) according to the French Republic's Constitution. The present Constitution of the Fifth Republic defines the content of the Republic's principles, stating that "France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social republic." These four principles constitute the French Constitution's first solemn proclamation and sum up the four foundations of the Republic's principles. The "secular Republic" is based on religious freedom and equality principles before the Law. Only the separation of church and state allows this to be achieved. As a result, no religion is given special treatment in the Republic, and everyone can express their beliefs and views. Secularism is the cornerstone of a harmonious society and the coagulant of the French Republic, as well as one of the essential foundations for the Republic's preservation and the shared value framework of the French national identity.

The major immigration model in France is the "Republican model of integration." This model is based on republican, secular, and equal citizenship values. As a result, being a French citizen necessitates identification with French republican principles. Furthermore, this model is founded on Rousseau's national idea of citizenship, which rejects the use of specific factors (such as ethnicity, race, or religion) to designate and classify people as distinct groups. So it means that everyone is treated equally. (Oberti, 2008, p.57) So secularism has long permeated all French culture and political elements, and it has served as an important basis for both the French national value system and the French Republic.

3.3. The ambiguous space of secularism's neutrality principle

However, in terms of particular definition, connotation, and scale of implementation, the concept of secularism's neutrality has been more contentious in actual policy implementation. Public opinion and left-wing forces have criticized Macron's government for adopting a series of policies in recent years to combat religious extremism and strengthen public power (state power) to restrict and interfere with religious behavior, particularly the Muslim headscarf, which has completely deviated from the principle of secularism's original connotation of state neutrality only. However, Secularization is evolving from a process to a movement, and it is now a dominant reality that has demolished secular illusions (Baubérot, 2003, p.458). Secularism was formed and defined in reaction to political requirements rather than having a solid and well-developed theoretical base(Daly, 2012). As a result, secularism is a notion with a lot of leeways. That leeway allows it to be exploited to support the policies of those in power (especially those related to religious beliefs).

According to Jean Baubérot, a leading French specialist on secularism, the year 2003 marked a turning point in the idea of secularism in France. Since then, the principles of secularism in force have been known as "neo-secularism." Jean-Pierre Raffarin, the French Prime Minister at the time, commissioned a report titled "Pour une nouvelle lacité" (For a New Secularism). The report, according to Jean-Bobrot, deviates from the principle of liberal secularism developed from the Law of 1905. Unlike the 1905 secular law, "neo-secularism" was designed to be anti-Islam rather than anti-clerical. In truth, it is a reflection of the globalization-induced fear of Islam. The concept of "neo-secularism" broadens the meaning of the principle of religious neutrality, which was established in the Law of 1905 limit religious activity in public spaces. This has created a dispute about whether modern secularism wants to preserve the principle of official neutrality toward religion as well as the fundamental right to religious liberty. However, public opinion and left-wing groups have criticized the French secularism-based scarf ban, which has been in place since 2004, for violating this definition, resulting in not only a further blurring of the principle of secularism's neutrality. But also, opponents claim, an overemphasis on secularism is a violation of individual religious freedom, a desecration of the French liberal tradition, and a contribution to Islamophobia in France. On the other hand, the present secularism policy of the French government meets its goals of imposing national integration and solidifying republican values and identity. The ambiguity of its neutrality principle allows for some flexibility in the execution of its religious policy. The historical heritage of secularism has rendered a sizable portion of the French public sensitive to religious speech and practice. As a result, French culture has reacted strongly to the blatant religious conduct and

expression of French Muslims in "public space." For the French government and supporters, secularism does not imply that the government is anti-religious; it is built on the idea of preserving a certain level of religious freedom. Secularism does not mean that the French government is anti-religious; instead, it is built on maintaining a certain level of religious liberty, separating the state from religion, and ensuring its neutrality toward religion (Minister of the Interior, 2020).

In conclusion, secularism has penetrated all aspects of France, which is why secularism's historical and practical significance has been emphasized several times in the 2020 policy reform. Additionally, French Muslims have become more active in the public space, resulting in a problem with identity for some French citizens. It has become the discourse about the potential Islamization and Islamization of the French state through this segment of the population. As the debate on the "identity crisis" goes on, the topic of Lacité is resurfacing. (Firmonasari, 2020, p.146) Former French president Hollande mobilized French citizens through the Republic. Hollande implemented a perpetuation strategy by basing the shared purpose of the national self on the traditional Republican model, with its stress on the state, a Republican education system, and secularism. He emphasized the fighting and unyielding spirit of the French Republic's national identity in the significant historical context of the French Revolution. As Hollande used the core elements of French republicanism as weapons against the terrorists, this discursive approach further empowered the Republic. (Bogain, 2018, pp.13-15) The integration policy in Macron's presidency is similar to Hollande's. France claims secularism is a cornerstone of the Republican values and that the bill is justified by the Law of 1905. And it strongly emphasizes secularism and republican values in its strategy to counter religious extremism. It demonstrates France's direction in increasing the legitimacy of immigrant integration through secularism.

4. Initiatives to promote social stability and development in France

Returning to secularism is meant to mend the schisms developed in French society, strengthening the French Republic's foundation. However, in terms of religion, the French integration policy appears to be more iron-fisted and hard-line, with a propensity to prioritize individual interests over collective assimilation goals. According to the French parties' governing ideology, living together in a community necessitates agreement on essential principles. Even though France's ruling parties have shifted over time, the notion of the general interest of the public space over the individual's interest and variety, which is the policy manifestation of French secularism, has remained constant (Webster, 2007, p. 5)

The French government explicitly establishes appropriate constraints on religious activity within schools - the institutions that educate future citizens - in locations of public education. In addition, encouraging the integration of French Muslim society requires addressing the problem of how to deal with the assimilation of French Muslims. Since Macron's presidency, France's immigration policy has been reformed to make it a requirement for newly naturalized French citizens to identify with the country's republican values to integrate into French society fully. Schools are at the core of returning to secularism policy. They are where future French citizens are taught to be educated to develop educated French citizens who have a strong sense of patriotism and can choose their destiny. Secularism was an indelible characteristic of French republican identity throughout the Third Republic, and it played a memorable part in the development of the French nation-state. The French government standardized the curriculum of public schools during the Third Republic's secular Revolution to create "secular" citizens (Kılınç, 2020). The republicans of the period were serious about education. At the time, Republicans were dedicated to producing "republic lovers" to reinforce the Republic's basis by pushing a "free, compulsory, and secular" national education. The contemporary French civic and moral education, which emphasizes the classroom as a vehicle for republican principles, received this characteristic from the Third Republic. On this battlefield, the public school is also employed as a battleground against the forces that threaten France, with the teacher serving as the "embodiment of the Republic." (Wesselhoeft, 2017, p.626)

France believes that pupils acquire republican ideals at school rather than religious values, so he supports secular education. Furthermore, being a public place shared by pupils from many backgrounds, the insistence on secular schools is also a defense of the majority's general interest. Secular education in France began in the second half of the nineteenth century when the government formally took back control of educational policy from the church. In 1905, the formal separation of church and state reinforced educational secularism, and unified secular education was the primary way to prepare a new generation of citizens (Freedman, 2004, p. 10). The Fifth Republic's current Constitution declares that "For children and adults, the state ensures equitable access to education, culture, and vocational training. The state is responsible for organizing free and secular public education at all levels." However, the initial goal of secular education in schools was to ensure students' freedom of thought. It is stressed that schools should create a neutral and peaceful environment for civic education.

As can be observed, the strategy of secularising education is similar to the past policy, but it broadens its scope. The French Parliament agreed in early April 2021 to change the anti-secession statute to make it illegal for Muslim females under the age of 18 to wear the headscarf in public.

Furthermore, the amendment expressly forbids parents from wearing religious attire on school excursions and functions with their children (WSWS, 2021). The French government insists that the concept of secularism in schools prohibits religious items from being worn in classrooms. The Muslim headscarf has been a source of contention in France since 1989. Still, it was not until 2004 that the scarf was officially banned, requiring Muslim girls in France to refrain from wearing it in public, such as in schools. In 2010, the Sarkozy government banned the veil and all other face-covering clothing in public, citing anti-terrorism measures.

However, the French scarf ban policy is divisive because France has become a multi-ethnic society, and immigration has made the country increasingly religiously diverse. In reality, the increase of the 2010 scarf ban's limits goes against secularism's heritage since the ban allows no place for public expression of differences or tolerance for the subjective beliefs of women who wear the headscarf (Hunter-Henin, 2012, p.628). According to left-wing organizations, implementing the French scarf ban has resulted in the infringement and interference of liberties rights. Furthermore, post-2015 secularist narrative education has been securitized, and secular education does not disguise the reality that its primary focus is Islamic radicalization (Peker, 2020).

Conclusions

In France, where most of the population believes in secularism, most of them consider secularism to be a liberal concept that emphasizes religious freedom, equality between religions, and the separation of religion from politics. (Baubérot, 2010, p.62) However, due to the ambiguity of the principle of secularist neutrality and the overly rigid attitude toward immigrants, left-wing forces and some international opinion have criticized French policy as hostile to Islam and in violation of the French principle of religious freedom. France adopted a strong position throughout the Charter of Republican Values development, leaving no space for dialogue with local French Muslims.

The contradiction between French multiculturalism or Islam and secularism has a long history. France banned the use of conspicuous religious symbols in public schools as early as 2004 by banning the hijab. Although the ban was considered an effort to defend the secularism of French public schools, it also caused some female students to drop out of school due to the rigorous constraints put on them (Abdelgadir, 2020).

It is clear that Muslims are portrayed in French policy discourse as a threat to secularist values and the security of French society. This exacerbates the problem of stigmatization of Muslims and hurts immigrant integration policies. As a symbol of the French "common purpose," secularism can

be regarded as a unifying element. The concept is used as a symbol of humanity and civilization as well as a means of countering the imagined emergence of Islam. Consequently, secularism unifies populist identity structures and anti-Muslim discourse into a single political identity. (Nilsson, 2015, p. 13-14) On the other hand, the shadow cast by French secularism over French Muslims provides insight into the limitations of the concept of civility. Secular republicans criticized Islamic civil obedience to clear norms and "right" behavior, inadvertently putting the dominant idea of individual autonomy into question. In the past, Laïcité has been associated with a form of government, alongside practices, discourses, and institutions meant to create specific types of social and ethical values. (Fernando, 2010, p. 30)

France should refrain from taking an overly assertive stance on religious matters to maintain a balance between religious freedom and secularism. First, the multi-ethnic trend in France has become irreversible, and over-intensifying the disagreement between religion and secularism would instead contribute to further separating Muslims from French society. Secondly, France has repeatedly asserted its support for religious freedom in the current bill; however, in practice, the policies, such as the ban on scarves in schools, have already deviated from this principle. Lastly, the survey indicates that the most significant determinant of Muslims' integration into French society is not what most people consider to be a religious factor. It has been identified that disparities in ethnic identity are a critical component of immigrants' integration (for example, French citizenship, French birth, and fluency in French). (Maxwell, 2014). The French government must continue to take steps in this direction.

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Geopolitical risks, GDP and tourism: an ARDL-ECM cointegration study on Ukraine

Olena STRYZHAK*, Ramazan SAYAR**, Yılmaz Onur ARI***

Abstract

Tourism is a sector of the economy that is significantly affected by fluctuations in economic and political activity and the influence of external factors. Political tensions with Russia and the Crimean issue have affected tourism revenues as well as Ukraine's economic growth. Therefore, the situation in the Ukrainian tourism sector requires the development of science-based approaches and practical advice to improve tourism in Ukraine, taking into account the impact of environmental risks. In the study, the long-term effect of Ukraine's GDP and GPR Index on Ukrainian tourism was investigated for the period 1995-2019. The ARDL Boundary Test is used in the analysis to explore the long-term impact of Ukraine's GDP and GPR on Ukrainian tourism. ADF by Dickey and Fuller, and Phillips Perron unit root tests are used to assess the degree of integration of the series. Empirical findings suggest that geopolitical risk has a negative impact on tourism revenues. Results of research support the initial hypothesis that there is a nexus among indicators of economic growth, tourism, and the GPR index. This gives grounds for the assertion that reducing the level of risk to a minimum will increase the attractiveness of Ukraine as a tourist destination, thereby creating new opportunities for economic growth and social development.

Keywords: geopolitical risk, GPR Index, economic growth, tourism, ARDL cointegration, Ukrainian tourism

Introduction

Tourism as a type of economic activity has developed quite rapidly in recent years. The number of international tourist arrivals worldwide reached 1.4 billion in 2018 (Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report, 2019) and still continues to increase. This proves the significant role of tourism in the global economy.

Tourism as an industry contributes to the GDP. This contribution is significant in many countries. A number of countries and regions are identifying tourism as a strategic priority for their

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* Olena STRYZHAK is an associate professor at Simon Kuznets National University of Economics, Tourism Department, Kharkiv, Ukraine, e-mail: sssselllennnn@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0002-9367-9061
** Ramazan SAYAR is an assistant professor at Bayburt University, International Business and Trade Department, Bayburt, Turkey, e-mail: ramazansayar@bayburt.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0002-7860-7561
*** lmaz Onur ARİ is an assistant professor at Bayburt University, International Business and Trade Department, Bayburt, Turkey, e-mail: onurari@bayburt.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0001-7634-2531

development. This is not only true for developing countries, but also for developed countries. To a certain extent, tourism can stimulate the economic growth both directly, by generating revenues for the budget and stimulating employment in the tourism sector, and indirectly, by initiating the development of tourism-related industries, which confirms the multiplier effect of tourism.

However, tourism is a sector that is highly vulnerable to various risks. Tourism reacts very quickly and painfully to global risks; therefore, it is necessary to timely determine the degree of tourism's dependence on external risks in order to develop preventive measures.

For transition economies, tourism can be a major source of economic growth as it generates foreign exchange earnings and has a short payback period for investments. Ukraine has the potential to develop the tourism industry, such as a favourable territorial location, natural and recreational resources.

But, despite the abundant natural resources, Ukraine occupies only 78 out of 140 places in the competitiveness rating in tourism and travel, with a share of tourism in GDP of 1.4% (Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report, 2019).

In addition, Ukraine's tourism industry has suffered significant losses as a result of the annexation of Crimea. Also, factors such as the military conflict in the East of the country caused by the intervention of the Russian Federation, the uncertain status of the occupied territories, significant migration, and a large number of internally displaced persons have had a negative impact on tourism in Ukraine.

Development of tourism in middle-income countries (like Ukraine) will not only increase budget revenues but also improve the country's image and, accordingly, its attractiveness to investors. Thus, it is very important to determine how tourism and economic growth are linked, as well as how strongly the level of geopolitical risk affects them.

We reasonably believe that the development of recommendations for assessing the level of risk for tourism and analysing its impact on the economy is an actual task. We also think that the relationship between indicators of geopolitical risk, economic growth, and tourism is significant. In this context, the aim of the study is to investigate the relationship between economic growth, geopolitical risk, and tourism, using Ukraine as a case study. In this context, it seems appropriate to assess the long-term impact of Ukraine's GDP and GPR index on Ukrainian tourism.

This paper is organized as follows; section two reviews the literature. Section three presents estimation technique used in the analysis. Section four mentions about results and discussion while section five is conclusions and policy recommendations.

1. Literature review

The importance of tourism to the global economy cannot be overlooked. Therefore, in recent years, many researchers have paid close attention to tourism and assessed its contribution to economic growth. A sufficient number of studies support the fact that tourism contributes to economic growth, as in the case of Turkey (Gunduz and Hatemi, 2005), Colombia (Brida *et al*., 2017), Spain (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá, 2002), Latin America, and the Caribbean (Brida *et al*., 2021).

Tourism is important for the economy because it can stimulate economic growth. There is plenty of research to back this up. Some of them are global in scope and cover all countries and territories. Ntibanyurwa (2006) found that tourism contributes significantly to economic growth. Nissan *et al*. (2010) confirmed this result and noted that tourism creates income and boosts economic growth.

In recent years, researchers have focused on identifying the interdependence between tourism and economic growth. Some studies confirm the positive contribution of tourism to growth. For example, Ekanayake and Long (2012) identified the causal relationship for 140 developing countries in 1995-2009. Cárdenas-García *et al*. (2013) found a link between economic development and the expansion of tourism activities for 144 countries in recent decades. This relationship was found to be more pronounced in developed countries. The results of Çağlayan *et al*. (2012) for 135 countries from 1995 to 2008 are mixed. A one-way causal relationship between GDP and tourism was found for the countries as a whole, as well as for the Americas and the Caribbean. The opposite is true for some countries in Asia and Oceania. In contrast, no such relationship was found in other regions. The results of Çağlayan *et al*.'s (2012) study for 135 countries from 1995 to 2008 are mixed. A one-way causal relationship was found across the countries as a whole, as well as in the Americas and the Caribbean, between GDP and tourism. The opposite is true for some countries in Asia and Oceania. At the same time, no such link has been found in other regions.

Scholars highlight cross-country differences and compare features of the mutual influence of tourism and growth in different countries across the region using the Granger causality test. Lean *et al*.'s study (2014) for the period 1980–2009 showed that Malaysia supports the long-term economic growth hypothesis for tourism, while Singapore supports the tourism-driven economic growth hypothesis. Similar scientific research for Morocco and Tunisia from 1980 to 2010 revealed a one-way causal relationship between tourism income and GDP growth in the short term (Bouzahzah and Menyari, 2013). Holik (2016) also analyzed the impact of foreign tourists on growth in ASEAN using a quantitative method on data from 1995 to 2012. Du *et al*. (2016) developed a tourism-growth model

and evaluated the model based on data from 109 countries. The model results showed that, in addition to investment in tourism, other factors affect economic growth. Tabash (2017) concluded that there is a long-run relationship between GDP and international tourism receipts in Palestine for the period 1995–2014. Moreover, the Granger test confirms a causal relationship from international tourism income to economic growth.

Govdeli and Direkci (2017) confirmed the positive impact of tourism income on economic growth for 34 OECD countries during 1997–2012. Based on the spillover index, Antonakakis *et al*. (2015) found that the dynamic link between tourism and growth is unstable in both degree and direction overtime for 10 European countries in the 1995–2012 range. Moreover, this relationship is strongly influenced by several different negative events.

Hysa and Gjergji (2018) assessed the contribution of tourism to the Western Balkans economy from 2000 to 2014. The results of the study, using the Panel Johansen Co-integration approach, suggest that there is no long-run relationship. The research by Wang and Liu (2020) indicates that tourism competitiveness and growth are not balanced due to the lag of growth in 56 developing countries in 2008–2017. As a consequence, the spatial distribution of growth and tourism competition varies across countries. Based on panel data analysis via E-Views 8 statistical software, Öztürk *et al*. (2019) concluded that there is a statistically significant relationship between tourism and GDP in ASEAN Member Countries. Chirilă *et al*. (2020) determined, based on data for the years 2000–2019, that the link between economic growth and international tourism in Central and Eastern Europe is not constant in time and direction. Moreover, this relationship is affected by economic, financial, and debt crises.

Various factors influence the link between growth and tourism. Some researchers have focused on examining the features of this impact in the context of different countries. For example, Granger's causality test has shown that the relationship between tourism income and real growth is unidirectional and goes from growth to tourism income for the national economy in Malaysia from 1994 to 2004 (Kadir *et al*., 2010). Archer's (1984) econometric analysis showed that a share of 40% of per capita income growth in Barbados was derived from tourism revenues. Ozturk and Acaravci (2009) found no equilibrium long-run relationship between real GDP and tourism in Turkey from 1987 to 2007.

Findings of a study using the Granger causality test for 1980–2009 by Lashkarizadeh *et al*. (2012) revealed that the causal relationship between development and tourism in Iran is mutual in the long run. The outcomes of Bayer and Hank and the ARDL approaches by Shakouri *et al*. (2017) for 1980-2014 proved that growth and tourism in Iran are interrelated, both in the short and long term.

Phiri (2016) examined the causality between growth and tourism in South Africa from 1995 to 2014 using linear and non-linear cointegration approaches. Both approaches showed a significant relationship. Based on Bayer and Hunk's and ARDL's cointegration approaches, Ohlan (2017) found that indicators of economic growth, financial development, and tourism are interrelated. The data analysis for 1960–2014 in India showed that tourism income has a positive influence on growth. Using a vector autoregression model and Granger test on 2004–2016 data, Fadilah *et al*. (2018) revealed for a sample of Indonesia that tourist arrivals cause growth and not vice versa. Suhel and Bashir (2018) concluded that growth in South Sumatra depends upon the number of tourists, value-added, and expenditures in the tourism industry. Using the Granger test and the simultaneous equation model, they set up that there is a one-way link between tourist arrivals and growth and a two-way link between growth and tourism expenditure.

Manzoor *et al*. (2019) analyzed the impact of tourism on employment and economic growth between 1990 and 2015 in Pakistan. Using the regression method and the Johansen cointegration approach, the researchers concluded that the increased flow of tourists brings positive economic results in terms of employment opportunities and GDP growth. Based on data analysis for the period 1980–2016, Maden *et al*. (2019) revealed a statistically significant and positive relationship between GDP and tourism income in Turkey, irrespective of the duration of the analysis period.

Mazaraki *et al*. (2018) confirmed the hypothesis of the NTS's influence on growth in Ukraine by allowing its worldwide importance and dynamic development based on data from 2000 to 2017.

Amaluddin (2019) considered the dependence of growth on tourism for the period from 2010 to 2017 in Eastern Indonesia. The study's findings revealed that the direction and essence of the cause vary over time. This dependence is bidirectional in the long term and unidirectional from growth to tourism in the short term. Using a vector autoregression model and Granger's test, Jamel (2020) illustrated a bi-directional positive correlation between growth and tourism in Saudi Arabia over the period 1990–2018. In their study, Prakash *et al*. (2020) concluded that earnings from foreign tourists affect GDP significantly in India, while tourist arrivals affect GDP insignificantly. Khan *et al*. (2020) studied the role of tourism in development, using Pakistan as an example, and the impact of tourism on the development of developing countries.

We believe that the ambiguity in the results of country studies in the context of determining the direction of the nexus between economic growth and tourism can be explained by various factors, including the share of tourism revenues in the structure of GDP, the strategic orientation of the economy, the national accounting system, and others. As seen from the above, despite the

discrepancies in the results obtained, most researchers concluded that the relationship between tourism and economic growth exists, and that it is positive.

The activities of the tourism sector are particularly susceptible to changes in politics and economic growth, as well as to various types of risks. Military unrest, strikes, and high crime rates have a negative impact on tourist flows. A high level of security in the country has a positive influence on the dynamics of tourist flows. Consequently, it is important to assess the impact of safety and risk on tourism.

It is well known that a tourist product is not a product for basic needs, so tourism demand is secondary. In this regard, the decision to travel is determined by many factors, one of which is safety. A high level of risk in a country negatively affects economic activity and is not conducive to tourism development. Therefore, it is important to assess the impact of risk on economic activity in general and on the tourism industry in particular.

It should be noted that global changes, both in the economy and in politics, are important for the tourism sector. Webster and Ivanov (2015) examined the most important global political and economic trends and their probable impacts on tourism and hospitality. In addition, contemporary studies include global security and its impact on tourism. For example, Bianchi (2006) analysed how the parameters of mobility and the international tourism environment are changing under the influence of security geopolitics and neoliberal international market expansion. Madankan and Ezzati (2015) investigated the effects of global political influences on tourism in 15 Middle Eastern countries. Scholars found that indicators of tourism attractiveness and geopolitical factors are directly related.

Recently, academics have used the Geopolitical Risk (GPR) Index to assess global risks. Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) developed this GPR indicator based on a count of newspaper articles highlighting tensions in the geopolitical sphere since 1985. This index reflects the risk of events that disrupt normal, peaceful, and democratic relations between populations and states. High geopolitical risk is often the cause of reduced business activity and leads to a shift in capital flows from less developed economies to more developed economies.

Researchers explore the impact of PGR on the tourism sector. Neacșu *et al.* (2018) consider tourism as an expression of freedom and examine the impact of geopolitical risks on contemporary tourism activities. More specifically, Demiralay and Kilincarslan (2019) estimated the sensitivity of tourism and leisure stock indices to the impact of GPR using conventional and quantile regression methods. Soybilgen *et al.* (2019) determined for 18 developing countries in 1986–2016 that geopolitical risks negatively and significantly affect growth rates. Demir *et al.* (2019) uncovered that

the GPR Index had a negative impact on inbound tourism in 18 countries from 1995 to 2016. Based on correlation analysis, Tkachuk (2019) identified that geopolitical risks negatively affect international tourism development. Lee C-C. *et al*. (2020) also confirm the negative influence of GPR on tourism demand for 16 countries in 2005–2017, and the pandemic only exacerbates this. In general, most researchers note that the impact of geopolitical risks on tourism is negative.

Studies that focus on identifying the dependence of tourism activities on geopolitical risks in the context of individual countries and territories are noteworthy. Neacşu *et al*. (2018) identified the areas in which the influence of GPR on tourism is manifested, namely: tourist heritage, geographic reconfiguration of tourist flows, and the emergence of dark tourism, which uses war artifacts. Balli *et al*. (2019) investigated how geopolitical risk affects tourism in developing countries. In general, GPR responds differently to tourism in different countries. GPR has little impact on tourist arrivals in attractive destinations. The impact of GPR on tourism flows is minimal for some Asian countries and significant for Mexico, South Korea, and South Africa. Demir *et al*. (2020) assessed the influence of geopolitical risks on tourist arrivals in Turkey over the period 1990–2018. The researchers found that an increase in the GPR Index reduces tourist arrivals in Turkey, while a decrease in the GPR Index has no effect at all in the short term. Thus, the empirical study confirms the dependence of tourism on geopolitical risk.

Akadiri *et al*. (2020) investigated the direction of causality between the GPR Index, economic growth, and tourism using the Granger causality approach in Turkey for the period from 1985 to 2017. The study shows that geopolitical risks have a negative impact on economic growth and tourism in Turkey. Tiwari *et al*. (2019), using India as an example, found that the number of tourist arrivals in developing countries depends on economic policies and the level of geopolitical risk.

The main areas of research on the relationship between tourism, economic growth, and risks for developed and developing countries can be identified through a bibliographic study of works from the Scopus database. Using the VOSviewer program, the authors of the paper identified the relationships between the research keywords for this topic. The results of the bibliographic analysis are presented in Annex 1 (Fig. A1-A5).

Based on the analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn: The research directions of the link between economic growth and tourism in key areas do not differ significantly depending on whether developed countries or developing countries are being studied. Current research directions on the link between economic growth, tourism, and risks have mainly focused on sustainable development, climate change, human factors, and ecosystems. It should be noted that at this stage, there are not so many studies aimed at analyzing the causality between tourism, growth, and GPR.

This is due to the fact that the methodology for calculating the GPR Index was proposed recently, in 2018.

Studies of tourism in Ukraine, according to the bibliographic analysis of publications in Scopus, mainly focus on tourism management and the organization of various types of tourism. At the same time, most studies of economic growth in Ukraine do not link it to the development of the tourism sector.

It's important to stress that we have not yet found the results of studies aimed at determining the relationship and interdependence of economic growth, tourism, and the GPR Index in Ukraine. The scarcity of research on the link between growth, tourism, and GPR Index reinforces the importance and timeliness of this study. As a result, the situation in the Ukrainian tourism sector necessitates the implementation of scientifically validated methods and realistic recommendations for tourism development in Ukraine, taking into account geopolitical risks.

2. Model and data set

Tourism is one of the significant foreign exchange-inflowing sources for a country, followed by export activities. However, geopolitical risks are an important factor in determining the holiday reservation preferences of tourists. In this study, the impact of the GPR, which is the geopolitical risk indicator of Ukraine, and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country on tourism revenues has been examined. The model is created as follows:

$$lnTOUR_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 lnGPR_t + \beta_2 lnGDP_t + \varepsilon_t$$

(1)

In Model (1), the impact of the GPR variable on tourism is expected to be negative. Therefore, the negative sign is used in the model. The study used annual time series data from 1995 to 2019. The reason for starting data from 1995 is that the tourism data of Ukraine has been published since this date. The logarithms of the series are taken to facilitate the analysis between variables and to give the elasticities of the independent variables to the coefficients to be estimated. β_0 is the constant term, β_1 and β_2 are the coefficients of elasticity to be obtained from the model as a result of estimation. Summary information about the variables is presented in Table 1 below:

Table 1. Description of the Logarithmic Variables

Variable	Symbols	Description	Data Source	Expected Sign
Tourism receipt (in US Dollar)	lnTOUR	International tourism revenues represent the expenditures of international visitors calculated by the current exchange rate of US dollar.	World Bank Database	
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (in US Dollar)	lnGDP	It represents GDP according to market prices. **Data are in constant 2010 US dollars.** The GDP in US dollar is derived from the GDP in local currency translated.	World Bank Database	+
Geopolitical Risk Index[25]	lnGPR	Caldara and Iacoviello (2018), which offers a more comprehensive geopolitical risk measurement by taking into account risk factors such as war, terrorist activities and tension.	Federal Reserve Board	-

Source: Authors' Compilation

Descriptive statistics of the logarithmic variables are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

	lnTOUR	lnGPR	lnGDP
Mean	21.29849	4.667123	25.49804
Median	21.48313	4.525481	25.56720
Maximum	22.62865	5.554666	25.75807
Minimum	19.06778	3.844289	25.15908
Std. Dev.	1.033377	0.450060	0.197936
Skewness	-0.436393	0.451776	-0.571629
Kurtosis	2.028767	2.459363	1.871385
Jarque-Bera	1.705050	1.154889	2.688345
Probability	0.426337	0.561331	0.260755
Sum	511.1639	116.6781	637.4510
Sum Sq. Dev.	24.56094	4.861302	0.940284
Observations	24	25	25

Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0

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[25] The GPR index was created by calculating the number of articles about geopolitical events and dangers that appeared in leading 11 English-language newspapers. The articles in question are divided into six groups based on the words they contain. The index is calculated by dividing the total number of articles by the number of articles containing these word groups, then normalizing to a value of 100. As a result, values greater than 100 indicate that the risk has increased (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2018).

The logarithms of the series are taken to facilitate the analysis between variables and to give the elasticities of the independent variables to the coefficients to be estimated. Although the skewness coefficients for both variables in Table 2 are the same, the fact that they are negative for LTOUR and LGDP and positive for LGPR means that these variables have a left and right skew distribution, respectively. A kurtosis value of less than 3 for all variables indicates that the distribution is skewed. After applying the Jarque-Bera test to the variables, it can be seen that the probability values of the test statistic are greater than 0.05. Therefore, it can be said that all three variables show normal distribution.

3. Methodology and findings

The ARDL Boundary Test is used in the analysis to explore the long-term impact of Ukraine's GDP and GPR on Ukrainian tourism. ADF by Dickey and Fuller (1981), and Phillips Perron (PP) unit root tests by Phillips Perron (1988) are used to assess the degree of integration of the series. The existence of a long-run nexus among the series if the variables are equally stable I (1) or some of them are I (0), is investigated with the ARDL boundary test model by Pesaran *et al*. (2001). If the variables in the process have a long-run link, the error correction model is estimated in the following steps. This assessment helps to examine whether the short-term imbalance improves in the long-run and to determine long-run coefficients.

3.1. ARDL Cointegration Test

As the analysis method, the ARDL Limit Test Approach is preferred in the study. The existence of possible long-run relationships among series is determined by cointegration tests. However, as a constraint, most of the cointegration tests, such as Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988), and Johansen and Juselius (1990), require series to be combined in the same order. However, in the ARDL model, the series do not have to be integrated in the same order. In the ARDL method, it is sufficient that series are not combined of second order or more. In this context, determining the lag length to a high degree makes it difficult to explain the determination of a long-run link among series. According to the tests mentioned, the ARDL method has many advantages.

These advantages (Pesaran *et al*., 2001):
- It allows the series to have different lag lengths.

- It will provide some privileges such as the ability to estimate short- and long-term parameters simultaneously.
- It is an effective estimator even if the selected sample is small or some independent variables are endogenous.
- Unlike the Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration method, the ARDL approach does not include pre-testing of variables used in the unit root test model.

The ARDL limit test is a three-step test. First, the existence of cointegration between variables is investigated. In the case of a cointegration between variables, the given conditions are supported for the second step. Then, long-run coefficients between the variables are determined. Finally, the short-run coefficients between variables are estimated, and the error correction model is computed using the optimal lag lengths measured (Narayan and Smyth, 2006). The three-variable model used in the first step of the ARDL limit test is adapted to our study below:

$$\Delta \ln TOUR_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{v} \beta_i \Delta \ln TOUR_{t-i} - \sum_{i=0}^{y} \alpha_i \Delta \ln GPR_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{z} \Omega_i \Delta \ln GDP_{t-i} + \delta_0 \ln TOUR_{t-1} - \delta_1 \ln GPR_{t-1} + \delta_2 \ln GDP_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

$$(2)$$

The terms "lnTOUR, lnGPR and lnGDP" in model (2) have already been described in Table 1. Also:

δ_0, δ_1 ve δ_2 are the coefficients for long-run relationships among series,

β_i, α_i ve Ω_i are the coefficients for short-run relationships among series,

Δ is the first-order difference symbol, indicating the terms which are in first differences,

β_0 is the constant term of the model,

ε_t is the white noise error term

v,y,z are the appropriate number of lags

First, Model (2) was estimated in order to evaluate the short- and long-run relationships among series using the ARDL estimator. Then, the hypotheses are formed to test possible cointegration in Model (2):

H_0: $\delta_0 = \delta_1 = \delta_2 = 0$ *(There is no cointegration between variables.)*

H_1: $\delta_0 \neq 0$, $\delta_1 \neq 0$ $\delta_2 \neq 0$ *(There is cointegration between variables.)*

In model (2), we investigated the existence of cointegration by the help of F statistics. The lower and upper limit values estimated by Pesaran *et al*. (2001) are compared with the F statistic value in the table. Pesaran *et al*. (2001)'s critical values table was formed with 20.000 and 40.000 replications for 500 and 1000 observations, respectively (Narayan, 2005). Narayan (2005) created a new table of lower and upper critical values for smaller samples, among 30-80 observations. Since the number of observations in this study is close to 30, the cointegration relationship between variables will be tested according to the critical values calculated by Narayan (2005). If the F statistic value is determined higher than the upper limit, H_1; If it is smaller than the lower limit, the H_0 hypothesis is accepted. In addition, no decision is made if the F statistic value is among the lower and upper limit. Finally, the error correction model is estimated by using the most appropriate lag lengths determined. In our study, results are shown at Table 8.

In this context, the error correction equation for the model we have established is as follows:

$$\Delta lnTOUR_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{v} \beta_i \Delta lnTOUR_{t-i} - \sum_{i=0}^{y} \alpha_i \Delta lnGPR_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{z} \Omega_i \Delta lnGDP_{t-i} + \Theta ECM_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

(3)

The terms β_i, α_i and Ω_i in model (3) represent the dynamic coefficients that bring the model into balance; the ECM term shows error correction term; the term Θ indicates the adjustment time that the model returns to its long-run equilibrium after a short-run shock. In this case, while the coefficient Θ should be negative, it should be considered that the coefficient should have a statistically significant probability value.

3.2. Empirical Findings

When dealing with non-stationary time series, Granger and Newbold (1974) discovered a spurious regression problem. Since there is no issue with the results obtained from stationary series, the use of non-stationary series can result in inaccurate and economically difficult-to-interpret results. As a result, before examining the presence of a nexus among variables in a regression analysis based on time series, it is important to investigate the time series properties of the variables used in the analysis. Dickey and Fuller (1979), Extended Dickey and Fuller (ADF) (1981), and Phillips-Perron (PP) (1988) tests are the most commonly used methods to test the stationary properties of series in practice. The ADF and PP unit root tests are used in this analysis to decide if the series is stationary or not, and the results are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. ADF and PP Unit Root Test Results

	ADF		PP	
Variables	With Constant	With Constant and Trend	With Constant	With Constant and Trend
lnGDP	-0.9213	-11.003	-10.746	-14.380
lnGPR	-19.426	-24.573	-19.426	-25.684
lnTOUR	-14.614	-11.760	-23.749	-11.760
ΔlnGDP	-34.981**	-35.438*	-34.745**	-35.065*
ΔlnGPR	-46.021***	-44.992***	-47.493***	-46.282***
ΔlnTOUR	-39.414***	-40.163**	-39.414***	-40.389**

Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0
Notes: MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. (*)Significant at 10%; (**)Significant at 5%; (***) Significant at 1%.

If the ADF and PP test statistics among the unit root tests are absolutely greater than the critical values, the H_0 hypothesis is rejected and it is decided that the series is stationary. In other words, it does not have a unit root. In the study, it is seen that lnGDP, lnGPR, and lnTOUR variables have unit roots at both fixed and trended level values. In their first difference, they are stationary at the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% in both fixed and trend models. ADF and PP unit root tests don't take into account structural breaks. It is possible that many structural changes will occur in the economy between 1995 and 2019, which are discussed in the study. Therefore, a possible structural break may affect the ADF and PP test results. In order to have information about these structural breaks, the graphical representation of the variables used is shown below:

Figure 1. Time paths of the variables (Logarithmic variables)

Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0

Because of the economic developments that may cause the structural break seen in the graphs of the variables above, the Zivot and Andrews unit root test is applied to all variables. Because the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test takes structural break into account, the result of this test is also taken into account, along with the ADF and PP tests. For the Zivot and Andrews tests, the null hypothesis states the existence of a unit root, that is, series are not stationary, and the alternative hypothesis states that there is no unit root, that is, series are stationary. If H_0 cannot be rejected as a result of the tests, the series is defined to be non-stationary, and the unit root analysis is continued by taking the difference between the series. Table 4 shows the test results:

Table 4. Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test

	Constant		1st Difference	
Variables	With constant	Break point	With constant	Break point
LGDP	-3.045249	2003	-5.009110***	2008
LGPR	-5.562168***	2013	-7.726387***	2014
LTOUR	-2.890882	2002	-5.032267***	2014

Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0
Notes: MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values (*)Significant at 10%; (**)Significant at 5%; (***) Significant at 1%

When Zivot and Andrews (1992) are examined with regard to the level values of series with the structural break, it is seen that the t-statistics value of the lnGDP and lnTOUR, except for the lnGPR, is less than the critical values. This situation leads to the acceptance of the zero-hypothesis indicating that a series contains a unit root, against the alternative hypothesis that series are stationary. This result does not change the conclusion that these series include unit roots, except for lnGPR, although there are structural breaks. Therefore, the lnGPR variable is stationary at the level I (0), while the other variables are stationary when their first differences are taken at I (1). When the first differences between all variables are taken, variables are found to be stationary as a result of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test. Where the outcomes of the standard unit root tests and Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root tests are compared, only the stationarity of the lnGPR variable is altered, while other variables are shown to be stationary at different levels. As a result, the fact that variables are stationary at different levels causes the ARDL limit test approach to be applied in our study to test whether there is cointegration between the variables.

In this analysis, the maximum lag length is 2 for the margin test, and the acceptable lag length is 2 based on AIC criteria. No autocorrelation problems are found in the selected lag length. After determining the number of lags, the cointegration relationship among series is examined using boundary checking. Table 5 shows the impact of the bounds testing performed to assess the long-term nexus between variables in the context of the model (4).

**Table 5. Bounds Testing Upper and Lower Critical Values**

	10% Significance Level		5% Significance Level		1% Significance Level	
	I(0)	I(1)	I(0)	I(1)	I(0)	I(1)
K:2	3.437	4.470	4.267	5.473	6.183	7.873
N: 25						

Note: k is the number of independent variables in the model; N indicates the number of observations. Critical values in unrestricted intercept and no trend model are taken from Narayan (2005).
Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0

ARDL Bounds Testing finds an F-statistic of 8.116720. At the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, testing based on model (4) is found to be greater than the upper critical value shown in Table (6). Based on this finding, we should conclude that there is a cointegration link among variables.

When considering the series for analysis using the ARDL process, the first step is to choose a suitable model in the sense of appropriate lag lengths. The maximum lag length for the model (2) developed in the first phase of the ARDL bounds testing method should be determined. Given the study's small number of observations and annual results, the maximum lag length is observed to be 2.

Figure 2. The Best 18 Models for Model (2), according to Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)

Akaike Information Criteria

Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0

The most appropriate lag length for Model (2) is determined using Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). The situation in which the AIC values calculated for each lag order are the smallest and there is no autocorrelation in Figure 2 gives the appropriate lag length. When Figure 2 is investigated, the optimum model with the smallest lag value among the estimated models is found to be ARDL (1,0,0). In this context, Model (2) is adapted to the following Model (4) after determining the lags. Finally, this model is used as a basis in the analyses performed.

$$\Delta lnTOUR_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{1} \beta_i \Delta lnTOUR_{t-i} - \sum_{i=0}^{0} \alpha_i \Delta lnGPR_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{0} \Omega_i \Delta lnGDP_{t-i} + \delta_0 lnTOUR_{t-1} - \delta_1 lnGPR_{t-1} + \delta_2 lnGDP_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

(4)

Table 6. Model (4) Descriptive Statistics

R^2	0.729448
Adjusted R^2	0.684356
Autocorrelation (LM)	2.988054 (0.0790)
Heteroscedasticity (White)	10.65835 (0.2999)
Ramsey RESET Test	1.595856 (0.1289)
Normality (Jarque-Bera)	2.720863 (0.256550)

Note: Probability values of test results are showed in parenthesis.
Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0

When the model's diagnostic test results are tested, it is observed that there is no autocorrelation in the model based on the Breusch-Godfrey LM test results. The error term is usually distributed based on the Jarque-Bera test results. Based on the White test results, there is no variance issue, and the model is defined in the correct parameters based on the Ramsey Reset Test results. Therefore, these results support the notion that the estimation results obtained are reliable.

Table 5 shows that there is a cointegration nexus between variables. The ARDL model, which was formed to determine the long-term nexus among variables, has been adapted to the study in the following ways:

$$\Delta lnTOUR_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{1} \beta_i \Delta lnTOUR_{t-i} - \sum_{i=0}^{0} \alpha_i \Delta lnGPR_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{0} \Omega_i \Delta lnGDP_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t$$

(5)

Table 7 presents the long-run coefficients as well as the diagnostic test results:

Table 7. Long-term Coefficients and the Model

Dependent Variable: ΔlnTOUR

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
ΔlnTOUR (-1)	0.150169	0.113822	1.319326	0.2036
ΔlnGPR	-0.292691	0.110190	-2.656236	0.0161
ΔlnGDP	3.569320	0.664887	5.368309	0.0000
C	0.005045	0.043235	0.116687	0.9084
R-squared	0.729448	Mean dependent var		0.073741
Adjusted R-squared	0.684356	S.D. dependent var		0.336821
S.E. of regression	0.189233	Akaike info criterion		-0.328708
Sum squared resid	0.644565	Schwarz criterion		-0.130337
Log likelihood	7.615788	Hannan-Quinn criter.		-0.281978
F-statistic	16.17691	Durbin-Watson stat		2.527042
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000024			

Long Run Coefficients				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
ΔlnGPR	-0.344411	0.144613	-2.381604	0.0285
ΔlnGDP	4.200033	0.852240	4.928229	0.0001
C	0.005936	0.050719	0.117047	0.9081

Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0

According to the outcomes in Table 7, the coefficients of the lnGDP and lnTOUR variables are statistically relevant in the long term. In other words, a 1% increase in LnGRP reduces tourism by 0.34%, whereas a 1% increase in LnGDP increases tourism by 4.2%. According the results of the analysis, we can say that geopolitical risks have a crucial impact on tourism for Ukraine. Economic growth is also very important for attracting investments to the tourism sector.

Finally, CUSUM and CUSUM square graphics revealed by Brown *et al*. (1975) are seen in Figure 3 to measure the stability of the long-term coefficients of ARDL and to decide if the error terms in the model are stable over the relevant period.

Figure 3. Cusum Test

Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0

Figure 4. Cusum Square Test

Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0

The fact that CUSUM and CUSUM2 test statistics are within the 5% critical value range indicates that, in the long term, the coefficients are stable and there is no break in the model.

Model (3) is adapted to Model (6) by adding lags for error correction model based on ARDL approach in order to investigate short-term nexus among variables:

$$\Delta lnTOUR_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{1} \beta_i \Delta lnTOUR_{t-i} - \sum_{i=0}^{0} \alpha_i \Delta lnGPR_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{0} \Omega_i \Delta lnGDP_{t-i} + \Theta ECM_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \quad \dots (6)$$

The ECM_{t-1} variable in the model (6) is a lag one period of the error term series obtained from the long-term nexus. The coefficient of this variable shows how much of the deviations from short-run equilibrium will be corrected in the long run. This coefficient is expected to be statistically significant and have a negative sign. In this study, what is achieved in the long-term analysis is replicated in the short-term. First of all, the lag length is determined as 2, and no autocorrelation problem is encountered at this selected lag length. The ARDL (1, 0, 0) model is the model to be investigated in the study of the short-run relationship as part of the selected lag length.

Table 8 displays the estimation results of this model:

Table 8. ARDL-ECM Cointegration Test Results

Cointegrating Form				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
D(ΔlnGPR)	-0.292691	0.110190	-2.656236	0.0161
D(ΔlnGDP)	3.569320	0.664887	5.368309	0.0000
CointEq(-1)	-0.849831	0.113822	-7.466306	0.0000
Cointeq = ΔlnTOUR - (-0.3444*ΔlnGPR + 4.2000* ΔlnGDP + 0.0059)				

Source: Researchers' computation using E-views 10.0

The signs of the variables give the expected results to endorse the long-run coefficient signs, according to the results in Table 8. Furthermore, the coefficient of error correction term (ECMt-1) is found to be -0,849831. The sign of the error correction word is statistically significant and negative, as predicted. As a result, in the following period, 84 percent of the short-term deviation is corrected. In other words, the long-term balance is quickly restored. This result can be interpreted as the effect of geopolitical risk and economic growth on the tourism sector in Ukraine disappears in the short term, and this effect continues in the long term. In this case, we can say that it supports the long-term analysis results in Table 7.

Conclusion and discussion

In the study, the long-term effect of Ukraine's GDP and geopolitical risk index on Ukrainian tourism was investigated using the ARDL Boundary Test for the period of 1995–2019. Our findings support the initial hypothesis that there is a nexus among indicators of economic growth, tourism, and the GPR index. This gives grounds for the assertion that reducing the level of risk to a minimum will increase the attractiveness of Ukraine as a tourist destination, thereby creating new opportunities for economic growth and social development.

The tourism sector is closely related to many factors, such as technological development, economic structure, and political conditions. In this study, we examined the political and economic interaction of tourism in Ukraine. Empirical findings suggest that geopolitical risk has a negative impact on tourism revenues. Ukraine is situated geographically between Russia and the European Union. This increases the geographical risk of the country. In particular, the annexation of Crimea by Russia has increased the tension between the two countries. Therefore, Ukraine should develop foreign policies that will increase its security. Establishing new economic cooperation between countries can reduce Ukraine's geopolitical risks. The most important limitation of the study is that it considers only geopolitical risks, which is one of the political risk factors in the study. For this reason, the effects of risk factors such as government stability, corruption, bribery, and ethnic and religious tension on tourism should be addressed in future studies.

According to the other findings of the study, we found that incentives in the tourism sector have the potential to support the economic growth of Ukraine. Therefore, policymakers should adopt a tourism promotion law to reflect the conditions of the day. It is also necessary to follow policies that will support the tourism sector in global competition. Ukraine has a large tourism potential with its coastal destinations near the Black Sea, historical places, and dark tourism areas such as Chernobyl. Thus, tourism revenues could be a crucial part of the Ukrainian GDP in the future.

Although the analysis carried out in the work confirms the existence of the link between the indicators of economic growth, tourism, and the GPR index, the problem of assessing the influence of other factors on the analyzed indicators has not been solved. For example, not too much research has been conducted on the effect of the global pandemic on tourism flows and economic activity in the tourism economics field. The pandemic has undeniably affected many industries. But the degree of this influence is different. And if tourism has suffered significant losses, then some industries, such as online streaming services, electronic payments, online communications, electricity, food, security, and household chemicals, were unaffected and even expanded. And pharmaceuticals and the

production of hygiene products and medical equipment received super-profits amid the pandemic. Therefore, it is important not only to take the risk into account but also to look for new opportunities even in difficult conditions.

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
Appendix 1

Figure. A1. Terminological map of publications by keywords*: tourism; economic growth; developing countries,* **493 articles**


Figure. A2. Terminological map of publications by keywords*: tourism; economic growth; developed countries,* **280 articles**

Figure. A3. Terminological map of publications by keywords: *tourism; economic growth; risks,* **241 articles**

Figure. A4. Terminological map of publications by keywords: Ukraine; *tourism,* **203 articles**

Figure. A5. Terminological map of publications by keywords: Ukraine; *economic growth*, 652 articles